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f - . V 




THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



WITH NATURE 



Neqne bsec omnia, quae diximus, et alia hujus generis, similitudines mera? 
aunt (qualca hominibus fortasse parum perspicacibus videri possint) sed 
plane una eademquc Natura; vestigia ant signacula, diversis materiis et sub- 
jects iinpressa. — Bacon, De Augm. Scient. Lib. iii. c. 1. 

Neither are all these things, and others of the same kind, mere resemblances 
(as may haply be thought by superficial observers): they are manifestly the 
footsteps of Nature, or seals impressed by Her, stamping with an unity of 
character things the most varied. 



THE 

ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 
WITH NATURE 

BY THE 

REV. Jf H. L. GABELL, M.A. 

' l! 

FORMERLY OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD. 




LONDON 

WILLIAM PICKERING 



MDCCCXLII 



* VST 3 



C. WI1ITTINGIIAM, TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE. 



PREFACE. 



T HAVE ventured in the following pages 
to treat of a subject on which Bp. Butler 
has preceded me. Some apology is neces- 
sary for so doing. I may be permitted, 
therefore, to observe, that I was not induced 
to make the attempt, because I undervalued 
that admirable author. On the contrary, 
a conviction of his extraordinary merit has 
been at once my strongest motive, and my 
greatest discouragement, in the prosecution 
of the task : — my strongest motive, because 
I have been taught by him, that the Argu- 
ment from Analogy is, when properly ap- 
plied, altogether unanswerable ; my greatest 
discouragement, because I might be thought 
to invite a comparison with him in the exe- 
cution of the work, which is what I have of 
all things most reason to dread. But I 
nevertheless thought, that the Argument 
was capable of a more extended and syste- 



vi PREFACE. 

matic application, than he has made of it ; 
that by introducing analogies drawn from 
the inanimate world, and from the pheno- 
mena of mind, the argument became more 
striking in itself ; and that some readers 
might be thus allured to an examination of 
the subject, as mere matter of intellectual 
curiosity. And, again, Butler has omitted 
to take notice of some analogies in that de- 
partment of the subject of which he treats, 
which appear to me to be as convincing as 
any ; such as those applicable to the subject 
of Prayer, to the observance of arbitrary in- 
stitutions, or ceremonies, and several others. 
But it also seemed to me, that even those 
parts of the subject which Butler has treated, 
might possibly be made accessible to a 
larger class of readers, to whom his style 
is repulsive, as it is confessedly obscure and 
difficult. The reader will see, that Part 
III. is in great measure taken from Butler, 
as any such argument must be. The Essay 
would have been incomplete without it, or 
rather, the strongest portion would have 
been wanting;. 

The greater part of this book consists of 



PREFACE. vii 

well known facts, in the Philosophy of Mind 
and of Matter, or in the common course of 
Nature : but I am not aware, that (excepting 
what I have taken from Butler) they have 
been systematically applied to the answering 
of objections against Religion and its Evi- 
dences. I have often drawn from Berkeley, 
Tucker, Reid, Stewart, and Brown, and 
sometimes from others: indeed, wherever I 
could meet with a thought or an expression 
adapted to my purpose, I have taken it. 
But I have not filled the pages with refer- 
ences, both because I think this general ac- 
knowledgment sufficient, and because many 
of the thoughts had been collected in a 
commonplace-book, long before I had any 
idea of laying them before the public : and 
I seldom knew myself to what author they 
belonged, nor even very often what was my 
own. And, again, if I had given references 
in some instances, and not in all, I should 
have seemed to be laying claim to all that 
was not thus allotted to its proper owner. 

The arrangement of the book will perhaps 
be thought faulty, because the religious doc- 
trines, which are illustrated or defended, in 



Vlll PREFACE. 

many cases do not succeed one another in 
a connected series. If, however, they had 
so succeeded one another, much repetition 
orconstant references to other chapters would 
have been necessary, because it often hap- 
pens, that several of these doctrines are il- 
lustrated by some one Natural Principle. 
Repetition was out of the question : and few 
readers would have been at the trouble of 
turning back to what was no longer fresh in 
their recollection. In the Conclusion I 
have attempted to obviate this objection by 
putting the argument into a more connected 
form. 

Clifton, near Bristol. 
May, 1841. 




CONTENTS. 

Page 



Introduction 1 

PART I. 

The Uniformity of Nature 5 

1 . In her mutual Resemblances 7 

2. In her mutual Adaptations 16 

3. In the Permanence of her Laws 21 

The Argument from Analogy 25 

PART II. 

The Accordance of Religion with our mental, Con- 
stitution 35 

Chap. 

I. That the perception of every Phaenomenon sug- 

gests to us the Notion of a Cause 37 

II. That all Change suggests to us the Agency of 

Mind as its ultimate Cause 43 

III. That from Design in the Effect we infer a de- 

signing Cause 49 

IV. That our Minds are not necessarily connected 

with our present Bodies 55 

V. That we have Freewill 75 

VI. That Belief depends partly on the Will 89 

VII. That we have a Prudential Regard for our own 

Happiness 93 

VIII. That Conscience is naturally supreme 100 



CONTENTS. 



Chap. Pnge 
IX. That Reverence and Love are naturally due to 
Power, Wisdom, Righteousness, and Good- 
ness 112 

X. That Belief is produced by human Testimony 

in respect to Matters of Fact 118 

XI. That Belief is produced by human Authority in 

respect to Matters of Opinion 126 

XII. That all our Speculative Knowledge is limited. 130 

XIII. That Knowledge increases our Speculative Diffi- 

culties 141 

PART III. 

e Accordance of Religion with ouk Moral Con- 
dition 146 

I. That we are subject to a Moral Government.. 150 

I I . That we transgress the Laws of this Govern- 

ment 154 

III. That we are accountable for our Actions 158 

IV. That our Happiness depends much on our- 

selves 162 

1. On our Exertions 166 

2. On our Habits 169 

3. On the Supremacy of our Moral Faculties. 175 

4. Onaprudential Regard to ourown Welfare. 182 

5. On our Religion 183 

6. On our Knowledge 186 

7. On our Opinions 189 

8. On our Belief 191 

9. On our Observance of arbitrarylnstitutions. 194 

V. That our Happiness depends partly on others. 202 
VI. That our Happiness depends partly on ex- 
ternal Circumstances 205 

VII. That Punishment is sometimes averted 207 



CONTENTS. XI 

CjIAP. Page 

1 . By Supplication 207 

2. By Repentance and Reformation 209 

3. By the vicarious Atonement of others . .. 209 
VIII. That Benefits are obtained by Supplication . . 218 

IX. That Excellence is best attained by aiming at 

Perfection 221 

X. That we must often act on probable Evidence. 224 

XI. That speculative Knowledge is not necessary 

for practical Purposes 226 

XII. That our Knowledge is not always in propor- 

tion to its utility 230 

XIII. That Good is distributed among us unequally. 233 

XIV. That the Reception of Truth is often retarded 

by Prejudice 236 

PART IV. 

e Accordance of Religion with the general 
Constitution of Nature 239 

I. That Means are used to efTect Ends 243 

II. That these Means are apparently circuitous.... 248 

III. That they are often apparently inadequate.. .. 252 

IV. That their real and their apparent Tendencies 

are often directly opposite to each other . . . 256 
V. That in the best Things there is a mixture of 

Evil 265 

VI. That many Things do not fulfil the apparent 

purpose of their being 268 

VII. That animated Beings every where abound in 

Nature, as far as our experience reaches . . 271 
VIII. That a Principle of Gradation prevails in Na- 
ture 273 

IX. That a Principle of Progression prevails in 

Nature 279 



xii CONTENTS. 

Chap. Page 
X. That the usual Course of Nature is sometimes 

interrupted 298 

XI. That the Deity constantly superintends the 

Universe 303 

XII. That many Capacities and Powers are deve- 

loped solely by Habit 306 

XIII. That all natural Tendencies fulfil useful Pur- 
poses, and have corresponding; real Objects. 323 

Conclusion 337 




INTRODUCTION. 



HE objections which have been made to 



JL Religion, Natural and Revealed, are all 
to be ultimately resolved into its alleged im- 
probability. Either its doctrines are said to 
be in themselves incredible, that is, not likely 
to be true; or (allowing their credibility, if 
supported by sufficient evidence) the actual 
evidence is said not to be sufficient to render 
them credible, that is, likely to be true. 

By objections of the first class, then, it is 
asserted, that the doctrines of Religion are 
such, that we, arguing from the principles of 
reason, cannot believe them to emanate from 
the Deity. 

JNow, any opinion which we can form on 
this matter, must, of course, be derived from 
what we know of the Deity ; and all such 
knowledge must be collected from what we 
can see of the present constitution of Nature. 
All the operations of Nature are conducted 
according to certain general principles or laws, 
which are to be ascertained by an induction of 
facts. Now it will be found, that almost all 




B 



2 



INTRODUCTION. 



the truths of Religion (probably all) may be 
classed under some one or more of these gene- 
ral principles ; and that the general principles 
contain those very particulars which are ob- 
jected to in Religion as incredible. In other 
words, it will be found, that the objections ad- 
vanced against the religious doctrines are 
equally applicable to these Natural principles, 
and, of course, to those undisputed and indis- 
putable facts in Nature, from which the prin- 
ciples are deduced. If the objections, there- 
fore, are really equally applicable in both 
cases, they cannot be truly applicable in either: 
they cannot disprove the truth of Religion, 
unless they can also disprove the reality of the 
works of Nature. 

I beg the reader to observe, that throughout 
this Essay, I mean by the Constitution of 
Nature, that of the Universe, both material 
and moral, including in the latter things some- 
times considered as artificial, such as the con- 
stitution of society civil and domestic ; — in 
short, whatever exists by the appointment of 
the Governor of the world. Perhaps it is 
hardly necessary to add, that, wherever Nature 
is spoken of as an operating active power, the 
Great Author of Nature is always intended. 
The Natural Principles, or Laws, are classed 
under three heads — those of our mental con- 
stitution — those of our moral condition — and 



INTRODUCTION. 



3 



those common to the whole constitution of 
Nature. From this classification, it would seem 
at first sight, that, since some of the Principles 
are more general than others, the less general 
are only partially observed in Nature ; that ex- 
ceptions to them do exist, and that, therefore, 
the case of Religion may be one of those excep- 
tions. They are, however, all equally univer- 
sal, that is, as far as their very nature admits 
of their being so. For instance, that law of our 
mental constitution, by which the perception 
of every phenomenon suggests to us the belief 
of a cause, does not extend to the material 
world. But this is only because it is not in the 
nature of matter to perceive at all. To say, 
therefore, that this law does not extend to 
matter, is only to say, that matter is not some- 
thing else than what it is : and this is surely 
no proof that the Law is not universal. And 
so of the rest : they are all universal : they 
extend through all the works of the Deity, as 
far as we are acquainted with them. 

The whole strength of the argument from 
Analogy is grounded on the strict uniformity 
pervading all Nature. But, as it may not be 
obvious to those who have never considered 
such subjects, either that the Deity does thus 
act with strict uniformity throughout all His 
works, as far as we are acquainted with them ; 
or that, even allowing this, there may be any 



4 



INTRODUCTION. 



reason to infer, that He will act on the same 
plan in other and untried circumstances ; I 
have, in the First Part, briefly mentioned some 
of the more obvious proofs of this Uniformity ; 
and I have then stated the Argument from 
Analogy, in which some reasons are offered 
for inducing us to think, that we may probably 
be governed in a future life on the same ge- 
neral principles, on which this world is now 
governed. 

With regard to the second class of objec- 
tions (those made to the Evidences of Revela- 
tion) they must rest on the ground, that the 
evidences are not such as to induce reasonable 
men to act upon them. Now, if it can be 
shewn, that the believer in Revelation is guided 
by the same principles of belief, which all 
mankind, both believers and sceptics, recog- 
nize and acknowledge and act upon, under 
similar circumstances, in the daily conduct of 
life ; this will shew, that the Evidences are 
good and sufficient, and the objections to them 
unsound. This is to be shewn by an appeal 
to those Laws of our mental constitution, by 
which we are constantly guided in believing 
or disbelieving either speculative truth and 
falsehood, or the common occurrences of life. 
And I have accordingly endeavoured to shew, 
that we are really guided by the same princi- 
ples in both cases. 




PART I. 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 
HOEVER believes that the universe 



* t has been brought into existence by an 
Allwise Creator, must naturally expect to find, 
that it has been framed according to some 
scheme or plan ; and that this plan is an 
uniform or consistent one, of which the several 
parts are in harmony with each other. This 
is indeed no more than we require in a picture 
or a poem, put together by a human artist. 
Accordingly such an Uniformity or Unity of 
character is really found to prevail throughout 
Nature in a very remarkable manner. Many 
apparent anomalies no doubt there are, and 
always will be, as long as our knowledge of 
Nature remains imperfect. Still we can un- 
derstand enough of her to be convinced that 
there is such a plan ; and every increase of 
our knowledge shews us, that it prevails, 
where it was unseen before, often where it 
was least expected. It is to be traced equally 
in the material and the moral worlds ; equally 
whether we consider these two great depart- 




6 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



ments as distinct and separate, or as related to 
one another. 

If, in examining any system or scheme of 
things, we found in it many striking resem- 
blances, even in those parts which least re- 
sembled each other; if we also found that the 
several parts were all, as far as we could un- 
derstand them, exactly adapted to one another; 
and if, lastly, we found that the laws, by which 
this system was governed, appeared to be per- 
fectly stable and permanent : if all this was 
found to be the case, such a scheme of things 
would, I think, be considered to be generally 
uniform, and of a piece : it would be thought 
to be stamped with the hand of one consistent 
Artificer. Nor would the inference be shaken, 
because some parts of this scheme were be- 
yond the comprehension of the observer ; more 
especially if it had been always found, that, in 
proportion as it had become better understood, 
fresh proofs of uniformity had been mani- 
fested, and apparent anomalies had constantly 
disappeared ; but that no one real inconsist- 
ency had ever been proved. 

Let us then examine Nature in this point of 
view, by considering, I. The mutual resem- 
blances both of structure and of the laws by 
which she is governed ; II. The mutual adap- 
tations of her different parts ; III. The perma- 
nence of her laws. 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



7 



I. Many of the mutual resemblances of 
Nature are open to the observation of the most 
careless spectator, though, from the very fact 
of their being always before his eyes, he may 
never have considered them in the light of re- 
semblances. Thus animals of the same species 
all resemble each other in innumerable parti- 
culars ; and the same is the case with vege- 
tables and minerals. All the several species 
have, again, many common points of resem- 
blance : so have different genera, orders, and 
classes. Some of them are sufficiently obvious, 
as for instance that all animals have powers of 
spontaneous motion, and organs for the recep- 
tion of food : others less obvious, as that all 
vertebrated animals have a brain, that their 
skeletons are all built after the same general 
plan. 

Many of these resemblances are only brought 
to light by the researches of science. Very 
curious ones are to be found in Geometry, such 
as, that the three angles of any triangle are 
together equal to two right angles, that is, re- 
semble them in quantity ; that in all right- 
angled triangles the square of the greater side 
is equal to the squares of the remaining sides 
added together. Geometry is full of such re- 
semblances : indeed geometrical thorems con- 
sist of nothing but proofs of them. Algebra 
is a method of calculating all sorts of quantities 



8 



THE UNIFORMITY OK 



NATUUL. 



by means of general characters : and the pos- 
sibility of doing this proves, of course, points 
of resemblance existing between number and 
magnitude ; and Algebraic equations are 
nothing but the expressions of these. Resem- 
blances exist between the processes of respira- 
tion and combustion ; between magnetism and 
electricity; between animals and vegetables in 
the sexual system. Curious analogies are to 
be traced between the phenomena, of light, of 
heat, and of sound : and these again are all 
reflected according to the same laws by which 
elastic balls rebound from surfaces. There is 
a spot in the retina of the eye, which is insen- 
sible to the action of light, so that an object 
placed before it in a particular direction can- 
not be seen, if the other eye is closed. So 
there is also some pitch of sound, varying with 
different persons, to which every ear is insen- 
sible, though sounds either graver or more 
acute can be distinctly heard : so that some 
men have never heard the chirping of a grass- 
hopper, others that of a sparrow : while others 
are unable to hear very grave sounds, f 

Again, two strong lights may be so placed 
as to produce a spot of darkness either on the 
eye or on a sheet of paper. Two musical 
strings may be made to vibrate in such a 



f Brewster's Natural Magic, p. 232. 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



manner, as that their sounds shall at certain 
intervals destroy one another, and produce 
moments of absolute silence. ij: 

If the eye is fixed on a spot of red, and then 
turned to a white surface, it will immediately 
see a spot of green, the complemental colour 
of red (or that formed by a mixture of the two 
other primary colours, blue and yellow) all 
together making up the harmonious triad, or 
concord. And so with any other given colour. 
A similar thing happens in music. When any 
given note is sounded on an instrument, it is 
instantly followed by those which form a chord 
and are called the harmonics. These resem- 
blances are particularly striking, because we 
cannot perceive the purpose of them ; and 
therefore it appears to our ignorance as if they 
had been contrived merely with the view of 
preserving analogies unbroken. And this last 
observation is particularly illustrated by what 
physiologists call rudimental organs. Not 
only do all organs and their functions exist in 
all different degrees of development and per- 
fection in different kinds of animals ; but in 
some are to be found merely the rudiments of 
an organ, without its appropriate function. 
Feet are found beneath the skin of the ser- 
pent, useless in all appearance to the animal ; 



I Brewster's Natural Magic, p. 196. 



10 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



but they keep up the analogy with quad- 
rupeds. And there are many similar in- 
stances. 

And yet a very small portion of these re- 
semblances has been discovered by man ; as 
we may learn from the ditficulties encountered 
in the most skilful attempts to form any 
Natural systems of Classification for the seve- 
ral objects of Nature. Resemblances more or 
less numerous must be embraced in every 
classification, whether Natural or Artificial ; 
as every attempt to form such classification 
must be founded on a conviction of their 
reality. Linnaeus constructed his system on a 
comparatively small number of resemblances 
arbitrarily selected. It is the object of a 
Natural System, to classify objects according 
to all the resemblances or affinities, which 
permanently exist between them ; not alone 
the resemblances of external character, but 
also those of their habits, properties, organiza- 
tion, and functions. Its several divisions into 
species, genera, orders, classes, or any other 
denominations, have no other foundation than 
this of resemblance. It is a proof of the num- 
ber and wonderful variety of these resem- 
blances, that naturalists have found it impos- 
sible to express them by names or definitions ; 
but are obliged to have recourse to the method 
of types, or examples eminently possessing the 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



11 



characters of the several groups. It is a proof 
of the systematic order which regulates all 
this variety in Nature, that a Natural Classi- 
fication may be formed on a consideration of 
any one class of these resemblances, inde- 
pendently of the rest : we may be guided 
equally by resemblances of external character, 
or of habit, or of properties, or of organization, 
or of function. For, whichever of these we 
follow out, the resulting Classification will be 
the same : so that all Natural Systems may be 
tested by this maxim, " that an arrangement 
obtained from one set of characters, shall coin- 
cide with an arrangement obtained from an- 
other set."t 

Such systems, then, must be pregnant with 
proofs, not merely of Resemblances here and 
there occurring, and which can, therefore, be 
thought to be casual ; but of a systematic plan, 
arranged with the most exquisite order and 
unity of design, combined with infinite variety. 
Being devised too by men of science, for sci- 
entific purposes, the systems cannot be vague 
or indefinite ; and must, therefore, be founded 
on Resemblances precise and well defined. 

In the moral world the same Uniformity 
prevails. Animals of the same species are 
endowed with the same instincts. Human 



t Whewell's Philos. of Induct. Science, vol. i. p. 521. 



12 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



beings have all similar mental powers, as those 
of Memory, Belief, the five senses : and their 
minds are subject to the same general laws, as 
those of Association, of Attention, of Memory. 
Even the disputes about Freewill imply the 
reality of such laws : for none ever thought of 
maintaining that some men's minds naturally 
acted by freewill, and others by necessity. 
Whichever is the fact, both parties admit, that 
that fact depends on some fixed principle, ap- 
plicable alike to all mankind. The rise and 
fall of empires depend on regular and uniform 
laws, however difficult these may be of inves- 
tigation : else no man would have troubled 
himself to search them out. There are many 
laws so extensive in their operation as to be 
applicable equally to the material and to the 
moral creation : such is the axiom, that things 
which are equal to the same, are equal to each 
other ; which is equally indispensable to the 
truth of a mathematical theorem, and of a syl- 
logism in Logic ; and shews, therefore, a re- 
semblance even between physical quantity and 
moral truth. All the General Principles stated 
in Part IV. of this Essay, are instances of 
Laws applicable alike to the moral and the 
material worlds. 

Whatever things are called by the same 
name, resemble one another more or less ; and, 
therefore, we have a short but decisive proof 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



13 



of the vast number of these resemblances, in 
the use of General Terms among mankind. 
General Terms express nothing but the Re- 
semblances which exist between the various 
objects of our knowledge. The most general, 
such as Being, Substance, Quality, express 
points of agreement existing between all the 
works of Nature without exception. The terms 
Matter and Spirit imply points of similarity, 
such as Penetrability and Impenetrability, 
between most comprehensive classes of beings. 
And the less general the term becomes, the 
more numerous are the points of resemblance : 
animals resemble one another in many parti- 
culars, quadrupeds in more, dogs and horses 
in still more. 

It is the same with the names of Qualities, 
as Hardness, Fluidity, Colour ; with those of 
Functions, as Digestion, Respiration : in these 
and in numberless others, millions of differ- 
ent beings resemble one another. 

And, so again, Laws of Motion, of Crystal- 
lization, of Definite Proportions, express by 
their very terms, that they are uniform ; " they 
express what will happen in certain general 
contingencies." 

There is, indeed, no object of our know- 
ledge which may not be brought under some 
general term : and these make up so great a 
part of language, that many books contain not 



14 THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 

a single word which is not a general one : and 
of these, every one expresses always some re- 
semblances, often a vast number : an evident 
proof how universally they prevail in Nature. 

But these Resemblances are not confined 
to our own earth. We can trace some of them 
to the most distant parts of the Universe. The 
planets have all, like our own earth, their 
poles and permanent axes of rotation. They 
are subject, like her, to the laws of Light, to 
the periodical division of their time into days 
and years. What are called the Fixed Stars 
are most of them too distant for us to ascer- 
tain whether they resemble our own system, 
in these particulars or not : but in other par- 
ticulars, which we can ascertain, they do re- 
semble it. Absolutely infinite as they are to 
our comprehension, not one has been found 
which is not globular, like the planets and the 
earth. They are all subject to the Laws of 
Light. Some of them at least obey the Laws 
of Gravitation. Whether they all do so, we 
are at present ignorant, since their splendour* 
conceals their satellites (if they have any) 
from our sight. But it is known, that between 
thirty and forty Binary Stars revolve about 
each other in elliptical orbits like those of the 



* It is calculated that the light of Sirius (the nearest of 
them) is at least double that of the sun. 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



15 



planets ; and that the Law of their velocities 
is also the same. In one hundred and four of 
these Binary systems, the two stars exhibit the 
complemental colours ;| and thirteen Period- 
ical Stars, by appearing and disappearing at 
regular intervals, lead to the belief of their 
obeying the same universal Law of Gravita- 
tion.! All the Heavenly bodies, too, (inclu- 
ding the Nebulae §) revolve in one uniform 
direction. The analogies extend, too, from the 
largest masses to the minutest particles : as 
the Heavenly bodies are all globular, so are 
the ultimate particles of matter on our earth : 
as those worlds have their opposite poles, so 
have these little particles: and both equally 
obey the Laws of Gravitation. 

We are impressed with the Uniformity of 
Nature, when, within the circuit of our own 
globe, we ascertain that the same Law, which 
we had first observed acting upon a very small 
scale, holds good equally upon the largest; 
when we find that that Law of atmospheric 
pressure, by which a fly hangs suspended from 
a ceiling, enables the walrus to scale an ice- 
berg ; that those Laws of chemistry, which 



t Nichols' Architecture of the Heavens, p. 92. 
X Ibid. p. 92. 

§ Some of these are clusters of innumerable stars, so distant 
as to appear only like mist, others seem to consist only of a 
hazy scattered light. 



16 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



were first developed in the laboratory, produce 
the thunderstorm and the earthquake. But 
how greatly is that conviction strengthened, 
when we find that such analogies extend to 
the Heavenly bodies. Yet so it is : 

" That very Law, which moulds a tear, 
And bids it trickle from its source, 

That Law preserves the earth a sphere, 
And guides the planets in their course." 

II. The mutual adaptations of Nature are to 
be considered. And these too are to be found 
equally in the material universe and the 
moral world, taken separately, and in the two 
considered in relation to each other. 

1. Vegetables are fitted to afford nourish- 
ment to animals, animals to be nourished by 
vegetables. The atmosphere is adapted to 
supply breath and nourishment to animals and 
plants : the whole economy of animals and 
plants is prepared for making use of these 
supplies. 

Instances of adaptation in the different parts 
of animals are innumerable. " If the viscera 
of an animal are so organized as only to be 
fitted for the digestion of recent flesh, it is also 
requisite that the jaws should be so constructed 
as to fit them for devouring prey : the claws 
must be constructed for seizing and tearing it 
to pieces; the teeth for cutting and dividing its 



TFIE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 17 



flesh ; the entire system of the limbs, or organs 
of motion, for pursuing and overtaking it ; and 
the organs of sense for discovering it at a dis- 
tance. Nature must also have endowed the 
brain of the animal with instincts sufficient for 
concealing itself, and for laying plans to catch 
its necessary victims." j" And so constant are 
these adaptations, that a skilful Comparative 
Anatomist is enabled, by examining almost 
any one bone of an unknown animal, to as- 
certain its whole general form and kind. 

The size and strength of all animals are 
carefully adapted to the power of Gravitation. 
Were man, formed as he is at present, placed 
on the surface of Jupiter, he would be instantly 
crushed beneath his own weight. The same 
thing would happen, if an animal were placed 
upon earth many times exceeding the elephant 
in size, and formed of similar materials. Even 
far within these limits it would become so un- 
wieldy as to be quite unfit for motion. But 
these restrictions do not apply to animals 
inhabiting the water. Accordingly the whale 
is many times larger than the elephant. 

These adaptations too, are not confined to 
our own world : they give it a relation and a 
connection with the distant parts of the Uni- 
verse, uniting both as parts of one uniform 



t Cuvier. 
C 



18 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



system. The earth, and the other planets, and 
the satellites of each, and the sun, all have 
their respective magnitudes adapted to each 
other, and to the Law of Gravitation : so that 
it seems as if the very smallest deviation in 
any one from its present scale would throw the 
whole system into confusion. The adapta- 
tions extend to the Fixed Stars, as far as ive 
are able to ascertain, that is, to the Binary and 
Periodical Stars. The sun sends forth light 
and heat, and all the heavenly bodies supply 
light : our atmosphere is fitted for transmitting 
and modifying these, and the whole economy 
of plants and animals is formed to derive health 
and nourishment and enjoyment from them : 
while heat and light, again, would be unfit to 
perform these their destined offices, if they 
were not thus modified and prepared by their 
passage through the atmosphere. The adap- 
tation of the mechanism of the eye to the light 
of the Fixed Stars is by itself a sufficient 
proof, that the most distant parts of the 
Universe were created upon one uniform and 
consistent plan. 

2. In the moral world taken by itself, it is, I 
think, sufficient to consider how wonderfully 
all the natural powers of our minds, both intel- 
lectual and moral, are adapted, when properly 
regulated, to procure, at the same time, the 
happiness of society and of the individual. 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



19 



Perception, memory, reasoning, habit, the 
desire of knowledge, of society, of esteem, of 
power ; conscience, a regard for our own hap- 
piness ; all these are fitted to procure our own 
welfare and enjoyment. Society, on the other 
hand, is so constituted, that we can in no way 
so effectually promote the public good, as by 
acting up to our truest private interests. • In 
the same way, the instincts of the lower animals 
lead them to their good ; and among the social 
tribes, as the ant and the bee, these indivi- 
dual instincts equally promote the common 
welfare. 

3. To consider the physical and the moral 
worlds in relation to each other. All animals 
are swayed by a natural desire of satisfaction, 
and by fear of pain : but they and the exter- 
nal world are so constituted in relation to each 
other, that what is pleasing is naturally for 
their good, what is painful is also injurious. 
A natural affection for their offspring, while 
young, is implanted in them : their offspring- 
are so formed as to stand in need of their 
affection. Every animal has a natural desire 
for its proper kind of food ; and this food is 
always adapted for nourishing the animal. 
All animals have a pleasure in exercising their 
limbs ; while their bodies are formed to derive 
benefit from this exercise. In man these two 
desires conspire in urging him to cultivate the 



20 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



earth ; and the earth again is made fruitful of 
corn, and wine, and oil, to satisfy his desires 
and his wants. He has a desire of knowledge ; 
and the sources of knowledge are inexhaus- 
tible. His mind is formed to derive pleasure 
from the sublime and the beautiful and the 
wonderful : both his own globe and the far- 
thest parts of the Universe teem with beau- 
ties and with wonders, to answer to his love 
of them. His mind is constituted to perceive 
and to enjoy the sensation of light; and light 
is supplied by all the host of heaven. 

All the objects and events existing in 
Nature, which are more immediately related 
to each other, are related in one of two ways : 
either they exist together at the same time ; as 
in a storm there is the tossing of the sea, the 
roaring of the winds, the breaking of the 
waves, and their foam : or they exist in suc- 
cession ; as in the firing of a cannon, there is 
the application of the match, the explosion, 
the flight of the ball, the destruction caused 
by it. Now to this constitution of external 
Nature, the constitution of our minds is exactly 
adapted. The associations of our ideas follow 
these same two laws. If we have been accus- 
tomed to see any particular phenomena exist- 
ing together at the same time, the ideas of all 
these crowd into our minds at the same instant : 
tiie ideas of the tossing of the sea, of its roar- 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



'21 



ing, of its breaking, of its foaming, all exist 
together : we cannot separate them. On the 
other hand, if I think of a match applied to 
the touch-hole of a cannon, this idea suggests 
that of the explosion ; the explosion, that of 
the flight of the ball ; and the other ideas 
follow in the order of the actual phaenomena. 
The uses of such an arrangement are obvious, 
since these associations are absolutely neces- 
sary, not only for the acquisition of knowledge, 
but for our preservation. If the sight of fire 
or of poison did not suggest to us the idea of 
pain and death, we should be liable at all times 
to run into the one, and to swallow the other. 

One other adaptation is remarkable. We 
have all, even from our earliest infancy, a 
belief, that the course of Nature will continue 
to be uniform. The belief is founded upon 
no act of reasoning (for reasoning on the sub- 
ject would be vain) : but it exists, because it 
is absolutely necessary for our welfare. But 
in accordance with this our belief, the course 
of Nature is actually uniform. 

III. The Permanence of the Laws of Nature 
is the third sign of her uniformity. And of 
this Permanence we have, I think, all the evi- 
dence, both negative and positive, of which the 
subject admits. 

Nothing in the most ancient authors seems 
to imply, that the Laws of Nature have under- 



11 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



gone any change. If it were so, these authors 
would be so far unintelligible to us. On the 
contrary, nothing is related in the books of 
Moses as miraculous, which would not be 
equally miraculous in the present day ; nor is 
anything related as in the common course of 
Nature, which would not be so now. 

The mummies of Egypt demonstrate, that 
the stature of mankind, as well as their general 
structure, is the same now as it was three 
thousand years ago. Neither were the minds 
of men constructed differently then from what 
they are at present : for the most ancient 
authors reason on the same principles as we 
ourselves : what was good reasoning then, is 
so still ; and what was then bad, continues to 
be so. Nor is their moral nature deteriorated. 
In the words of Herschel, " The intellect of 
Newton, La Place, or La Grange, may stand 
in fair competition with that of Archimedes, 
Aristotle, or Plato ; and the virtues or pa- 
triotism of Washington with the brightest ex- 
amples of ancient history." 

The same thing is proved with regard to the 
size and make of the lower animals. The 
Egyptian mummies of birds and other animals 
shew, that the size and structure of these have 
undergone no change ; and wherever we meet 
with fossil remains of those species which still 
exist amongst us, we are taught the same les- 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



23 



son. And the most ancient of these remains 
prove to us, that all animals were constructed 
thousands of years ago on the same general 
principles of form, structure, and economy, 
after the same type, as the present races. 
And this is a most convincing proof, not merely 
of One superintending God, but that that God 
works through countless ages (for such are the 
periods contemplated by Geology) on a plan 
uniform and analogous to itself, even in the 
most minute details. Indeed, many naturalists 
are of opinion, that gaps existing in the 
Natural System of living animals, are filled up 
by fossil animals ; a fact, which goes to prove, 
not only that the Creator has wrought from 
the beginning on a system consistent and 
similar to itself, but that the plan of the whole 
is indeed one and the same. 

This permanence too extends to the distant 
parts of the Universe. The science of Astro- 
nomy has been reared on facts, many of which 
took place ages ago. If the Laws of the Uni- 
verse had undergone any the slightest change, 
no conclusions founded on these facts could be 
applicable to the actual order and phenomena 
of the heavenly bodies. But it is notorious, that 
the predictions of astronomers are every day 
fulfilled. Provision is made too in the Laws 
of Gravitation for future permanence as well 
as for actual stability ; since the very pertur- 



24 



THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE. 



bations of the Planetary System ultimately 
produce their own correction. 

However, there is little probability, that this 
stability of the Laws of Nature should ever be 
called in question : for, as was before observed, 
a belief in it is one of the original and intuitive 
principles of the human mind, not only in 
respect to the past, but equally as regards the 
future. The husbandman sows his seed in 
seed-time, in confidence that it will spring up 
and bear fruit, as it always has done. The 
physical enquirer investigates the laws of 
matter, and the metaphysician those of mind ; 
both of them relying on experiment, obser- 
vation, and reasoning, whose value itself de- 
pends entirely on the constant uniformity of 
these laws. And this affords a presumptive 
proof, that the Laws of Nature will also con- 
tinue to be in time to come, what they are at 
present — as long at least as man continues to 
think and to act here; since he will be unfit 
to do either, as soon as this is no longer the 
case. 



25 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 

If such Resemblances, such Adaptations, and 
such Permanent Laws thus uniformly prevail 
throughout the whole Universe, as far as we 
have any knowledge of it ; the general inference 
must, I think, be, that it is governed by a 
consistent and unchangeable Ruler ; and there- 
fore that in those parts of it, which are still 
unknown to us, the same uniformity may be 
expected to reign ~ As a traveller, who had 
visited some one province of an extensive 
monarchy, and had found that it was wisely 
and beneficently governed, might reasonably 
infer, that the other provinces of the same 
monarch were probably ruled on similar prin- 
ciples ; just so, if we can understand anything 
of the principles and laws on which things 
subjected to our observation are governed by 
the Deity, we may draw the same inference 
with regard to other parts not within our ex- 
perience. We are able to discover something 
of the spirit of these laws, and of the character 
of the Legislator ; and we may therefore with- 
out rashness form some opinion (more espe- 
cially if we have found Him to be perfectly 
consistent and unchangeable) whether any 
other laws asserted to be His, but not visibly 
operating here, are likely to be His or not. 



20 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 



It is well known, that the physical enquirer 
is best enabled to form probable conjectures 
with regard to unknown phaenomena by an 
extensive acquaintance with what has already 
been discovered. Hence the peculiar value 
attached to the conjectures of Newton. The 
mind of Newton was both deeply impressed 
with this " Consonance" t of Nature, and it 
was also full of those analogies, by which all 
rational conjecture must be guided ; and which 
constitute perhaps the most universal principle 
of Nature. 

But, independently of the general argument 
from Analogy, some more particular reasons 
may perhaps be found, to show a probability, 
that the constitution of other parts of the Uni- 
verse may be similar to that of our own planet, 
even as to some of its details. 

First, With regard to their physical condi- 
tion. It has been before observed, that the 
inhabitants of other planets are subject, like 
ourselves, to the laws of light and heat and 
gravitation. Now it is observed by Herschel,| 
that " the sun's rays are the ultimate source 
of almost every motion which takes place on 
the surface of the earth :" and gravitation ap- 



t " For Nature is very consonant and conformable to her- 
self." — 3\st Query at the end of Optics. 
X Astronomy, p. 211. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 



27 



pears to be the antagonist power, which is 
employed to restore the equilibrium. § It is an 
obvious conjecture from this remark, that a 
constant state of physical change must be 
another point of resemblance between other 
planets and our own, since they are thus sub- 
ject to the same causes productive of change 
as we ourselves. Their time is also, like ours, 
divided into day and night : we must, there- 
fore, conjecture, that their inhabitants are im- 
perfect beings, requiring intervals of rest, like 
ourselves : yet that they must occasionally be 
active during those intervals ; for, like us, they 
also have their moons. 

Secondly, If the Heavenly bodies are in- 
habited by sentient and rational creatures (of 
which there can be little doubt) it can scarcely 
be, that their ideas of truth, and their know- 
ledge, can be altogether different from our own 
in kind, however much they may differ in 
degree. For first, in respect of physical truth, 
some at least of the laws of Nature, as those 
of Gravity and of Light, and the vast circle of 
cosmical phenomena, must be open to the ob- 
servation of these beings, as they are to ours. 
We observe and reason upon the velocity, or 

§ Davy says, that " Gravitation is the first and most general 
cause of change in our terrestrial system : — the great antagonist 
power is heat." Surely heat should be mentioned as the cause 
first in order. 



28 THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 

the aberration, of light. But if we believe, 
that our ideas of these facts have any founda- 
tion in the reality of things; then must their 
ideas of them and our own so far agree. What 
these truths are to ourselves, they must be also 
to them. Secondly, as to moral truth. If 
they be moral creatures, they must have some 
idea of right and wrong, of virtue and of vice; 
probably some notion of a Deity, of His jus- 
tice, of His benevolence, of His wisdom, of 
His adaptation of means to ends, of His power. 
Their ideas of all these must again bear some 
resemblance to ours. If we are not entitled 
to argue thus, we are not entitled to argue at 
all about the Deity, or about His attributes. 
If our ideas of these attributes are something 
altogether different from the real attributes of 
God ; then we can mean nothing at all, when 
we say, that He is wise, or just, or good. Or 
if it can be supposed, that there may be other 
beings, to whom truth may be something else, 
of a nature absolutely different from what it 
is to us; there is an end of all reasoning on 
the subject; and neither Natural Religion nor 
Revelation can be either probable or impro- 
bable, rational or irrational. But if we are 
not to believe things at once so absurd and so 
shocking to our feelings — if we may believe, 
that truth and wisdom and virtue are some- 
thing more than the idle fancies of human 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 



29 



error ; then we may surely think it not incre- 
dible, that the inhabitants of other parts of 
the Universe may be rational and moral beings 
— rational and moral in the same sense, that we 
ourselves are so : that the Deity, therefore, 
exercises a Moral government throughout the 
Universe, as He does here. 

These, however, may be thought to be 
vague speculations, unsupported by sufficient 
evidence. Such, however, is not the case with 
the broad principle of Analogy. This has 
been confirmed by actual experience. Newton, 
from having observed " the Consonance of all 
Nature" within his experience, and arguing 
from Analogy, conjectured, that the whole Pla- 
netary System was probably obedient to the 
same laws as our own globe. f The progress 
of Astronomy was probably retarded for ages, 
because Aristotle had assumed a principle di- 
rectly the reverse of Newton's, — that the celes- 
tial motions were regulated by laws proper to 



t Bacon had very decidedly advanced the same opinion : — 
" Quicunque enim superlunarium et sublunarium conficta di- 
vortia contempserit, et materiae appetitus, et passiones maxime 
catholicas (quee in utroque g-lobo validae sunt, et universitatem 
rerum transverberant) bene perspexerit ; is ex illis, quae apud 
nos cernuntur, luculentam capiet de rebus ccelestibus informa- 
tionem ; et ab iis e contra, quae in coslo fiunt, haud pauca de 
motibus inferioribus, qui nunc latent, perdiscet ; non tantum 
quatenus hi ab illis regantur, sed quatenus habeant passiones 
communes." De Augm. Scient. L. iii. cap. iv. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 



themselves, and bearing no affinity to those 
which prevail on the earth. Newton was after- 
wards enabled to demonstrate the truth of his 
conjecture, by showing, that the laws of the 
Heavenly bodies are exactly what they must 
have been on his supposition. But, till he 
was able to do this, it was merely a conjec- 
ture ; and that conjecture was grounded solely 
on Analogy. 

Now the Argument may be applied to the 
case of Religion with three advantages which 
Newton had not. First, Newton had no pre- 
cedent to appeal to. The argument had never 
been successfully established in any similar 
case. We have the precedent of Newton : the 
Argument from Analogy, as applied to the 
material Universe, has been by him demon- 
strated, mathematically demonstrated, to have 
been a sound one. Secondly, the question of 
Religion, though it relates to mankind in 
another and a different state of being, yet it 
does relate to mankind : and it is yet more 
probable, that we ourselves shall be hereafter 
governed on the same principles as we are 
now, than that other beings, the inhabitants 
of different and distant parts of the Creation, 
such as Newton's argument applied to, should 
be so governed. Thirdly, Newton undertook 
to make out by positive proofs a case, for 
which he had no other evidence. But the case 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 



31 



of Religion demands only negative proof: it 
has its own independent external evidence, 
and requires only to have it shown, that its 
doctrines contain nothing contrary to the Ana- 
logy of other parts of Nature, and therefore 
nothing absurd. 

The discoveries then of Astronomy, the un- 
doubted certainty of which is proved even to 
the vulgar by the prediction of eclipses, de- 
monstrate, that there is a real Analogy between 
the things of this world and the rest of the 
material Universe. The discoveries of Geology 
demonstrate, that this Analogy has existed 
through periods of time surpassing the compre- 
hension of man : for not only are fossil animals 
constructed after the same general type as 
those now living, but we know that they had 
also similar relations to other parts of the Uni- 
verse. There is proof that their eyes were 
adapted to the light of the Heavenly bodies 
according to the same laws which still prevail. 
The whole Creation, therefore, both organic 
and inorganic, (as far as it is subjected to our 
observation,) is constituted and governed, and 
has been governed for countless ages, on one 
uniform plan. And if this is so, it cannot be 
absurd to suppose, that a similar Analogy may 
extend throughout the Moral creation ; that 
the Deity governs this too on an uniform sys- 
tem. We cannot comprehend the beauty and 



32 THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 

the regularity of this system : but that we 
might expect would be the case, since we can- 
not observe it from a proper point of view, so 
as to embrace the whole of it at once. We 
cannot discern with the eye the beauty and 
regularity of the Planetary System, in the 
midst of which we live — and for that very 
reason — we are too -near to it. Neither are we 
able to discover the real arrangement of the 
Stars, — because these again are at too great a 
distance. But we can see at a glance the 
order and regularity which govern the system 
of Jupiter and his satellites ; " a system offering 
a beautiful miniature of that greater one, of 
which it forms a part, and presenting to the eye 
of sense, at a single glance, that disposition of 
parts, which in the Planetary System is dis- 
cerned only by the eye of reason and imagina- 
tion.' "t Just so that unity of design, which 
we may be sure exists in the Moral creation, 
is hidden from our eyes ; and for the very 
same reason — we are placed in the midst of it ; 
too near to some parts to take in the general 
design ; too distant from others to have any 
view of them at all : separated, not merely 
(as in the case of the material Universe) by 
space, which the eye can in some measure 
traverse ; but cut off by the more impassable 



f Herschel. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 



33 



barrier of time, which conceals from us the 
past and the future almost equally. 



From the general consideration of the uni- 
formity of design, and the permanence of the 
Laws, by which the Universe is governed, we 
may draw some inferences with regard to Re- 
ligion. 

1. The great leading truth, which Religion 
inculcates, is this, that throughout the whole 
of our existence, wherever we are placed, we 
shall be subject, as we are here,* to God's moral 
government, that is, to one of rewards and 
punishments allotted to virtue and to vice. 

The uniformity and stability of Nature, 
must lead us by Analogy to expect the same 
thing. 

2. If such exquisite order prevail throughout 
the material Universe, we are led to suppose, 
that similar order would be found to pervade 
the Moral creation, if we could comprehend 
the whole of it : — that, as astronomers thought 
from an imperfect view of the Planetary 
system, that it contained within itself the 
elements of its own dissolution, but discovered 
on more perfect knowledge, that all such ten- 
dencies are really corrected by its own laws ; 



Part III. Chap. I. 
D 



34 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. 



so it may be probable, that provision is made 
for ultimately correcting the disorder of the 
Moral creation : that that moral government 
therefore, which seems to be imperfectly exe- 
cuted here, will in the end be carried out to 
perfection ; that is to say, that rewards and 
punishments will with perfect justice be al- 
lotted to virtue and to vice. 

3. If the whole scheme of Nature be one of 
General Laws, we might expect, that the 
scheme of Religion, if it proceed from the 
Author of Nature, would be so too. A Law of 
Nature is defined to be " a statement of what 
will happen in such and such general contin- 
gencies." Now Religion proclaims to man- 
kind in general, that if any man does well, 
happiness will ensue to him ; if he does ill, 
misery will follow. This is strictly a General 
Law ; and the whole scheme of Religion is 
built upon it. 

4. This universal prevalence of General 
Laws may well make us suspicious of any 
such doctrine as that of absolute Election and 
Reprobation, as maintained by Calvinists. For 
this doctrine represents the Almighty as de- 
parting from this His universally established 
method of governing by General Laws — as act- 
ing in His distribution of reward and punish- 
ment altogether arbitrarily and by caprice. 



PART II. 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION WITH 
OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 

" There is no need to depart from the received rules of rea- 
soning 1 to justify the belief of Christians." 

Berkeley's Minute Philosopher, Dial. vii. xviii. 

TF such Unity of design and such perfect 
harmony prevail throughout all Nature, 
(especially if they prevail in the Moral crea- 
tion) it follows of course, that Religion, if it 
proceeds from the Author of Nature, must be 
in perfect harmony with the Mental Constitu- 
tion of man, this being considered as a part of 
Nature. In some of the following chapters I 
have attempted to show, that this Accordance 
does in reality exist. 

But this method of arguing applies not 
only to the doctrines of Religion : it is equally 
applicable to its evidences. If Religion be 
true, then we are required to believe it. Now 
a consistent Creator cannot possibly be sup- 
posed to require us to believe either in these 
doctrines or in their evidences; and at the 
same time to have endowed us with "mental 
faculties, the very constitution of which should 



30 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



force us to disbelieve them ; as we must neces- 
sarily do, if the evidences are really bad and 
insufficient. Another portion therefore of this 
Second Part is employed to show, that, when 
we believe the evidences of Religion, our belief 
is in accordance with the Natural Laws of 
our Mental constitution. And this is to be 
shown by proving that religious belief is 
founded on the very same principles, which 
are admitted by all mankind (including in- 
fidels themselves) to be just and sound in all 
other cases ; and in obedience to which they 
all both believe and act, whether in matters of 
speculation or in the common affairs of Life. 

The argument, as here applied, depends not 
at all on the truth or falsehood of any meta- 
physical theories. The appeal is made to 
facts, which are equally true, by whatever 
theory they are to be explained, or if they 
cannot be explained at all. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



37 



CHAPTER I. 

That the Perception of every Phenomenon sug- 
gests to us the Notion of a Cause. 

^P^HIS axiom, having been admitted for 
A ages by all mankind, equally by phi- 
losophers and by the vulgar, was called in 
question by Hume. Before his time most 
writers had proceeded on the assumption of 
it,| as being a truism : both before and since 
his time philosophers and mankind at large 
have equally believed and acted on the assump- 
tion of it. 

When any singular appearance presents 
itself, they immediately inquire, Why it is so ? 
From what cause it happens ? If any man's 
house is broken into, he instantly sets himself 
to discover, who did it: the thought never 
once occurs, that it may have been done by 
nobody, without a cause. There is not a 
human being, who can bring himself to believe 
such a thing for an instant. Even when we 



t Some have expressly asserted it. TLavn yap acvvarov 
\ojpiC aiTis yevtaiv a~)(£iv. Plato. Timaeus. 

Nihil fieri sine causa, potest. Cic. De Divin. Lib. ii. 28. 
Causamigitur investigate in re nova atque admirabili,si poteris. 
Si nullam reperies, illud tamen exploratum habeto, nihil fieri 
potuisse sine causa. Ibid. 



38 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

dream, nothing happens without some fancied 
cause : nor is this surprising ; for by a Law of 
our nature we cannot help this belief, just as 
we cannot help feeling pain when we thrust 
our hands into the fire. 

And so deeply rooted is the persuasion of 
the necessity of a cause for every event, that 
it will render men blind to the grossest absur- 
dities. Hume has himself observed, that " in 
proportion as any man s course of life is go- 
verned by accident, we always find, that he 
increases in superstition ; as may particularly 
be observed of gamesters and sailors :" for 
such persons, being unable to trace the events, 
which come under their notice, to their real 
causes ; and yet being irresistibly led by their 
nature to assign some cause or other for them ; 
rather have recourse to any the most absurd 
and far-fetched, than leave the events unac- 
counted for. And hence, he says, arise a 
great part of the superstitions, which have 
prevailed in the world. 

Hume was the first, who successfully estab- 
lished, what is now generally admitted among 
speculative men, that, when we say that one 
physical phenomenon is the cause of another, 
we have no reason to believe any necessary 
connexion between the two ; nor can we see 
how or why there should be any real power in 
the first to produce the second : we only 
know, that the two phenomena are in fact 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 39 



conjoined. And it may be observed by the 
way, that the prevalence of an error so ancient 
and so universal as the belief of such a neces- 
sary connexion has been, is another proof, 
how deeply rooted in the human mind must 
be the conviction of the necessity of a cause 
for every event. But Hume, like most the- 
orists, was led by partiality for his own theory 
to push it beyond its legitimate bounds, and 
to deny the existence or the necessity of any 
really efficient cause whatever. 

This latter assertion, however, is altogether 
unlike the former, both in the nature of its 
evidence and in the matters comprehended by 
it. As to its evidence, we can easily suppose 
any two physical events, which we have been 
accustomed to consider as cause and effect, to 
be separated without the separation involving 
any absurdity : as, for instance, that the will 
to move our limbs should not be followed by 
the motion of them ; for this actually happens 
in cases of paralysis. And this is, of course, a 
manifest proof that there is no necessary con- 
nexion between the two. But to show this, is 
only to show, that some one particular phe- 
nomenon is not the really efficient cause of 
another particular phenomenon : but to go on, 
and argue hence, that there is no necessity for 
causes at all, would be as though the man, 
whose house had been broken open, should, 
because he could not trace a connexion be- 



40 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



tween the burglary and any particular burglar, 
therefore argue, that nobody at all had done 
it — that it had happened without a cause : or 
as though a philosopher, because he cannot 
show how substance is connected with its se- 
veral qualities, should go on to maintain, that 
there is no necessity for supposing the exist- 
ence of substance at all to support those qua- 
lities. We cannot possibly believe for a mo- 
ment, that anything whatever happens really 
without a cause, because such a supposition is 
absurd: it is contrary to a first principle of 
reasoning. 

Hume, however, attempts to controvert this 
principle by some subtle metaphysical reason- 
ing, resting on a theory of his own. Now, 
even supposing the reasoning to be apparently 
unexceptionable, no self-evident principle can 
be overset by any reasoning whatever ; since 
this reasoning must itself be ultimately found- 
ed on some similar principle no stronger than 
the former. In attempting to do so, we should 
be attempting to prove by reasoning, that no 
reasoning has any solid foundation whatever. 

Even supposing, therefore, his arguments to 
be in themselves incontrovertible, (which I 
think is not the case,) we might still say of 
them, what he has said of Berkeley's : " that 
they are merely sceptical, appears from this, 
that they admit of no answer, and produce no 
conviction." 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 41 

But he himself continually slides back un- 
consciously into the popular belief, as in the 
following passage : " We are ignorant of the 
manner, in which bodies operate on each other: 
their force or energy is entirely incomprehen- 
sible. But are we not equally ignorant of the 
manner or force by which a mind, even the 
Supreme Mind, operates either on itself or on 
body? "I These words surely imply, that, 
according to his own belief, there is some 
operating force or energy, in mind at least, if 
not in body. 



The inference from Hume's argument is, of 
course, that, since we cannot argue from the 
effect to the cause, we have no reason to think 
that the world and all that is in it, were pro- 
duced by any cause at all ; that there is any 
First Cause, or God. 

It is remarkable, that the ancient atheists 
were all driven by their denial of a God, to 
have recourse to some absurd imaginary cause 
to account for the creation of the world : one 
assigned Chance as the cause, another Love 
and Discord, another the Nature of things: 
but not one was ever so hardy as to assert, that 
no cause at all was required. So that they 
evidently thought that the former absurdities 



f Essays, vol. ii. p. 87. 



42 



THE ACCORDANCE OF UELIGION 



might be believed by some: the latter asser- 
tion was too revolting to be broached by any 
one of them. 

It is also curious, that this very axiom, 
" that every event requires a cause," is one of 
the most plausible arguments adduced in sup- 
port of the atheistical doctrine of Necessity. 
It adds but little to our presumption in favour 
of such a doctrine as Atheism, when we see its 
advocates thus reduced to argue, in support of 
it, from contradictory premises ; the ancient 
Atheist assuming, as the foundation of his 
reasoning, the very same principle, which the 
modern Atheist denies with the same purpose 
in view. 

Since, however, the very constitution of our 
minds compels us to believe, that every the 
most trifling event, which happens, must have 
originated in some cause ; surely we must, a 
fortiori, believe, that the Universe, and all that 
is in it, could not have come into existence 
without any. No man can consistently be- 
lieve the one, and disbelieve the other. No 
man can be a consistent Atheist, but he, who, 
when his house has been broken into and 
plundered, will sit down with the conviction, 
that nobody has done it ; that the thing has 
indeed happened, but has happened without 
a cause. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



43 



CHAPTER II. 

That all Change suggests to us the Agency of 
Mind, as its ultimate Caused 

IN tracing out the causes of natural pheno- 
mena, the vulgar, as was before observed, 
universally believe, that they have discovered 
a really active cause, whenever they have de- 
tected some other phenomenon, which imme- 
diately and invariably precedes the one under 
examination ; and men of speculation once 
believed the same thing. Supposing that this 
were a just and philosophical view of the sub- 
ject, as far as it goes, it obviously supplies us 
with no ultimate cause of any phenomenon. 
In the mechanical communication of motion 



f " Totum id, quod novimus, cui nomen corpus indidimus, 
nihil in se continet, quod motiis principium seu causa efficiens 

esse possit Prseter res corporeas, alterum est 

genus rerum cogitantium : in iis autem potentiam inesse cor- 
pora movendi, propria experientia didicimus." Berkeley. De 
Motu. 22. 25. " Nothing that we know under the name of 
body, or matter, contains in it, what can possibly be the 
beginning or efficient cause of motion. But besides material, 
there is another kind of things endowed with thought, and we 
have learned by our own experience, that these last possess a 
power of moving body." 



44 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

for instance, one ball, though it sets another 
rolling, manifestly originates no motion at all ; 
since it is easily proved by experiment, that 
the first ball loses just as much motion as it 
imparts to the second. And again, with re- 
gard to any of the phaenomena of nature, if we 
trace back the course of these to their origin, 
we must arrive at last at some first link in the 
chain, unconnected with any preceding one : 
and this link will require a cause just as much 
as the last. The origin, therefore, of the whole 
series remains quite unexplained, if we do not 
ascend to something higher than the series 
itself. Neither does this view of the subject 
give any account of the ultimate cause of those 
phaenomena, which we are able to trace up to 
the voluntary motions of animated beings: for 
thus we come to a first link in the chain of 
material causes, having no preceding one to 
account for it. 

These latter are indeed the only cases falling 
within our experience, in which we are able to 
trace events to a really active cause. We are 
acquainted with only two causes of motion, 
either some antecedent physical phaenomenon, 
or mind. Wherever we feel assured that the 
former does not exist, we infer that the latter 
does ; and this opinion had assumed the form 
of an apothegm as early as the time of Anax- 
agoras : " Nsv ntv apyjiv KivriawQ — Motion has 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



45 



its origin in Mind."t And, accordingly, it is 
well known that children and savages, upon 
being shown anything of a novel kind, which 
appears to move of itself, really believe that it 
is alive. It is related of a party of New Zea- 
landers, that having been shown a watch, and 
having consulted together about it, they agreed 
unanimously, that it was a god ; and when they 
had broken it, they thought that it was killed. 
And many similar instances are related of 
savages, who have thought that watches were 
living creatures. And we ourselves must be- 
lieve so too, if we were really convinced that 
no mechanical cause of its motion existed ; that 
is, that its motion was unconnected with any 
preceding phenomenon. 

Nor have we indeed any proof whatever of 
the existence of mind in our fellow-creatures, 
which may not be ultimately traced up to their 
power of producing motion. We can only infer 
the existence of mind in others, as we infer the 
existence of matter — by its effects : and the 
only immediate external and sensible effect of 
mind is the production of motion. Indeed, the 
whole power of man over external nature is 
strictly limited to this ; he can move his own 
limbs, and he can place external objects in 
juxtaposition ; everything else that he wishes 



f Burnet, Archeeol. p. 195. 



46 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

to be done, and that he is commonly said to do, 
being in fact done by the laws of nature thus 
set in operation by him. 

It has been said, indeedt, that we infer the 
existence of mind in other human beings from 
their resemblance to ourselves, and in the 
lower animals from their analogy to the human 
race. But if this were so, we should then 
believe, that the principle of mind existed in a 
man as long as he continued to resemble us 
externally ; whereas we always suppose the 
mind to have fled as soon as we believe his 
power of moving to have ceased for ever. This 
is the test of life or death, though the external 
resemblance continues some time longer. 

And what has been said of motion is equally 
true of all other change : perhaps, indeed, all 
other physical change is nothing but motion. 
But whether this be so or not, of all change it 
is equally true, that we are impressed with a 
belief that mind is capable of commencing it ; 
and we act upon this belief ; but we know of 
no other cause capable of doing this. 



If, then, we are thus irresistibly led to believe 
in the existence and operation of Mind, to 
account for the commencement of any the most 



f By Stewart, Philos. of the Active Powers, vol. i. p. 352. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 47 

trivial change in ordinary occurrences, and if 
we know of no other sufficient cause, it cannot 
be absurd to require a cause equally efficacious 
for those changes which are commonly called 
phenomena of Nature, and for that greatest, of 
all, by which the Universe was brought into 
existence — changes which, of course, require 
a cause powerful in proportion to their magni- 
tude. We might safely thus infer the operation 
of Mind, though no other arguments (such, for 
instance, as the evidence of design) could be 
adduced in support of this opinion. 

Indeed, the doctrine of Hume, that physical 
causes have no real power to work their effects, 
when pursued only to its legitimate extent, is 
so far from leading to Atheism, that, on the 
contrary, it implies, what many of the ablest 
philosophers have contended for — that the im- 
mediate Power of the Deity is constantly 
operating to produce every the minutest change 
which takes place in the Universe. 

But, says the Atheist, no man has ever seen 
the Deity. Neither has this Atheist ever seen 
that mind, which he himself does not hesitate 
to believe exists in his fellow-creatures ; he 
has never seen it, except in its effect ; and this 
effect is the production of motion. Motion is 
the sign of Mind : and he himself does not 
hesitate, upon seeing the sign, to believe in 
the existence of the thing signified ; so that 



48 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



lie has evidence just as good and sufficient for 
the existence of a Mind, which created and 
governs the Universe, as for that of any other 
mind in the world besides his own. He sees 
the effects of both, and nothing more. Why 
should he hesitate to believe in the existence 
of a similar cause of these effects equally in 
both cases? 

But again it is asserted by the Necessitarian, 
that all things, both matter and changes of 
every kind, including motion, exist by Neces- 
sity. To this assumption, built upon an un- 
meaning word, many sufficient answers have 
been given : such as, that if matter exists ne- 
cessarily, the whole Universe must have been 
filled with one mass of it ; and that motion 
could not have been determined by necessity 
to any particular direction or velocity. But 
Geology, by showing us that many new species 
of plants and animals have been successively 
created, has supplied us with an unanswerable 
proof that all things have not existed from 
eternity, and therefore of course not neces- 
sarily.! 



+ As to the analysis of this law of our minds, it probably 
has its origin in association. The most direct and familiar (if 
not the only direct) knowledge which we possess of any cause 
operating to produce sensible changes, is derived from our own 
power to produce such changes, and our own power (as was 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



49 



CHAPTER III. 

That from Design in the Effect we infer a 
designing Cause. 

WHENEVER, in examining an object 
submitted to our inspection, we find the 
several parts of it adapted to one another, and 
the whole obviously conspiring to produce 
some one result ; in all these cases we infer 
that the object has been planned and arranged 
with the design of producing that result ; that 
is, that it was planned by some Designing 
Mind. Even the mutual resemblance of seve- 
ral parts, so formed as to produce mere regu- 
larity's sufficient to create in us this conviction 
of Design, though we may be quite ignorant 
of any purpose for which the object was formed. 
If a man should find upon a table an hundred 
pieces of paper, all exactly square or trian- 
gular, he would conclude from their regularity 
alone that they had been formed with some 
design, though the design may have been only 
that of a child to produce the mere regularity. 

before observed) is confined to the production of motion by our 
Mind or Will. Hence, probably, upon seeing changes pro- 
duced, we infer Power, that is, Mind or Will, as the real and 
ultimate cause. 



50 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



But when we meet with a steam-engine or a 
watch, of which all the parts are adapted to 
each other, while all conspire to produce some 
one result, and that result manifestly a useful 
one, in these cases the conviction of design is 
brought home to our minds still more strongly. 
No man ever thought of asserting that watches 
or steam-engines were brought into existence 
by the operation of chance. No man would 
think so, if there were no more than a single 
watch or a single steam-engine in the world ; 
still less can he think so when there are many 
thousands of both ; for in this latter case there 
is the proof drawn from the uniformity and 
resemblance of many things, added to that 
derived from the adaptation of many parts to 
produce one result. 

It never enters the head of any man, when 
he is studying the laws of England, or when 
he sees them carried into execution, to suppose 
that these were made by chance, or to doubt 
that they were framed by legislators who de- 
signed that they should be for rules of action 
to those who, he sees, actually obey them. 

It never enters the head of any man, in 
reading Paley's Theology, to suppose that the 
book was produced by chance ; that the types 
happened of themselves to fall into that order 
which he sees before him ; that all the expla- 
nations contained in it of natural contrivances 



WITH OUR MRNTAL CONSTITUTION. 51 



were not intended to produce conviction in him 
who reads them. 



And yet there have been men, who have 
maintained such absurdities with regard to the 
works of Nature. 

The same man, who, when he finds an hun- 
dred squares of paper upon a table, can per- 
ceive design in their being all shaped alike, 
can see no traces of it in the resemblance and 
regularity of all the flowers in the world. The 
same man, who, on seeing the steam-engine, 
can infer design from the mutual adaptation of 
its several parts, and from the fitness of the 
whole to produce one effect, this same man 
can see no design in the structure of his own 
body — in the adaptation of the eye for seeing, 
of the ear for hearing, of the teeth for masti- 
cating, of the stomach for digesting, of the 
lungs for breathing — no design in any one of 
all the wonderful processes of life and organi- 
zation, or in the mutual adaptations of these 
several parts and properties, or in their joint 
co-operation for supporting the life and com- 
fort of the man ; and this, though he admits 
that all these things do most admirably and 
wonderfully fulfil all these purposes. This 
same man, who can see that the Laws of Eng- 
land were designed to fulfil the purposes which 



52 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



they do fulfil, though very imperfectly, cannot 
see this with respect to Laws of Nature, which 
are adapted with perfect wisdom and success 
to fulfil their several ends, which are infinite in 
number, and which are obeyed invariably with- 
out any exception. 

This same man, who can see design in the 
composition of Paley's book, in the Author's 
description of some few of the contrivances of 
Nature, can see no design in all these innumer- 
able contrivances themselves; he believes that 
the designing mind of Paley was itself consti- 
tuted without any designing Cause ; that not 
only all things else, but Design itself, came 
into existence without design, by what he calls 
Chance. The absurdity of such an opinion 
(though it is hard to believe that any man 
ever really entertained it) cannot be set in a 
stronger light than by those few words : " He 
that planted the ear, shall He not hear : or He 
that made the eye, shall He not see f ' 

The belief that the works of Nature were 
not created with any design of their fulfilling 
the purposes which they actually fulfil, is not 
rendered at all less absurd by the fact, that we 
infer the design only from the effect produced ; 
for this is equally true of works of human art. 
And in this latter case the Atheist makes this 
inference as readily as other men. We have 
no proof whatever of a designing mind in a 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



53 



watchmaker, except from the effects of that 
design, that is, from the watch. And even 
though we should be told by the watchmaker, 
that he had made it with the design of showing 
the hours, still the same thing is true : for the 
words uttered by the watchmaker, and the 
ideas thereby produced in our minds, are no- 
thing but the effects of his thought and design. 
We cannot see the man's mind, or ascertain 
its existence in any other way than by its 
effects, by what he does and what he says. 
In the two cases, therefore, of the works of 
Nature and those of human art, the proof of 
design is the very same in kind; but in the 
case of Nature stronger and more overpower- 
ing in degree, in proportion as Her works 
surpass those of man in the wisdom with which 
they are designed, as well as in their number 
and in the power with which they are exe- 
cuted. 

The supposition of the Universe being the 
result of chance t involves the grossest absurdi- 
ties. For what does it imply ? The present 
order of things is a fortuitous combination of 



t This doctrine is not to be classed amongst errors which 
are exploded, and become only matter of history. It has found 
many advocates amongst modern French philosophers ; and no 
less a man than La Place has given it the sanction of his 
authority. 



54 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



atoms, out of an indefinite number of such 
combinations, all equally possible and equally 
probable. Atoms were jumbled together at 
random, without any superintending Mind, till 
at last this Scheme of Universal Nature hap- 
pened to come out. The advocates of this 
opinion have forgotten to inform us what has 
become of the innumerable worlds and systems 
— failures fit for nothing but to be immediately 
destroyed — which by the doctrine of chances 
must have come into existence before this 
lucky throw of the present Universe happened 
to turn up : or why we never see such systems 
coming into existence now : or lastly, how it 
was, that this jumbling happened to cease just 
at the very moment when our present wonder- 
ful System was brought into being. Intelli- 
gence would seem to be as necessary on this 
most absurd supposition, for stopping the pro- 
cess just at the proper moment, as for intending 
and designing the result. 

As to the doctrine of all things having existed 
by Necessity, and therefore from Eternity, just 
as they do now, the discoveries of Geology, 
before alluded to, have put an end to all need 
of proving its absurdity, by demonstrating that 
the fact is otherwise. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



55 



CHAPTER IV. 

That our Minds are not necessarily connected 
with our present Bodies. 

DISPUTES have been carried on from the 
most ancient times as to the nature of 
Mind ; some asserting it to be a separate and 
distinct Substance ; others holding it to be a 
Power or Property belonging to certain systems 
of organized matter, or a Result of Organiza- 
tion. f It does not appear to me, that any 
arguments have hitherto been advanced suffi- 
cient to decide this question. Those most con- 
fidently urged have not been positive argu- 
ments on either side, but have taken the form 
of objections against the opposite doctrine; 
tending, therefore, rather to show the difficul- 
ties besetting either view, than determining 
the point at issue. 

Against the doctrine of Mind being a sepa- 



f The opinion, that Mind is matter itself, deserves no con- 
sideration, as it can be so called only by confounding' the com- 
mon acceptations of the words " Matter" and " Mind." The 
man who asserts that Mind is Matter, must mean, if he means 
anything, that Mind is something which is extended and resists 
compression : for such is everything included in the word 
Matter — evidently a gratuitous assumption, if not an absurdity. 



5fi 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



rate Substance it is argued, that, in thus assum- 
ing the existence of an unknown substance to 
account for the manifestation of mind, we in- 
fringe an acknowledged rule of philosophizing 
— that of not admitting more causes than are 
necessary for the production of phsenomena ; 
but that the phenomena in question are suffi- 
ciently accounted for by considering Mind as 
a property of the brain : that, since Mind is 
universally found wherever there is a brain, 
but never without one, the inference is legiti- 
mate, that it is a property of that substance: 
just as Newton's inference was legitimate with 
respect to Gravity being a property of matter. 

But to this I think it may be replied, that 
we do not here assume the existence of a sub- 
stance not otherwise known to exist ; for every 
man who acknowledges a Deity believes that 
He is a Spiritual Substance — that such a Sub- 
stance therefore does exist. Hence the objec- 
tion amounts to nothing. I think, indeed, 
that it may be retorted upon the objectors ; 
for I shall presently attempt to show,| that 
the very rule of philosophy thus appealed to 
should rather deter us from assenting to the 
doctrine of Materialism. 

The principal argument, strenuously urged 
by Brown as well as others, against Mind 



f P. 59. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



57 



being a Power or Property of Matter, is, that 
since matter is extended, Mind, that is, thought, 
if it be a property of matter, must be extended 
too : but that thought is not in fact extended, 
since it is obviously absurd to talk of half or a 
quarter of a thought, of the top or bottom of a 
sensation. Now to this it may be replied, that 
it by no means follows, because a substance is 
extended, that all its properties must be ex- 
tended too, and that we can therefore with 
propriety speak of half or a quarter, or the top 
and bottom of a thought. If thought be a pro- 
perty, it is a single property resulting from 
organization, from an organized mass of matter 
taken as a Avhole; and not many properties, 
each one severally belonging to each several 
particle of that mass : just as the vital power, 
both in animals and vegetables, is allowed to 
be a property belonging to extended masses of 
organized matter. And yet who ever talked 
of half or a quarter, or of the top and bottom 
of the vital power? So, too, with lifeless things : 
the moving power of a watch is the property 
of the watch, of extended matter : yet the pro- 
perty is indivisible, has neither top nor bottom, 
half nor quarter ; it must either exist as a 
whole, or it cannot exist at all. 

This objection aims to show, not merely that 
Mind is not in fact a Power attached to matter, 
but that the supposition of its being so is 



58 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



absurd, and implies a contradiction. But as I 
cannot see any contradiction implied in a sub- 
stance being extended and its property at the 
same time unextended ; so I cannot see any 
absurdity in supposing that the Deity may, if 
He has so pleased, have annexed thought to 
matter. That we cannot conceive how this is 
done, is of course no sort of objection ; for it is 
obvious that we can as little conceive how an 
immaterial Being thinks, as a material one ; or 
how any one property or power belongs to any 
substance whatever — further than that such is 
the will of the Deity. It seems, too, that he, 
who argues for an immaterial substance on 
account of this difficulty, must encounter a 
difficulty quite as great — that of conceiving 
existence without extension :\ 

It appears to me, then, that, the objections 
against both doctrines being equally untenable, 
and there being no strong and direct arguments 
to prove either, we cannot, in the present state 
of our knowledge, come to a decision on this 
question. I incline, indeed, to think, that the 
mind is a separate immaterial substance ; be- 
cause, believing that the Deity is himself such 



t The opinion that mind is not a separate and independent 
substance is commonly held to be opposed to the truth of 
Revelation : but, since Revelation distinctly asserts the resur- 
rection of the body, as well as of the soul, I cannot see that 
they are opposed to each other. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



59 



a substance — that such a substance therefore 
does exist — I think it would be to assume two 
causes quite dissimilar for similar attributes 
and properties (and therefore to infringe the 
rule of philosophy before mentioned'! ) if we 
were to consider the Divine Mind to be a 
Substance, and the human mind a Property. 
For, however immeasurably the one is in all 
respects inferior to the other, we can hardly 
avoid concluding that their nature is similar 
— that a real resemblance exists. And this 
does not appear to be merely that vague re- 
semblance necessarily implied in both being 
classed under the general name of Mind ; but 
one which may be traced in our Moral, our 
Intellectual, and our active Powers : because 
the only idea, which we can possibly frame of 
the Deity and of His Attributes, is formed by 
extending to Him, and indefinitely enlarging, 
the ideas of our own capacities and our own 
Active Powers. The only idea which we can 
form of His Moral Attributes must be derived 
from the idea of our own moral excellencies 
carried out to perfection : the only idea we 
can form of His Wisdom must be drawn from 
something of the nature of human wisdom, 
only infinite in degree. And in this latter 
case the justice of our doing so is confirmed 



f P. 56. 



00 



THE ACCORDANCE OK RELIGION 



by the appearances of Nature. The Deity 
adapts means to ends with the view of effect- 
ing particular purposes, just as the mind of 
man adopts the same method of proceeding. 
There have been instances in which human 
inventions have exactly resembled in principle 
the contrivances of Nature, though these latter 
were unknown to the inventors. The tele- 
scope and the camera obscura were first made 
without any consideration or knowledge of the 
structure of the eye. This surely shows a 
resemblance between the contriving minds. 

In the same way our idea of Divine Power 
must be derived from that of our own power, 
however limited this may be. If we cannot 
argue thus from our own nature and powers to 
those of the Deity, it is obvious, that we cannot 
argue or think at all about His Nature : we 
cannot say that He is Good, or Powerful, or 
Wise ; for these terms will mean absolutely 
nothing, if they do not mean something in the 
same sense in which we apply them to our- 
selves. 

But this resemblance is, I think, an argu- 
ment for supposing that the mind of man par- 
takes in some degree of the Divine Nature ; 
that in this sense " God created man in his 
own image and that therefore, if the Supreme 
Mind is an immaterial Substance, the mind of 
man is probably so too. 



• WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION . 61 

However, whether Mind be a Substance or 
a Property of Matter, let us consider if, on 
either supposition, it be contrary to the Analogy 
of Nature, that it should continue to exist after 
the dissolution of the body. 

1 . Suppose it to be an immaterial Substance. 
Then it would be contrary to the whole Analogy 
of Nature if it were annihilated, either by death 
or by any other cause : for we know not a 
single instance in Nature of the annihilation 
of Substance, either material or immaterial. 
The only immaterial Substance, besides the 
human soul itself, | of which we have any 
natural knowledge, is the Deity. None will 
deny that He never can be annihilated. All 
Qther substances within our knowledge are 
material : and it is allowed by all, that not a 
single particle of these is ever annihilated. 

To this however it may be replied, that 
Analogy is not in this case to be trusted : for 
it is equally contrary to all Analogy, that 
substances should be created within our expe- 
rience ; but that a soul is created at the birth 
of every child. Now this creation of the sub- 
stance of the soul at birth seems to be assumed 



f If the human soul be an immaterial Substance, the souls 
of brutes may be so too : if they be, the above argument would 
apply equally to them ; that is to say, they are immortal : and 
Bishop Butler has shown that the supposition of their being so 
involves no absurdity. 



02 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

without evidence. We certainly have no proof 
of it. But, judging by the Analogy of Nature 
where other evidence fails, should we not 
rather suppose, that in the case of the consti- 
tution of mind out of a Spiritual Substance, 
the process is similar to what it is in the con- 
stitution of the bodily frame out of matter? 
By Substance, either material or immaterial, 
we understand an unknown somewhat, which 
may serve for a support of all attributes and 
properties known to us. In the case of mate- 
rial Substance, we know that this is endowed 
under certain Laws with such and such powers 
and properties ; that these powers and pro- 
perties are continually changing, and often 
lie dormant or inactive for a time, and then 
appear or become active again : — chemical 
powers, and the vital powersof seeds and plants, 
are familiar instances of such things. But 
however much or frequently these powers 
change or disappear, the material Substance 
still remains undestroyed and indestructible. 

If then we form our opinion by Analogy, 
(the only guide we have) it seems most agree- 
able to this to suppose, that spiritual Sub- 
stance, like material, always exists, though 
endowed only at certain times and according 
to certain Laws with properties which make it 
perceptible to us — that is to say, with consci- 
ousness and Active Powers. If it should be 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 63 

said, that we cannot even conceive the exist- 
ence of Mind not endowed with certain qua- 
lities, as, for instance, with consciousness ; I 
answer, that we find it equally difficult to con- 
ceive the independent existence of material 
Substance, without some particular qualities 
besides those of extension and solidity, (as, for 
instance, without particular shape and colour) : 
as we do to conceive of anything so entirely 
contrary to our experience : and yet from the 
changes which all these qualities undergo, we 
do not doubt, that matter has such an inde- 
pendent existence. In the case of Mind, how- 
ever, we have some experience of this very 
thing happening : for the cases of sound sleep, 
of swooning, of being stunned, are instances, 
within our experience, of the Substance of the 
Mind still subsisting, though deprived for the 
time (as far as we know) of all its properties 
and powers, certainly of all those which make 
it an object of perception to us. Whether 
these powers may more properly be said to be 
merely inactive, or to be extinct for the time, 
would be only a dispute about words ; nor 
would the argument be affected by a decision 
either way.f 



f Whoever believes in a future Day of Judgment, can hardly 
avoid believing in a suspension of consciousness between death 
and that Day, unless he admit the doctrine of Purgatory. For 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



But although we should suppose the sub- 
stance of Mind to be created at birth, still it 
may be naturally immortal. It has been 
sometimes said, that whatever begins, must 
have an end. This is not true. It is true in- 
deed, that whatever begins, cannot be neces- 
sarily immortal : but if it has pleased the Deity 
to annex immortality to its nature, (which he 
can of course do,) then it will be naturally im- 
mortal. 

Since then we see, that the only Spiritual 
Substance, of which we have any natural 
knowledge, viz. the Deity, is imperishable — 
that though the powers of the human mind 
are continually changing and often suspended, 
yet its Substance (for we are now arguing only 
on the supposition of its being a Substance) 
still remains undestroyed, as long as we have 
any knowledge of it, (for we are still the same 
persons after sleep or a swoon, that we were 
before ;) and since the same thing happens 
with regard to matter (the only other substance 
within our knowledge) of which not a single 
particle ever perishes : therefore all Analogy 
leads us to suppose, that if the Mind be a Sub- 
stance, it is imperishable. 

if the soul enter immediately on a state of reward or of punish- 
ment, these would obviously precede the Judgment, by which 
they are supposed to be allotted ; and which would thus be- 
come nugatory. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION . 65 

2. Let us suppose Mind to be a Power or 
Property of certain systems of organized mat- 
ter. This may be said in three senses. 

First, It may be a property belonging to that 
particular system of particles, which consti- 
tutes our bodies at any particular time. This 
however is manifestly not the case ; because it 
is a fact well established in physiology, that 
we are every hour changing these particles ; 
and yet we remain the same persons. 

Secondly, The mind may be a property at- 
tached to a succession of particles constituting 
our bodies. Now if the mind is thus at one 
time joined and related (as a property to its 
substance) to certain parcels of matter ; if its 
powers and properties are often during this 
union suspended by sleep or by swooning; and 
if it afterwards ceases to have any relation at 
all to these same parcels of matter,') and yet 
continues to be the same mind : then it will 
not be contrary to the Analogy of Nature, if it 
shall in the same way, after our present lives, 
be again transferred to other parcels of matter, 
that is, to other bodies, and this after an in- 
terval of unconscious existence, we being never- 
theless the same persons. And by being the 
same persons, I mean merely, that we shall 
hereafter have memory of things that have 



f See Butler's Anal. Part I. Chap. I. 
F 



THE ACCORDANCE OF 



RELIGION 



happened, as having happened to ourselves: 
for in regard to future reward and punishment, 
and the justice of these, it seems to be quite 
sufficient, if the Deity shall annex to the mind 
such a consciousness or memory ; whether the 
substance of the mind shall be the same or 
different. Whether this may properly be 
called Personal Identity, I shall not here in- 
quire ; but it is certainly an Identity similar to 
that of which we speak, when we say, that the 
same life continues in animals or plants, while 
their material particles are in a continual flux. 
Neither can I doubt, that the Deity is able to 
annex such consciousness, or memory, to any 
systems of matter, if He so pleases — because 
His so doing implies no contradiction. Indeed, 
on the supposition, on which we are now argu- 
ing, of mind being only a property of matter, a 
similar transfer of consciousness actually hap- 
pens to us every hour of our present lives : for 
the materials of our bodies are so incessantly 
changed and renovated, that physiologists as- 
sert, that "in the course of a few days we 
change every particle of our solid fabric"! 

The third supposition (though a very impro- 
bable one) is, that the mind may be a Property 

t Sir C. Bell, Animal Mechanics, Libr. of Useful Know- 
ledge, p. 59. He adds, " If there be anything firmly estab- 
lished in physiology, if there be truth in the science at all, 
this fact is incontrovertible." 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



67 



attached to some single particle of matter, or 
monad ; for no man can demonstrate, that there 
may not be in the human frame some such 
single particle, which never changes. If this 
be the case now, and if this Property be also 
sometimes dormant, or inactive, now ; it will 
be according to the Analogy of Nature, if the 
same thing shall but continue hereafter — if this 
particle shall continue (for every particle of 
matter is, as far as we know, indestructible) to 
be, as it is now, the nucleus for different suc- 
cessions of particles ; still having the same 
property of Consciousness, and therefore still 
constituting us the same persons. 

Nor again, Avhether Mind be a Substance 
or a Property in any of the above senses, is 
there any absurdity in supposing, that it may 
be separated, not only entirely, but suddenly, 
from that body to which it has hitherto been 
always united, and on which it appears to be 
now dependent for its existence ; and, in yet 
supposing, that it may continue to exist after 
the separation. For this is no more than hap- 
pens to every child born into the world. The 
infant in the womb is entirely united with, and 
dependent on, the mother : it partakes of her 
circulation, is nourished by her, and would 
perish, as far as life is concerned, if prema- 
turely separated from her. Yet, though its 
actual existence thus entirely depends on its 



08 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



union with her, this union is destined by Nature 
to be dissolved. The umbilical cord is severed, 
and the child forthwith commences an inde- 
pendent existence, brought about by this se- 
paration — the very means which Mould have 
seemed fitted only for its destruction. Why 
may not a similar thing happen to the mind? 

Whatever hypothesis therefore we entertain 
as to the nature of mind (and it appears to me 
to be quite immaterial to the question of a 
future life, which we choose) ; I think the 
Analogy of Nature shows, that it is not absurd, 
but on the contrary agreeable to our experi- 
ence, to suppose, that it may continue to exist 
after the dissolution of our present bodies. 
And if it is so, this is of course a sufficient 
answer to any objections drawn from the sup- 
posed absurdity or incredibility of the thing. 
But I will add a few considerations, which 
appear to me to render the thing in some de- 
gree positively probable in itself. 

1. Those unaccustomed to consider such 
subjects are apt more or less to confound the 
operations of body and mind, certainly not to 
perceive, how entirely distinct and different 
they are. They suppose, for instance, that 
the organs of sense have themselves a real 
perception of external objects. Now nothing 
is more certain, than that these organs only 
convey such perceptionstothe mind, — thatthey 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



69' 



are merely instruments — that we see with the 
eye, just as we see with a telescope, or hear 
with an ear-trumpet. If the eye had itself 
any perception of objects, each eye must of 
course have a separate perception, and we 
should see every object double ; and so with 
our ears and hands. Again, a man who has 
lost a limb, continues to experience the same 
sensations, which were originally conveyed to 
him by the limb : he still fancies that he feels 
pains in it as sensibly as if it were really at- 
tached to him. And again, a paralytic limb, 
or one whose connection with the brain has 
been cut off by division of the nerves, may be 
lacerated or injured in any way, and the man 
will be unconscious of pain. And so with 
all the organs of sense ; if the nerves con- 
necting them with the brain are divided, the 
organs immediately become useless for their 
office. 

These facts then prove, that the bodily 
organs are themselves unconscious ; that it is 
the mind, which really feels, as well as thinks. 
If it were indeed the body in its different 
parts, which is alone conscious, it might then 
seem more reasonable to conclude, that Ave 
must cease to have any consciousness after its 
dissolution. But if the fact is not so, — if it is 
not contrary to the nature of the mind to ex- 
perience even bodily sensations, after it has 



70 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

lost the organ proper for exciting them ; it 
seems so far more credible, that we may con- 
tinue to be conscious even of sensations like 
those of the body after death : much more 
would it seem to be credible, that we may 
exercise those higher and more spiritual attri- 
butes (such as thought, and reason, and the 
moral powers) which are much less immedi- 
ately connected with the body, after we shall 
have been separated from this. 

2. The phenomenon of swooning shews us, 
that the mind is capable of existing, though 
the mutual intercourse between it and the 
body is to all appearance entirely suspended. 
During a swoon the mind is unable to act 
upon the body ; for the man cannot move : 
the body is equally unable to affect the mind ; 
for the man may be struck or injured in any 
way, without the mind being at all conscious 
of it. 

3. This intercourse is again partly inter- 
rupted during sleep. Then, too, the will gene- 
rally loses its command over the body. We 
cannot support ourselves in an upright posture, 
while we sleep : and in dreaming we even 
make attempts to move our limbs, while these 
refuse to obey the call. 

4. And yet during sleep the mind is often 
particularly vigorous and active. Ideas suc- 
ceed one another so rapidly, that we believe 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 71 



hours and days to have elapsed during the 
space of a few seconds. 

Addison has remarked, that, though inven- 
tion is one of the most fatiguing efforts of the 
mind, yet during sleep this faculty is very 
actively employed without any fatigue at all. 
Mathematicians have sometimes solved prob- 
lems during their sleep, which they had in 
vain attempted during their waking hours. 

These then are instances where the mind is 
particularly vigorous, at the same time that 
its intercourse with the body is less than 
usually intimate. 

5. In dreaming the mind is conscious of 
bodily sensations, in the same manner as when 
awake. It sees, while the eyes are closed, and 
hears, though no sounds are conveyed by the 
ears ; and so with the other senses ; and these 
sensations are as vivid, as when they are con- 
veyed by the bodily organs, so that at the 
time we are fully persuaded of their reality. 
It seems, therefore, that the mind is capable 
of existing without the intervention of its bodily 
organs, even in those states, which seem at 
first sight to be most immediately dependent 
on the operation of these organs. 

6. In delirium arising from acute pain, 
though the body may still be in the state 
which first produced the pain, or in one 
adapted to produce still greater, yet the mind 



72 



THE ACCORDANCE OV RELIGION 



is altogether unconscious of suffering. While 
the body (so to speak) is undergoing tortures 
and destruction, the mind is not merely unin- 
jured and sound, but is often enjoying itself in 
some agreeable reverie.f 

7. It frequently happens at the approach of 
death, when the body is worn out by old age 
or by disease, that the mind not only retains 
its pristine strength, but seems to acquire an 
unaccustomed vigour. J And t his is so common, 
that a belief has arisen in different ages and 
countries, of men being at that time endowed 
with prophetic powers. 



(- "Delirium seems to be a very curious affection: in this 
stale a man is quite unconscious of his disease ; he will give 
rational answers to any questions you put to him, when you 
rouse him, but he relapses into a state of wandering-, and his 
actions correspond with his dreaming - . I remember a man with 
compound fracture jn this hospital, whose leg - was in a horrible 
state of sloughing-. I have roused him, and said, ' Thomas, 
what is the matter with you? how do you do V He would reply, 
' Pretty hearty, thank you; nothing is the matter with me; 
how do you do?' He would then go on dreaming of one thing 
or another : I have listened at his bedside, and I am sure his 
dreams were often, of a pleasant kind. He met old acquaint- 
ances in las dreams, &c, It cannot but be regarded as 

a very benevolent effect of nature's operations, that extremity 
of suffering should thus bring with it its antidote." — Aber- 
nethy's Lectures. 

I " The exaltation of the Intellectual faculties, or the sudden 
augmentation of the Memory, Judgment, Power of reasoning 
and Imagination, in severe diseases, is almost always a certain 
indication of a last effort of nature, to which fatal sinking very 
speedily succeeds." — Hooper's Physician s Vaclc Mecum, p. 14. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



73 



8. All the Intellectual and Moral operations 
of the mind, (such as we may suppose it 
will be chiefly employed in, if it is to be 
raised to a higher state of existence,) are best 
carried on, when it is least interrupted by 
bodily feelings. No state is so well adapted for 
intellectual exertion, as that, in which we are 
altogether unconscious of all bodily sensations, 
whether from disease or from external objects : 
every man endeavours to keep off all interrup- 
tion from these sources, when he is occupied 
in anything requiring thought. And so with 
regard to our Moral Powers ; it is well known, 
that, other circumstances being alike, we are 
most prone to obey the dictates of virtue, when 
we are in good health, that is, when all parts 
of the body perform their several functions 
without making us aware, as far as our feelings 
are concerned, that they even exist. 

9. If the union of mind and body were in- 
dissoluble, so as that the one were entirely de- 
pendent on the other ; it might be expected, 
that exertion of the one would always fatigue 
the other. If mind were material, we might, 
I think, expect, that it would be fatigued by 
the exertion of putting the body into action, 
on the mechanical principle, that action and 
reaction are always equal. But this is not the 
case. Bodily fatigue and mental are things 
quite different and distinct. 



74 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



10. It has been the object of Moral Philoso- 
phy in all ages to induce mankind to restrain 
their indulgence in sensual enjoyments, and to 
place their highest gratification in those Moral 
and Intellectual pleasures, which have least to 
do with the body. The wisest among men, 
therefore, have been led by reason to agree, 
that the highest and best qualities of the mind, 
those which of course are most likely to be 
exercised in a higher state of existence, are 
such as are least intimately connected with the 
body. 

All these considerations tend, I think, to 
shew, that the mind is not solely and exclu- 
sively adapted for its present abode, that it is 
not necessarily connected with the body, but 
that it is in its own nature fitted for a higher 
and a better state. An unwillingness to believe 
in such a doctrine may be partly accounted 
for by considering, that the mind and the body 
are, in our present existence, as it were iden- 
tified together ; we cannot think of one without 
the other ; in imagination they are inseparable. 
But this is only a proof, that they have always 
been united, while subjects of our observation : 
it is no proof whatever, that they are in their 
own nature inseparable. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



75 



CHAPTER V. 
That ice have Freewill. 

HARDLY anything could be more start- 
ling, or appear more absurd, to a plain 
man, than to be told for the first time, that he 
has no power of determining his own will to 
the doing or the not doing of any action. Yet 
few doctrines have been advocated with greater 
confidence or perseverance, than that of Ne- 
cessity. When an opinion, how plausibly 
soever maintained by a few speculative men, 
still appears after a lapse of ages grossly ab- 
surd and revolting to all unsophisticated minds, 
the presumption must be, that it is founded 
upon sophistry. That such accordingly is 
the case with this doctrine, appears to me to 
be sufficiently manifest from the following 
considerations. 

1. There is then such a natural and irre- 
sistible conviction amongst mankind in general, 
that they are free agents. From very early 
times, indeed, a few speculative men have 
argued, or tried to argue, themselves out of 
this conviction ; and, one or two, have been 
bold enough to assert, that the evidence of con- 
sciousness is in favour of their argument : but 



70 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

they have all allowed, that it is quite impos- 
sible for men not to act on the supposition of 
their freedom — that the common business of 
the world could not go on, if they were to act 
systematically on the opposite principle. 

The advocates of Necessity, however, assert, 
that this universal and irresistible conviction 
is a deceitful one ; and this they attempt to 
prove by a course of abstruse and subtle rea- 
soning. Now the same answer is applicable 
here, which was given on a similar occasion 
before,i ~ — that, since all reasoning must itself 
ultimately rest on some intuitive belief, which 
cannot itself be proved, but must be taken for 
granted ; therefore no intuitive belief can be 
destroyed by any reasoning whatever. 

No argument for Necessity is more confi- 
dently urged, than the one founded on the 
maxim, " That whatever begins to exist must 
have a Cause ;" and therefore the will must 
be determined by some cause. The truth of 
the maxim is assumed as a First Principle, 
for it cannot be proved. Now our belief of 
this maxim is not at all stronger, than is our 
conviction of our own free will. Nay, if the 
question were put to any unprejudiced person, 
as to which of the two cases he felt the firmest 
conviction ; I believe there is no one who 



t Chap. I. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



77 



would not answer, that he felt it in the case of 
his own free will. If therefore the question could 
be decided by a direct appeal to the strength 
of our conviction in the two cases, even then 
I think the decision must be in favour of Free- 
will. But such is not the case : for before 
this maxim "That every thing must have a 
cause" can be applied to the question of Ne- 
cessity, a certain process of reasoning must be 
gone through. But in every process of rea- 
soning there are several distinct steps, in every 
one of which some assumption must be made, 
and some error may be committed. I must 
assume, for instance, that my memory does 
not deceive me, when I believe that I have 
really examined the premises, from which I 
draw my conclusion : I must assume, that I 
have drawn the conclusion correctly. As to 
neither of these steps however, can I feel any 
firmer conviction, than I do as to my own 
freedom. To argue, therefore, against such an 
intuitive belief, is first to controvert a species 
of evidence, which we must ourselves admit as 
the foundation of our own argument ; and it 
is, secondly, to claim stronger evidence for the 
last link in a chain of reasoning, not of course 
infallible in itself, than the very first link, 
on which all the rest depend, can possibly 
possess. 

It appears to me, therefore, that this one 



78 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



consideration is sufficient alone to overthrow 
all arguments, that ever have been, or that ever 
can be, produced against the freedom of the 
will. If indeed mankind in general shall ever 
agree, that we have an intuitive belief in Ne- 
cessity, then it may be impossible to prove 
Freewill — there will be a balance of probabi- 
lities, or rather of contradictions. But no ar- 
gument can ever disprove an intuitive belief, f 
To admit even the uncertainty of such belief, 
is at one stroke to cut away the foundations of 
all human knowledge, since all human know- 
ledge ultimately rests on some such intuition.^ 
Arguments for Necessity in themselves un- 
answerable, might, I think, be met in this 
way. But the strongest that have been ad- 
vanced, do not appear to be incapable of being 
answered on their own grounds : besides that 



f Johnson's answer was philosophically just as well as 
pointed: " We know that we are free, and there s an end 
on't." 

I Cicero uses arguments resting on this ground : " Si mini 
libeat assentiri Epicure, et negare omnem enuntiationem aut 
veram esse aut falsam : earn plagam potius accipiam, quam 
fato omnia fieri comprobem. Ilia enim sententia aliquid habet 
disputationis, hcec verb non est tolerabilis." De Fato. 10. 

And again: " Quod si ita est, omnia necessitas efficit. Id 
si verum est, nihil est in nostra potestate. Est autem aliquid 
in nostra potestate. At, si omnia fato fiunt, omnia causis 
antecedentibus fiunt. Non igitur fato fiunt, queecunque fiunt. 
Hoc arctius astringi ratio non potest." Ibid. 14. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



79 



there are positive arguments at least as strong 
on the side of Freewill. We may therefore 
briefly consider the principal of each. 

2. Secondly therefore, every thing through- 
out the world is constituted exactly as it would 
be, if Ave were really free. Neither our own 
Moral nature, nor our external condition, can 
be explained but on that supposition. This 
the advocates of Necessity are themselves com- 
pelled to allow. 

Man thinks and acts, as if he were free. 
He believes, that he may either voluntarily 
perform particular acts, or refrain from them, 
as he pleases ; and that he shall reap the con- 
sequences accordingly : he proceeds to act 
upon that supposition, and all experience con- 
firms him in it ; and when he has acted, his 
conscience either approves of what he has 
done, or it reproaches him for his folly or his 
wickedness. Again, his conduct towards others 
is regulated on the same principle. He has a 
sense of merit, and of demerit, as arising out 
of their actions: he feels both gratitude and 
ingratitude towards them : he feels, and he in- 
flicts, vengeance for injuries, because he feels 
assured, that these injuries have been com- 
mitted against him voluntarily and freely : if 
this were not his reason, he would attempt to 
punish a tree, that had fallen upon him, 



CO 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



equally with a murderer, who had aimed a 
dagger at his breast. 

The whole frame of civil and domestic 
government is constituted on the same basis of 
our free will. Both these regard mankind as 
accountable beings, and make them accord- 
ingly answerable for their conduct. They 
deem punishment to be deserved, and inflict 
it with a view to deter others, as being free 
agents, from committing crimes. 

Nor are all these things to be considered in 
the light of mere human inventions : for they 
were clearly intended by the Author of our 
nature ; and they are parts, as well as proofs, 
of His Moral government of mankind. If in- 
deed we believe, that this government is a 
Moral one, f that is to say, one in which virtue 
as such is rewarded, and vice as such pu- 
nished ; or that such a Moral government will 
ever be brought into operation hereafter ; or if 
we believe, that the Governor of the world 
is a just and righteous Being; then we must 
also believe, that we are free agents. For we 
cannot possibly think, that such a Being would 
punish creatures of Necessity, as though they 
were free to choose between good and evil. 
If He does so, not only must the whole Moral 



f Part III. Chap. I. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



81 



Creation be looked upon as discordant with 
itself, with reason, and with justice, and as in- 
capable of explanation ; but God himself must 
be thought to be essentially unjust. The saying 
of the Apostle would be literally reversed : for 
every man would be true, and God a liar. 

3. Upon the supposition of Necessity we 
must believe, that Virtue and Vice, Right and 
Wrong, Merit and Demerit, Honour and Dis- 
honour, Justice and Injustice, Benevolence and 
Malevolence, in a word all Moral distinctions, 
are mere empty names, distinctions without 
differences, which have been introduced into 
the world through mistake, and ought to be 
blotted out of all languages. We must believe, 
that tyrants or murderers ought to be as 
much objects of our esteem, as the most disin- 
terested benefactors of mankind. We must 
persuade ourselves, that no man was ever 
assisted by prudence, or retarded by impru- 
dence, in working out his purposes ; that re- 
wards and punishments produce as much effect 
on the most thoughtless as on the most pru- 
dent (that is, that they produce no effect at all) 
either in education, or in civil government, or 
on any other occasion ; that all those maxims, 
whether of prudence or of virtue, which have 
served mankind, as rules of life and conduct, 
since the world began, are nothing but the 
useless fictions of error, founded in prejudice, 

G 



82 



THE ACCORDANCE Ol< RELIGION 



and ending in failure. We must believe, that 
it is of no use for us to act, or rather, that it is 
not in our power to act at all, but only to be 
acted upon, like lifeless machines. 

All this is surely very hard to believe. 

4. But the advocates of Necessity assert, that 
Freewill is impossible. 

"Every change," they say, "implies the ope- 
ration of a cause : volition, therefore, must be 
produced by some cause, by which it is com- 
pelled to act. Man, therefore, is a Necessary 
agent." Upon this argument it may be ob- 
served, First, That it is equally applicable to 
the Deity, as to ourselves ; that whoever admits 
it, must be prepared at the same time to main- 
tain, that no event, great or little, including the 
formation of the Universe, could possibly have 
happened otherwise than it did ; a conse- 
quence, which Spinoza admitted as following 
from these his premises ; but which is too 
absurd not to be revolting to every unpre- 
judiced person. It may be said indeed, that 
the conclusion oversets the premises, like a 
mathematical demonstration in the form of a 
reductio ad absurdum. 

Secondly, The maxim, " that every change 
requires a cause" is not true, M'hen stated in 
this unrestricted sense. It is true of inanimate 
matter alone; and to assert that it is true 
when applied to mind, is a mere begging of 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 83 

the question. So far is it from being true in 
this sense, that on the contrary, by a law of 
our constitution, which has been before stated, 
we refer all change to Mind, as to its ultimate 
Causef— in the works of Nature to the will of 
the Deity ; and in those of man to the will of 
man. To say that mind cannot act without a 
cause is to say that mind cannot really act at 
all, but can only be acted upon : so that the 
very term Necessary Agent is a contradiction. 

Thirdly, It may be observed, that, if this 
maxim is to be taken without limitation, as it 
is in this argument, there can be no First 
Cause at all. For the so-called First Cause 
will still require some prior one to produce it ; 
and this is more absurd than even Atheism. 

5. Another argument for Necessity is founded 
upon the principle of the Sufficient Reason. 
The mind, it is said, is necessarily determined 
by motives ; and if contrary motives urge it in 
opposite directions, it must be determined by 
the strongest. 

In answer to this it may be observed, First, 
That there is no test, by which the strength of 
motives can be measured, except this very one 
of their power to determine. To say therefore, 
that the strongest motive must determine a 



t " Ad animorum motus voluntaries non est requirenda 
externa causa." Cic. De Fato. 11. See Chap. II. 



84 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



man, is merely an identical proposition, which 
asserts, that that motive, which must determine 
a man, must determine him : and this does not 
much advance our knowledge of the matter. 

Secondly, To assert, that the Mind can only 
act from motives, is contrary to the most ob- 
vious experience. If five shillings are upon 
the table, I can take up one, though I am con- 
scious of no motive whatever for choosing that 
one rather than another : and if I am con- 
scious of none, none of course can operate 
upon me. 

Thirdly, This argument from the operation 
of motives is only a particular form of that 
more general one last examined, that every 
thing which exists, must have a cause ; and 
may of course be refuted in the same manner. 

6. Another argument for the Doctrine of 
Necessity, is, that Freewill is incompatible with 
Divine Foreknowledge — that, if God fore- 
knows that I shall do a particular act, it must 
be certain, that I shall do it : and if it is 
certain that I shall do it, then I must do it of 
necessity. 

It may be granted, that I shall certainly do 
it : but to assert that I must do it of necessity, 
is again a mere begging of the question : and 
it seems a sufficient answer to this, merely to 
beg the opposite side of the question, and with 
equal confidence to assert, that whatever acts 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 85 



of ray freewill are certain, I shall certainly do 
them of my freewill. 

It is here assumed, that whatever is certain 
to happen, must happen necessarily. This as- 
sumption, however, cannot be admitted with- 
out proof :f and to prove it is, I believe, above 
the reach of our faculties. On the contrary, if 
the Deity is himself a Free Agent, it cannot 
be true. For we ourselves certainly foreknow, 
that He will always do what is right, since it 
is a contradiction to suppose that a Perfect 
Being should do otherwise. Yet it cannot be 
said, that because He certainly will do what 
is right, therefore He does not act freely : for 
this would be to say, that the right use of li- 
berty destroys liberty, and consequently that 
liberty consists only in its own abuse. In de- 
nying therefore, that the Deity can foreknow 
human actions, if men are free agents, we deny 
to an Infinite Intelligence the possibility of a 
power, which He has conferred upon ourselves, 
who (weak and ignorant and dependent beings 
as we are) do yet foreknow, that He, a Free 
Agent, will always do what is wise and right. 

Suppose, however, we admit, for the sake of 
argument, that Foreknowledge is really incon- 



f Cicero, indeed, directly asserts the contrary : " Ratio ipsa 
coget, et ex eeternitate quaedam vera esse, et ea non esse nexa 
causis aeternis, et a fati necessitate esse libera." De Fato. 16. 



80 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



sistent with Freedom: let us see to what the 
admission will lead us, that we may judge of 
the tree by its fruit. 

The Deity, then, may have either Freedom 
or Foreknowledge : He cannot have both. 
Either, therefore, He is utterly ignorant what 
He himself will do to-morrow and in all future 
time ; or else He has created and governed, 
and always must govern, the Universe under 
compulsion — because He cannot help doing 
whatever he does. Either branch of the di- 
lemma is too absurd and shocking to be 
listened to. 

If the arguments establishing such a con- 
clusion were demonstrative, we might surely 
suspect that some fallacy were lurking in 
them : much more may we suspect this, when 
these arguments are built on the assumption, 
that we must understand the manner in which 
an Infinite Intelligence foreknows things.f 
But with regard to the fact of His foreknow- 
ing them, I do not see any greater difficulty 
involved in it, than in His knowing our pre- 
sent thoughts, which every Deist admits that 



f By a similar line of argument Carneades was led to main- 
tain, that past events could not be known to the Deity, any 
more than future, unless from their connection with things 
present. " Ita ne praeterita quidem ea, quorum nulla signa, 
tanquam vestigia, extarent, Apollini nota esse censebat." — 
Cicero De Fato. 14. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



87 



He does. I do not know that it involves 
greater difficulty, than does the phenomenon 
of mere human memory. For we are utterly 
ignorant how we ourselves remember : of the 
fact that we do remember, we are quite assured. 

It will hardly be denied, that the argu- 
ments both for Freewill and for the Divine 
Foreknowledge are strong, when considered 
apart. As long as the advocate of each keeps 
to his own field, he carries all before him : it 
is when he makes an inroad into the enemy's 
camp that he is repulsed. The two doctrines 
cannot be fully and satisfactorily reconciled, 
and therefore men have seemed to think, that 
they must disbelieve the one or the other. Is 
this what they do in other similar cases ? in 
that, for instance, of mathematics? Can any 
man reconcile his belief, that two lines can 
perpetually approximate, with his belief, that 
they will never meet? And does he, therefore, 
reject the belief of either? No. He rather 
concludes, that there is some imperfection in 
his faculties, which disables him from fully 
comprehending, how both can be true. Why 
should we not do the same in the case of Free- 
will and Divine Foreknowledge ? The perfec- 
tions of an Infinite Intelligence are not surely 
more easy of comprehension, than the proper- 
ties of lines and surfaces. 



88 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

The application of this subject to the ques- 
tion of Religion is self-evident. But the decision 
of it is by no means of that importance, which 
is commonly supposed ; for Bishop Butler has 
admirably shewn, that the opinion of Necessity, 
even if true, by no means destroys the notion 
of Religion. 

Even though the doctrine should be specu- 
latively true, yet it is at the same time prac- 
tically false. Although it should be true, that 
we are really creatures of Necessity ; yet it is 
equally true, and much more undoubted, that 
we are in fact rewarded and punished for our 
good and bad actions, as if we were free : and 
it is equally indisputable, that if we were to 
attempt to act upon the opinion of Necessity, 
(however true) even in this life, it would 
plunge us into the most insufferable evils. It 
is, therefore, practically false ; that is to say, 
it would mislead us, if applied to practice here. 
With what confidence, then, can we act upon 
it, where the interests at stake are so much 
larger and more important, as in the case of 
Religion ? 

It seems, indeed, to be just as probable, 
that the opinion may mislead us in the one 
case, as in the other. If blind Necessity 
brought us into this world, and here rewards 
and punishes us, creatures of Necessity, as 
though we were free ; this is indeed very con- 



WITH OUU MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



89 



trary to what our reason would have led us 
to expect. But it is just as probable (though 
it may seem equally unreasonable to us) that 
the same blind Necessity may also cany us 
into another world, and there too reward and 
punish us, as if we were free, for the good or 
evil we have done. 



CHAPTER VI. 
That Belief depends partly on the Will. 

EVERY man knows that his Belief, whether 
relating to a matter of fact or of opinion, 
is universally regulated by the degree and 
strength of evidence ; according as these ap- 
pear to his mind to be sufficient or insufficient. 
He cannot believe, that two and two make 
either four or six, according as he chooses to 
believe the one or the other. And in reasoning 
on probable grounds it is the same. If evi- 
dence is laid before him, such as satisfies his 
judgment, that a particular event is rather 
probable than improbable, or probable in some 
certain degree ; no effort of the will can make 
him think the contrary. 

It is, however, equally manifest (if at least 
we have any power of willing at all), that, 



UO - THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

when evidence is offered to him, he may either 
direct his attention to the examination of it, or 
not attend to it, whichever he chooses. There 
is the same difference between merely hearing 
a truth stated and examining into it, as be- 
tween seeing a thing and looking at it : the 
one is involuntary, the other voluntary. A 
Judge upon the bench, if he is either indolent 
or willing to favour one of the parties, may 
hear the evidence on one side, and refuse to 
hear any on the other. I entertain a belief on 
some speculative point, according to the argu- 
ments either now or formerly present to my 
mind : nor can I, as long as these arguments 
form my sole ground of judgment, believe 
otherwise than I do. Nevertheless, if I possess 
a book, which I know contains other argu- 
ments relating to the point in question ; I may 
either open this book and examine it, or I 
may through indolence or from prejudice re- 
fuse to do so. And as I may open the book 
and turn my bodily eye to the page, or avert 
it, whichever I please : so I have the liberty 
either of directing my attention to the examin- 
ing of a question by my own reason, or of not 
doing so : I may deliberate or not. I may 
likewise examine the question with earnest- 
ness, and a desire to banish prejudice and 
passion, and interest ; or I may do it indo- 
lently and without any such desire. And not 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



only thus directly, but more remotely, the moral 
character constantly influences in many ways 
the decisions of the intellect. Thus, though 
we cannot directly command our own assent 
or dissent; we can, nevertheless, in many 
cases, entirely command those means by which 
that assent or dissent will be decided. 

Where the case is one of merely speculative 
truth or falsehood, we are open to a charge of 
folly, whenever we have from such wilful 
blindness confounded the two. But if the 
question be one of Moral right and wrong, 
then we are as clearly open to a charge of 
guilt, as well as of folly, — and this in propor- 
tion to the importance of the question at issue. 
If this is not so, then a jury, who convict an 
innocent man through indolence or prejudice, 
are guilty of no crime at all. Or, supposing 
there was sufficient evidence to the Jews, that 
Christ was the Son of God, (whether or no 
there actually was so, is nothing to the ques- 
tion : but supposing that there was sufficient 
evidence,) nevertheless His murderers were 
blameless — if there is no such thing as wilful 
blindness to evidence — for they doubtless be- 
lieved, that He was an impostor. Can any 
man think this ? 

Some men are bad reasoners, and come to 
false conclusions on that account : and this 
they cannot now help. And yet they may 



92 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



have been to blame even here : for if they have 
voluntarily neglected opportunities of im- 
proving their reason, and therefore only have 
come to wrong conclusions, their fault has 
been so far wilful. Again, there can, I think, 
be no doubt, that a sceptical habit of mind 
may be wilfully indulged, and wilfully formed, 
and for this we shall be answerable. 



Belief and disbelief in Religion, either na- 
tural or revealed, exactly resemble in their 
relation to the Will, belief and disbelief in any 
other matter of fact or of opinion. They de- 
pend upon the Will just as much in this case 
as in any other, and no more. We have all 
(at least in Christian countries) opportunities, 
greater or less, of examining into the question 
of Religion and its evidences. In proportion 
then, as we neglect these opportunities, and 
are unbelievers in consequence of so doing, in 
that proportion we are guilty — guilty both of 
folly and of crime : of folly, because the ques- 
tion involves our own highest interests ; of 
crime, because it is also a question of obe- 
dience or of disobedience to the Governor of 
the world, — of Moral right and wrong. 

The abilities and opportunities possessed by 
many, of forming their own opinion on the 
matter, are obviously but scanty, as compared 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



93 



with those enjoyed by others : but it is equally 
manifest, that this can be no excuse whatever 
for their neglecting those opportunities, which 
they have. 



That we have a prudential Regard for our 



HE lower animals are all instinctiv 



JL impelled to seek the immediate gratifica- 
tion of their several appetites ; and there is 
in them apparently no antagonist principle 
(except, perhaps, that of fear) intended to 
restrain them from indulgence, whenever in- 
dulgence is in their power. Man alone, as he 
foresees distant consequences, has also of 
course a power of regarding his own distant 
and ultimate good — of considering what will 
be for his advantage upon the whole. But 
man too has, like the brutes, his appetites and 
desires, mere instinctive propensities, which 
prompt him to seize the present gratification, 
however small, though at the expense, or 
rather without consideration, of distant good 
however great. For Good and Evil appear 
to the eye of Desire, like material objects to 
the bodily eye, larger in proportion as they 



CHAPTER VII. 



own Happiness. 




94 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



are near : the delusion must be corrected by 
an appeal to judgment and experience, which 
can alone teach us in either case to estimate 
things according to their real, not their appa- 
rent, magnitude. If we act therefore, while 
under the delusion, and without reflection ; 
appetite, left to itself, will impel us to seize the 
present good, though smaller, because from its 
very nearness it occupies a larger space in our 
mental vision. Reflection, on the other hand, 
will remind us, that good will really be equally 
good a thousand years hence, as at the present 
moment ; and that therefore it is the part of a 
wise man to choose whichever is really the 
greater, without any regard to distance of time. 
Such a conviction seems indeed sufficiently 
manifest to the eye of unbiassed reason. But 
a speculative conviction of a truth is so very 
different from a persuasion strong and lively 
enough to become a principle of action, that 
no man can look to distant consequences, and 
make them objects of pursuit, with the same 
steadiness and zeal, as though they were im- 
mediate. 

Children are apt in this case as in others, to 
be led by the instinctive feeling rather than by 
reflection ; to look to immediate, rather than to 
distant, consequences : and it is therefore a 
necessary part of education to supply this 
defect by bringing, as it were, distant conse- 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION . 



05 



quences nearer in the shape of rewards and 
punishments. The illusion, to which they are 
subject, is thus in some measure corrected, 
and an habitual preference encouraged of that 
which is for their own ultimate happiness. 

And such an habitual preference is what 
constitutes, not only the difference between the 
prudent man and the imprudent, but in some 
measure too the distinction between the vir- 
tuous and the vicious. It is the object of pru- 
dence to secure our own happiness upon the 
whole : and it is surprising to one, who has 
never carefully considered the subject, how 
very vast a proportion of human misery would 
be avoided, if mankind in general systemati- 
cally acted with a due regard to its dictates.! 
But such a line of conduct will, if carried out 
to its full and adequate extent, form us to 
virtue as well as to prudence : for virtue is as- 
suredly our highest interest, as well as our 
duty. If this requires any proof, it is proved 
by the fact, that a regard for our own happiness 
has by some moralists been made the sole 
foundation of all virtue : and although this 
doctrine has been, as it ought to be, strenuously 
opposed, yet no instance has ever been pro- 

f This is illustrated in almost every page of Combe's " Con- 
stitution of Man." The book is mixed up with Phrenology 
(of which I give no opinion) : but its leading doctrines are 
equally true, whether Phrenology be true or false. 



96 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

duced, in which duty and interest are really at 
variance. And if men expect, that happiness 
either in this life or the next will be the conse- 
quence of virtuous conduct ; they cannot pos- 
sibly help this expectation from operating with 
them as a motive. For " this at least is beyond 
all doubt and indisputable, that all men wish 
well to themselves ; nor can the mind divest 
itself of this propensity, without divesting itself 
of its being. And this is what the schoolmen 
mean, when they say, that ' the will is carried 
towards happiness not simply as will but as 
nature.' "i Indeed Bishop Butler has gone fur- 
ther : for he has expressed an opinion, that a 
regard for our own happiness is in itself a Moral 
duty. " It deserves to be considered, " says he 
" whether men are more at liberty in point of 
morals, to make themselves miserable without 
reason, than to make other people so; or dis- 
solutely to neglect their own greater good, for 
the sake of a present lesser gratification, than 
they are to neglect the good of others, whom 
Nature has committed to their care. It should 
seem, that a due concern about our own in- 
terest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour 
to secure and promote it, which is, I think, 
very much the meaning of the word Prudence 
in our language ; it should seem that this is 



f Leighton. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



97 



virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and 
blameable : since in the calmest way of reflec- 
tion we approve of the first, and condemn the 
other conduct, both in ourselves and others." | 
And such a view of the case is, I think, 
strongly confirmed by the fact, that the neglect 
of our own interest is constantly and very 
severely punished in the natural government 
of the world. Now such a constitution of things 
surely implies that guilt is incurred by such 
neglect : this is implied in the very idea of 
punishment at all. On the other hand a pru- 
dent attention to our own interest is in the 
constitution of the world naturally rewarded ■ 
and this equally implies merit. But, whe- 
ther this be so or not, the fact itself is un- 
doubted, that we and the world around us are 
so constituted, that a regard for our own hap- 
piness is absolutely necessary for our welfare ; 
and our welfare is actually in great measure 
proportioned to this regard. 



Now, in conformity with this constitution of 
things, Religion makes use of this natural 
regard for our own happiness as a motive 
whereby to induce us to a right course of action. 



X Dissertation — Of the Nature of Virtue. 
H 



98 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

She shews us that " godliness is profitable 
unto all things, having promise of the life that 
now is, and of that which is to come." 

Yet Lord Shaftesbury has argued against 
the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, 
on the ground, that " if it be true piety to love 
God for his own sake, the over-solicitous regard 
to private good expected from Him, must of 
necessity prove a diminution of Piety." And 
again : " The more there is of this violent 
affection towards private good, the less room 
there is for the other sort towards Goodness 
itself." f Lord Shaftesbury supposes, there- 
fore, that it cannot be the way of Providence 
to rear us to habits of virtue by holding out to 
us the expectation of rewards and punish- 
ments, and that the whole notion of Religion 
is therefore false. 

Now such a supposition is proved to be 
erroneous by the actual constitution of the 
world. The Author of our nature has made 
a regard for our own welfare, one of the 
strongest of our Active Principles : and such a 
regard is so far from being incompatible with 
a sense of duty or a love of virtue, that on the 
contrary it is indisputable, that we are very 
commonly first led to the formation of virtuous 



f Vol. ii. p. 58. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 99 



habits merely by a consideration of our own 
interest : especially in education, children are 
formed to such habits by the hope of rewards 
and the fear of punishments. The hopes and 
fears too held out by Religion (whether true or 
false) certainly operate in the same way more 
or less. All this is matter of present experi- 
ence. Yet this is the very thing which Lord 
Shaftesbury maintains to be incredible, as set 
forth in the scheme of Religion ; though he 
has himself laboured successfully to show, that 
virtue does actually lead to happiness here, 
and vice to misery. 

But if a regard for our own welfare is thus 
actually rewarded by the Natural Governor of 
the world, and a disregard of it punished ; and 
if such a regard also leads in the natural course 
of things to the formation of virtuous charac- 
ters, then such regard cannot be inconsistent 
with the scheme of Religion, since the forma- 
tion of virtuous characters is the very object of 
Religion. 

Perhaps in our future state a security from 
relapsing into vice may be in part derived from 
this principle of our Nature. For in propor- 
tion to the greater perfection of our intellectual 
faculties, we shall then perceive the distant 
consequences of our actions as clearly and 
vividly as the most immediate : that illusion, 
which tempts us now to seize present gratifi- 



100 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



cation at the cost of future misery, which 
seems small only from the obscurity of dis- 
tance, will be destroyed : and if virtue and 
happiness, vice and misery, do really in the 
long run (as there is every reason to think they 
do) always respectively coincide ; vice will 
then perhaps become impossible to us from 
mere considerations of self-interest. There 
will of course be other and higher motives of 
action : but this may be one there, as it is 
here. 



CHAPTER VIII. 
That Conscience is naturally Supreme. 

TN our present state, however, this regard 
X for our own good is not alone sufficient 
to guide us in a right line of conduct. As 
a Principle of Action, it labours under two 
defects. First, it would often require very 
enlarged views to enable us to foresee all the 
remote consequences of our actions : and there- 
fore, to the great majority of mankind it must 
often be useless as a practical guide. Secondly, 
even to those who possess the most enlarged 
views, consideration is necessary, before they 
can arrive at right conclusions ; but in the 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 101 

conduct of active life a monitor is required, 
who shall be able to prompt us on the instant. 

Therefore, to supply the defects of this 
guide, Nature has implanted in us another 
principle, the Sense of Duty, or Conscience, 
which prompts us to do right, forbids us to 
do wrong ; and afterwards commends or re- 
proaches us accordingly. Both principles, 
when allowed to exert their proper and na- 
tural influence, will lead us in the same line 
of conduct ; just as two guides, both perfectly 
skilful, will conduct a traveller to his object by 
the same route: but the operation of Consci- 
ence, being instantaneous, enables us, in cases 
of right and wrong, to reap all the benefits of 
the utmost prudence and reflection, without 
the labour or delay, which attend upon these 
— " the happy effect of following Nature, 
which is wisdom without reflection, and above 
it." | What Sterne has said of the heart, is 
equally true of the Conscience : " When the 
heart flies out before the understanding, it 
saves the judgment a world of pains." 

This very coincidence, indeed, has induced 
some moralists to contend, that Virtue is merely 
a matter of prudence, and that, therefore, the 
Sense of Duty may be resolved into a regard 
for our own interest. That they are, however, 



t Burke. 



102 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

really distinct principles, may be easily shown. 
First, Conscience evidently begins to operate 
as an Active Principle, long before we are able 
to form any idea of our own good upon the 
whole. Secondly, it operates with those, who 
do not take the trouble, or have not opportu- 
nity, or who positively refuse, to calculate the 
distant consequences of their actions. Thirdly, 
both the pleasures and the pangs of Consci- 
ence are entirely different from those feelings, 
which arise from the recollection, that we have 
promoted or thwarted our own interest. 

The existence of a Moral Principle, and 
consequently of any natural distinction be- 
tween right and wrong, has been denied 
chiefly on account of the diversity, which 
exists between the moral judgments of men in 
different ages and nations. The Spartans 
reckoned theft to be honourable, and the 
Chinese consider child-murder as harmless. 
But if we are thus to argue, that no faculty is 
natural, whose use has been perverted, we must 
assuredly maintain, that mankind have na- 
turally no Reasoning Faculty ; for the errors 
in speculative opinion current amongst them 
are beyond comparison greater and more nu- 
merous, than the differences of their Moral 
judgments. If this is too absurd to be main- 
tained, (which it evidently is) we cannot in 
consistency maintain the other. Both cases 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 103 

are indeed easily explained and accounted for 
from those common causes of error, which 
mislead us alike in either. | 

Mankind in general are indeed agreed as 
to the existence of such a Moral Principle 
amongst us. Vice itself cannot help paying 
its homage to virtue, both by studiously as- 
suming its semblance, and by secretly at least 
holding it in honour and esteem ; thereby ac- 
knowledging its existence : nor can the most 
abandoned of mankind refuse to believe, that 
some men perform actions from a sense of 
duty. Moral axioms may indeed be denied 
without such glaring absurdity, as a denial of 
those of mathematics would involve ; but this 
is only because they are not, like them, neces- 
sary to reasoning, but are a part of our moral 
constitution. The very existence of such words 
as Right and Wrong, Virtue and Vice, Ought 
and Ought not, in all languages, is of itself a 
sufficient proof, that a Moral Principle is 
equally universal. Perhaps too, strange as it 
may appear in a world, where vice so greatly 
abounds, there is yet no desire more universal 
among men, than that of a peaceful conscience, 
and that in proportion as men have experienced 



f These causes are traced by Stewart, in his Philosophy of 
the Active Powers, vol. i. p. 175. 



104 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



the miseries of remorse. In the most headlong 
course of vice, there is still some distant vision 
of repentance and amendment, before death 
shall overtake us. " Let me die the death of 
the righteous, and let my last end be like his," 
is the secret wish of the most profligate and 
abandoned. 

Thus the most convincing proof of the reality 
of a Moral Principle is to be found in every 
man's own breast, equally in the breast of him 
who denies it, as of him who acknowledges and 
obeys it. Nor is the certainty of its existence 
at all affected by men's disputing about its 
origin — whether it is an original Principle of 
our Nature, or whether it can be resolved into 
others more elementary. But still it may 
properly be asked, how do we know that its dic- 
tates are to be obeyed in preference to those of 
nil our other feelings and sentiments, when it is 
often in direct opposition to these? To this it 
is to be answered, that the rightful Supremacy 
of Conscience is shewn at once by the very 
place, which it so evidently holds in the con- 
stitution of our minds. No other feeling or 
sentiment takes upon itself, as this does, to sit 
as judge over any of its fellow-feelings. They 
may, and do for ever, contradict and struggle 
with one another. Compassion is opposite to 
Resentment, and Friendship to Hatred: never- 
theless, neither of these assumes to itself aright 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 105 



of passing judgment upon its antagonist. But 
the Conscience does, from its very nature, as- 
sume and exercise this right. It continually 
interferes both to sanction and to forbid the 
exercise of all our other feelings. Now, no 
man doubts, that the several faculties of our 
minds were given us, each for its appropriate 
office ; and that that office can be ascertained 
only by the part which the faculty actually 
fulfils in our constitution ; from the office being 
actually executed by it. We are very sure 
that our reasoning powers were given us to 
guide us in matters of reasoning. How are 
we sure of this? Because they do actually 
guide us in these matters, and serve no other 
purpose. When, in examining a steam-engine, 
we perceive, that what is called the " governor 1 ' 
in that machine, executes the office of regu- 
lating all its movements, and fulfils no other 
end; we conclude, without any doubt, that 
such was the purpose for which it was devised 
by the inventor. Just so, we cannot doubt, 
that the office of Conscience was intended by 
the Author of our nature to be that of a judge, 
who should regulate and pass sentence on our 
conduct ; because that is the sole office which 
it actually performs. 

Other proofs are not wanting. One is to be 
found in the fact, that, whenever we reject the 
decisions of Conscience, punishment is inflicted 



106 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



on us by nature : f punishment severe in pro- 
portion as the decision, which we rejected, has 
been clear and strong. Now, Nature never 
systematically inflicts punishment upon us, but 
when we have transgressed some one of her 
laws. Therefore, we may be sure, that the 
dictates of Conscience are the dictates of Na- 
ture. 

Again, every one of our other faculties may 
be brought into operation beyond its due and 
proper measure; and whenever this is done, 
some evil consequence ensues to us — we are 
invariably punished for it in the end. But this 
never happens with Conscience. No man ever 
reasonably repented that he had paid entire 
obedience to its dictates. The more scope we 
give it, the greater the benefit and enjoyment 
which we derive from it. 



If Conscience, then, be a principle implanted 



f Cicero says of the Law of Nature (of which that of Con- 
science is of course a part) : " Cui qui non parebit, ipse se 
fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernatus, hoc ipso luet maximas 
poenas, etiam si caetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit." 
-De Republ. iii. 22. 

" Dat poenas, quisquis expectat ; quisquis autem meruit, 
expectat." " Whoever is expecting punishment, is punished 
by so doing ; hut every man expects it when he deserves it." 
— Seneca, Epist. 105. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 107 



in us by Nature for our direction, we might be 
sure that both its general right of supremacy, 
and its particular dictates, would be confirmed 
by Religion, if Religion be true. And, ac- 
cordingly, Natural Religion enforces this 
maxim above all others, that we are to do that 
which Conscience tells us is right, because our 
so doing is agreeable to our nature, and to the 
Author of our nature. Revelation everywhere 
inculcates the same lesson : " If our heart 
condemn us not, then have we confidence 
toward God."j" And, " If thy right eye offend 
thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee." " If 
thy right hand offend thee, cut it off and cast 
it from thee.";}; Make any sacrifice rather than 
do that which you know to be wrong. The 
power of Conscience to direct and guide us is 
equally recognised in the Old Testament : 
" For this commandment, which I command 
thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, 
neither is it far off. It is not in Heaven, that 
thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to 
Heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may 
hear it, and do it? Neither is it beyond the 
sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over 
the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we 
may hear it, and do it? But the word is very 
nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, 



t 1 John, iii. 21. 



\ Matthew, v. 29. 



108 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

that thou mayest do it."§ And the whole 
tenor of Scripture manifestly breathes the 
same spirit. 

And as both conviction and punishment for 
our moral offences are in great measure 
brought about by the operation of Conscience 
in this life ; so it may very possibly effect the 
same purposes in the next. Should the recol- 
lection of past crimes have vanished from our 
minds, there can be no doubt, that our Great 
Judge will have power to recall the conscious- 
ness of them in all their freshness. And there 
are facts in the phenomena of our minds, 
which seem to indicate the present existence 
of some latent germs, which may hereafter be 
called forth into more active operation in sub- 
servience to such a purpose. 

It must have happened to every man occa- 
sionally, that certain passages of his past life 
have suddenly and unexpectedly recurred to 
his mind, after they had long apparently been 
forgotten for ever. This very commonly 
happens in dreaming. But the following facts 
will show, that it is in the nature of the mind 
to experience similar phaenomena in a much 
higher degree. They are recorded as some of 
the common effects of opium, by one who fre- 
quently experienced them. " The minutest in- 



§ Deuteronomy, xxx. 11. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 109 



cidents of childhood, or forgotten scenes of 
later years, were often revived : I could not be 
said to recollect them ; for if I had been told 
of them when waking, I should not have been 
able to acknowledge them as parts of my past 
experience. But, placed as they were before 
me, in dreams like intuitions, and clothed in 
all their evanescent circumstances and accom- 
panying feelings, I recognised them instanta- 
neously. I was once told by a near relation, 
that having in her childhood fallen into a river, 
and being on the very verge of death but for 
the critical assistance which reached her, 
she saw in a moment her whole life, in its 
minutest incidents arrayed before her simulta- 
neously as in a mirror ; and she had a faculty 
developed as suddenly for comprehending the 
whole and every part. This, from some opium 
experiences of mine, I can believe : I have in- 
deed seen the same thing asserted twice in 
modern books, and accompanied by a remark, 
which I am convinced is true ; viz. that the 
dread book of account, which the S.S. speak 
of, is, in fact, the mind itself of each individual. 
Of this at least I feel assured, that there is no 
such thing as forgetting possible to the mind : 
a thousand accidents may and will interpose 
a veil between our present consciousness and 
the secret inscriptions on the mind ; accidents 
of the same sort will also rend away this veil ; 



110 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

but, alike whether veiled or unveiled, the in- 
scription remains for ever." -\ 

It seems not impossible too, that that " worm, 
that never dieth," mentioned in Scripture, may 



f Opium Eater, p. 161. The following are similar instances 
of this phenomenon. " A Lutheran clergyman of Philadelphia 
informed Dr. Rush, that Germans and Swedes, of whom he 
had a considerable number in his congregation, when near 
death always prayed in their native languages, though some of 
them, he was confident, had not spoken these languages for 
fifty or sixty years." Abercrombie on the Intellec. Powers, 
p. 141. " An ignorant servant girl, mentioned by Coleridge, 
during the delirium of a fever, repeated passages from theolo- 
gical works in Latin, Greek, and Rabbinical Hebrew, which 
being taken down and traced to the works, from which they 
were derived, were found to be repeated with perfect accuracy. 
It turned out, that she had been servant to a clergyman, a man 
of much learning and peculiar habits, who was in the habit of 
walking in a passage in his house which led to the kitchen, 
and there reading aloud his favourite authors." Ibid. p. 142. 
In Macnish's Philosophy of Sleep, the case of a girl is related, 
who during the delirious paroxysm of a fever spoke Welsh, a 
language, which she had learnt in her childhood, but had quite 
forgotten previously to her illness, and of which she could not 
speak a syllable after her recovery. In her case too, " during 
the delirium of fever, the obliterated impressions of infancy were 
brought to her mind, and continued to operate there so long as 
she remained under the mental excitation occasioned by the 
disease, but no longer." 

Dr. Pritchard too, describes the case of a man in St. Thomas's 
Hospital, who in consequence of an injury in the head recovered 
a knowledge of Welsh, after he had ceased to speak it for 
thirty years, and had entirely forgotten it. Dr. P. adds, that 
this statement, first given by Mr. Tupper, was confirmed to him 
by a personal witness. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. Ill 

be only the Conscience applied as an instru- 
ment of punishment ; as it is supposed above 
to be one of conviction. And it is remarkable, 
in connection with this subject, that, though it 
is a general law of our minds, that passive feel- 
ings, whether pleasurable or painful, are 
exhausted quickly, in proportion as they are 
intense and vivid; yet in the case of Consci- 
ence this law not only does not operate, but is 
reversed : for the more intense are either its 
pleasures or its pains, the longer do they last. 
What Byron has said of memory in general is 
particularly applicable to Conscience — that 
" it is that mirror, which affliction dashes to 
the ground ; and looking on the fragments, 
only beholds the reflection multiplied." 

Now we have only to suppose these laws of 
our minds, of which we obtain a glimpse in the 
facts related above, to be hereafter carried out 
into full and complete operation ; and Con- 
science will thus acquire a power of allotting 
both rewards and punishments to an indefinite 
extent. 



112 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



CHAPTER IX. 



That Reverence and Love are naturally due to 
Power, Wisdom, Righteousness, and Good- 



r PHE mind of man has been so constituted 



JL as to be affected in certain definite ways 
by certain objects. This is obvious to all in 
the case of the bodily senses ; for we cannot 
fail to take notice, that we experience the sen- 
sation of sight or of smell, for instance, when 
the proper objects of these senses are presented 
to us. And in the same way the several Emo- 
tions or Sentiments are excited by their re- 
spective objects : and though these exist in 
very different degrees in different persons, yet 
there cannot be a doubt, that they are equally 
parts of human nature. 

The sentiment of Reverence or Awe is thus 
naturally called into action by the contempla- 
tion of Power, of Wisdom, or of Righteousness ; 
Love and Gratitude are called forth by Bene- 
volence and Goodness. Every man feels these 
more or less towards his fellow-creatures, in 
proportion as they are invested more or less 
with these attributes. That such is human 
nature, we have both the direct testimony of 



n ess. 




WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION". 113 



different ages and nations, and the indirect, 
but no less decisive, proofs afforded by all lan- 
guages. The words Reverence and Awe 
would else never have been invented : for they 
are applied to no other feelings, but to such as 
are inspired by these qualities of Power, Wis- 
dom, and Righteousness. In the same way 
Love (not of course the sensual passion of Love) 
and Gratitude would be useless terms, had they 
never been excited by Goodness and Benevo- 
lence. We should be ignorant of their mean- 
ing. 

The Reverence inspired by Power is the 
main support of civil, as well as of domestic, 
government; the numerical force being always 
on the side of the governed : and this again is 
a proof that bad men feel it as well as good. 
And when to Reverence is added a belief in 
the Wisdom and Righteousness of the gover- 
nors, then such a government will never be 
contemned or disobeyed. If again to these is 
added a conviction, that it is also a tender and 
a kind government, then there is as little doubt 
that it will be loved, as well as reverenced ; 
and such a government is perfectly secure 
from internal violence. 

These sentiments, then, are natural to man- 
kind in general. And every man's own breast 
bears witness, not only that the thing is so, 
but that it is right and fit that it should be so. 

i 



1 14 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



What does Irreverence imply, but that Re- 
verence is justly due to some characters and 
persons? and what characters are these, but 
the Good, the Wise, and the Powerful? Or 
what does Ingratitude mean, if no Gratitude 
be due to any ? and to whom can it be due, if 
not to those, who show us kindness? Do we 
not naturally approve these feelings in our- 
selves and others? Do we not as naturally 
reproach ourselves, and blame others, for the 
want of them? And is not the justice of our 
so doing confirmed by the fact, that, though 
these sentiments exist more or less in all men's 
breasts, yet they are found to be strong in 
proportion as men are themselves wise and 
virtuous and benevolent? 

But it is not necessary to our entertaining 
these sentiments, that we should be present 
with the persons, who are the objects of them, 
or even that we should ever have seen them. 
It is for the character that we entertain the 
emotions, not for the outward and bodily man : 
for we experience them in the case of men of 
remote ages and countries. 

Again, in the case of one of this character, 
to whom we are known, there is added to these 
sentiments a desire on our parts of gaining his 
esteem and approbation, his goodwill and his 
love, as being in themselves both agreeable and 
honourable to us ; and so far, therefore, inde- 
pendently of any advantages thereby accruing 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



115 



to us. Nevertheless, if he is also one who has 
it in his power to confer benefits upon us, 
still more if he has actually conferred such, 
these feelings are doubtless increased in us 
both by gratitude for past, and hope of future, 
benefits. 



This then is the account, as we gather it 
from experience, of this part of our Mental 
constitution ; — that these sentiments of Reve- 
rence, Love, and Gratitude are naturally ex- 
cited in our breasts in proportion as the several 
qualities and circumstances, which are the pro- 
per objects of them, exist in different charac- 
ters ; that it is sufficient to produce this effect, 
for us to know, that the person has this cha- 
racter, even though we may never have seen 
him; that the sentiments are excited in us 
more strongly when benefits have been con- 
ferred by him on ourselves ; and that they are 
still further strengthened by expectation of 
future favours. 

Now all this is only a description of that 
relation in which we ourselves confessedly 
stand with respect to the Deity : if at least we 
are not wrong in extending to Him the above 
Attributes in the same sense in which we apply 
them to our fellow-creatures'] . And it follows 



f See Chap. iv. 



110 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

of course, that we shall also properly extend to 
Him those same sentiments with which we are 
wont to regard these attributes among them. 
And, indeed, He has so constituted our minds, 
that we cannot but feel assured, not only that 
such characters properly excite such senti- 
ments in creatures like ourselves ; but that 
such sentiments and conduct are founded on 
principles, not merely applicable to ourselves 
in our present circumstances, but universal, 
eternal, and immutable, such as will hold good 
in all cases and at all times. It seems, there- 
fore, manifest from this account, that we 
should act contrary to the nature He has 
given us, if we did not entertain towards Him 
those sentiments which it is thus natural to us 
to entertain towards any being having the 
character which He has, and acting towards 
us, as He acts; that we should justly be thought, 
and must think ourselves, to be acting wrongly, 
and contrary to our own sense of what we 
ought to do, if we did not do so ; that these 
sentiments ought in His case to be carried to 
their utmost extent; that, as He is infinitely 
Wise, Powerful, and Righteous, we ought to 
feel towards Him sentiments of Infinite Re- 
verence and Awe ; that, as His Goodness is 
Infinite, and as we are entirely dependent on 
Him for all the benefits we enjoy, and as we 
have received such without number at His 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 1 17 

hands, so ought our love and gratitude to be 
without limits also. The immediate practical 
consequence of all which feelings will of course 
be, that we shall obey His will, and devote 
ourselves to His service. And on the other 
hand it is equally manifest, that, in proportion 
as these sentiments and this conduct are more 
urgently due in His case than in any other, so 
must our guilt be greater, if we neglect to cul- 
tivate and to manifest them. 

This doctrine of the Love of God has been 
often perverted to the excesses of Enthusiasm 
and the reveries of Mysticism. This, how- 
ever, is obviously no sort of reason, any more 
than the perversion of any other thing that is 
right and true, for its being rejected as false. 
Indeed, such a perversion shows, how deeply 
the principle itself must be founded in our 
nature ; since men have been thus blinded by 
it to the greatest extravagancies and follies. 
But it has been thus, not because men have 
carried the real and genuine Love of God to 
an excessive pass (which cannot be done), but 
because they have omitted to join with it that 
Reverence which is equally His due ; or have 
put in the place of both an emotion rather re- 
sembling, and partaking of, the fervours of an 
animal passion ; which is entirely unlike, whe- 
ther in its origin, its nature, or its effects, to 
that spiritual and reverential awe, which is 



1 18 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



due to the Goodness and Power and Wisdom 
of a purely Spiritual and Perfect Being. 

It is to be considered too, that evils equally 
great, perhaps much greater, have arisen from 
the want of this sentiment. For by this men 
are led, having no source of internal religion 
within them, to place all their reliance on ex- 
ternal religion, that is to say, on mere forms 
and ceremonies, and all the varieties of super- 
stitions observances. 



CHAPTER X. 

That Belief is produced by human Testimony in 
respect to Matters of Fact. 

THE human mind is naturally disposed to 
place reliance on testimony. And this 
it does quite independently either of reason or 
experience : for it is well known that children, 
before they are capable of either, give im- 
plicit credit to whatever they are told. The 
effect of experience, indeed, is rather to teach 
us, that this implicit reliance is to be re- 
strained and modified according to circum- 
stances, not to be practised in all cases in- 
differently. But though this is the effect 
of experience, to make us canvass the merits, 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION . 119 



and examine the strength, of any particular 
testimony, before we admit it as sufficient evi- 
dence ; yet testimony in general, indepen- 
dently of all consideration of the veracity of 
any particular witness, still continues to have 
of itself a power of producing belief. The tes- 
timony of a witness may be shaken in various 
ways : but, if this is not done, the presumption 
is, that he speaks the truth. This is true of a 
single witness ; but if several agree together 
in the same story, and no positive reason can 
be shown for disbelieving them ; then no man 
hesitates to believe them. Courts of justice 
have obviously nothing else to go upon : 
imagine that conviction, which is naturally 
produced in the human mind by testimony, 
as such, to be done away ; and their proceed- 
ings must cease entirely. And it would be 
equally impossible to carry on the common 
business of life without it : men must act every 
hour upon the information of others, or sacri- 
fice their lives and properties to their incredu- 
lity. Common as is the sin of lying, testimony 
is true ten thousand times, where it is false 
once. 

How very extensive is the influence of tes- 
timony, appears at once, when we consider, 
that all knowledge not derived from our own 
experience (and the results of our own experi- 
ence are obviously as nothing, compared to 



120 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



the amount of our whole knowledge) must 
be founded solely and entirely on testimony. 
It is only on this ground that we believe that 
there are any such places as Rome or Athens, 
or such a man as the Emperor of China, and 
ten thousand other things, which no man in 
his senses ever doubted. A reliance on the 
authority) of others too in matters of opinion 
necessarily implies a reliance on their testi- 
mony : for when we rely on the opinion of 
another, we must of course believe, that the 
person states his opinion truly, and has no in- 
tention of deceiving us. 

History obviously rests entirely on testi- 
mony. And yet no man doubts, that there 
was such a person as Julius Csesar, that he 
was Emperor of Rome, and that he conquered 
Britain. 

But History embraces not only the civil 
transactions of mankind : it includes all those 
facts, and observations, and experiments, on 
which the several Inductive Sciences have 
been reared. No one man ever ascertained a 
thousandth part of these on his own experi- 
ence ; nor would it be possible for him to do 
so. Newton reared his system of Astronomy 
on the observations of his predecessors, for 

f This subject is considered in the following chapter, and 
all the instances there mentioned are for the reason above as- 
signed equally proofs of our reliance on testimony. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 121 

which he had no other evidence, than human 
testimony. And yet this system is admitted 
by the world at large to bear the character of 
demonstration. Nor let it be objected, that 
we consider the system as demonstrated, only 
because it is confirmed by the present appear- 
ances of the heavens : for this fact itself is 
known to the world in general only from the 
testimony of living astronomers. 

Nor is it only in cases, where there is 
nothing extraordinary, nothing in the opposite 
scale to excite our disbelief, that we are thus 
irresistibly led to believe in testimony. On no 
other evidence, and with as little hesitation, 
we believe the reality of facts, which, as far as 
■we knoiv, lie out of the common order of 
nature, which are in other words strictly mira- 
culous. No man hesitates to credit the fact, 
that several stars have at different times dis- 
appeared (some of them suddenly) from the 
heavens, and that new ones have appeared. 
Upon what ground is this credited ? Solely 
because we have the testimony of astronomers 
many ages ago, that these stars were then to 
be seen ; and the testimony of others in the 
present day, that they are no longer visible. 

In the same way it is universally believed, 
both by men of Science and by the world at 
large, that the surface of our globe has under- 
gone very extensive revolutions, and that vast 



122 



THE ACCORDANCE OF 



RELIGION 



numbers of organised beings, both animal and 
vegetable, have been successively introduced 
upon it : of which facts the latter class at least 
cannot be accounted for by the operation of 
the existing Laws of Nature. Now, whether 
such things have been brought about by a 
temporary suspension of the existing Laws, or 
whether these Laws have themselves under- 
gone changes ; in either case, what we call a 
miracle has been wrought, that is to say, some- 
thing has been done, which could not have 
been done according to the actual Laws. This 
is generally admitted to be satisfactorily es- 
tablished on geological proofs. )' And yet how 
very few persons, how few even among men of 
Science, nay, how few of professed Geologists, 
have ever ascertained the facts, from which 
these deductions have been made, on their 
own experience. It may be doubted, indeed, 
whether any single individual has ever himself 
observed a sufficient number of facts, whereby 
to establish any one of the great leading doc- 
trines of the Science. The facts rest on testi- 



f And even if it should be denied that miraculous interpo- 
sitions are proved by Geological facts, still the argument here 
advanced would be equally good. For it is undeniable, that 
the great body of men of science have long held that opinion, 
and no one ever thought of objecting to it, or of ridiculing it, 
on the ground of the evidence being insufficient in itself to es- 
tablish the facts supposed to be miraculous. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 123 

mony, on human testimony, on the testimony 
of witnesses, many of whom we do not know 
by name, much less by character, either in 
respect of their understanding or of their good 
faith. Many of these facts are strictly and 
literally miraculous. Yet the truth of them is 
unhesitatingly admitted by the world, and by 
the most sceptical among men of Science. 
And any man, who should refuse to admit 
them on the ground that they could not be ad- 
mitted on the strength of mere human testi- 
mony, would universally be considered to be 
guilty of the highest absurdity — as fit only to 
be ridiculed, instead of being argued with. 



" I flatter myself," says Hume, " that I have 
discovered an argument" (against Miracles) 
" which, if just, will with the wise and learned 
be an everlasting check to all kinds of super- 
stitious delusion, and consequently will be use- 
ful, as long as the world endures. For so 
long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles 
and prodigies be found in all history sacred 
and profane."* The argument, thus trium- 
phantly introduced, is that well-known one, in 
which he has attempted to show, that no 
amount of testimony can ever render the 



* Essays, vol. ii. p. 128. 



J 21 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

account of a miracle even probably true — 
much less prove one-t 

Hume, therefore, must have rejected as fa- 
bulous and absurd all those accounts (however 
apparently well authenticated) which assert, 
that any stars have disappeared, or that new 
ones have appeared. These facts rest on tes- 
timony, and testimony is insufficient for the 
proof of them. If Hume were now alive, he 
would treat with contempt all those accounts, 
by which the successive creation of plants and 
animals has been established. This he must 
do, if he would be consistent. It can scarcely, 
however, be supposed, that he would be guilty 
of so great absurdity. But if he were so, we 
might justly consider him, as one disabled by 
prejudice from reasoning on this subject. 

At the end of his Essay, indeed, he all at 
once restricts his argument to those miracles, 
which profess to have been wrought in proof 
of a system of religion. One can hardly help 
suspecting from this, that he was conscious of 
the intrinsic weakness of his general argu- 
ment ; but hoped to gain a more ready acquies- 
cence in it, by thus substituting for his original 
proposition (which includes " the accounts of 
miracles and prodigies in all history sacred 
anH profane") a different one, which he thought 



t Ibid. p. 150. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 125 

likely to be more easily admitted by his 
readers, in consequence of the prejudices en- 
tertained by many, particularly at the time he 
wrote, against the miracles of Scripture. For 
he offers no shadow of argument for this sudden 
and arbitrary restriction, nor indeed takes any 
notice of it ; while his whole course of rea- 
soning, as well as his original proposition, has 
been directed to show the impossibility of any 
miracle whatever being proved by testimony. 

Nor is it any objection against the possi- 
bility of religious miracles being thus proved 
by testimony, that men are said to be na- 
turally more prone to believe in such, rather 
than in other miracles. This may be a good 
reason for carefully weighing the strength of 
the testimony : but it can never demonstrate 
the impossibility of proving miracles at all by 
testimony, while a single instance can be pro- 
duced, in which the objectors themselves must 
allow, that the thing is actually done. And 
they do actually allow it with regard to the 
miracles of Astronomy and Geology. 

Nor, again, is it any objection against the 
Scripture miracles, that none have taken place 
in our days. For this is equally true of the 
miracles of Geology. The evidence in both 
cases alike is all that remains to us : the 
events took place alike ages ago. 



1 26 



THE ACCORDANCE OF KELTOTON 



CHAPTER XI. 



That Belief is produced by human Authority in 
respect to Matters of Opinion. 

T I THE reliance of children on the authority 



JL of their elders as to all matters of opinion 
is equally implicit with their reliance on testi- 
mony as to matters of fact. And in this way 
they learn a vast variety of things, long before 
they are at all capable of understanding the 
evidence on which they rest. If they could 
learn nothing but by their own experience or 
their own powers of reasoning, their acquisitions 
would be scanty indeed. 

But in respect of this reliance on Authority 
we must all act like children in a great number 
of cases. In learning the several arts and 
sciences (the mathematical alone excepted,) 
the commonest way of proceeding is to acquire 
first the general principles : and these must 
be taken entirely upon trust ;f for the learner 
is unacquainted with the facts, from which 
they have been deduced. 

Nor is it only in matters of theory or of phi- 
losophy, that we place this reliance on the 




f Oportet discentem credere. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 127 

authority of others ; but also in the daily prac- 
tice of life, and on occasions the most interesting 
and important. When our worldly property is 
at stake, we call in the opinion of our lawyer : 
very few of us think it necessary to inquire 
into the reasons of the lawyer's opinion ; on 
very many occasions, where this is founded on 
technical points of law, we should be unable 
to understand them, if we did. But it is the 
lawyer's opinion; and we are satisfied, and 
proceed to act upon it. And this we do, 
though a single mistake of his may cost us the 
loss of our whole property : in the case of a 
person charged with crime, it may cost him 
his life. 

Again, in sickness we call in our physician ; 
and we rely upon him as implicitly. How few 
of us know anything of phy siology or disease, or 
inquire even, what medicines he administers, 
on what reasons he founds his opinion, or how 
he proposes to effect the cure. His Authority 
is everything. 

In courts of judicature it is the same. The 
most learned judge, in regard to questions of 
science, of which he himself is ignorant, relies 
on the authority of scientific men. The houses 
of Parliament, where men of the greatest abili- 
ties in all kinds are assembled, do the same : 
and on questions of law they are guided by 
the Authority of the Judges. 



128 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



Most men indeed are able to give the proofs 
and reasons of an exceedingly small part of the 
knowledge they possess ; no man knows the 
proofs of all his knowledge : but of course, 
Avhatever knowledge we possess of this kind, 
must be based upon the Authority of others. 
Nor without such reliance on Authority could 
either speculation or the common business of 
life possibly be carried on. And the necessity 
for it will continually increase with the pro- 
gress of knowledge : for it will become daily 
more impossible for any man to master more 
than a small portion of the whole circle of it. 
Whoever therefore rejects authority, must at 
the same time reject the belief of all facts, of 
which he knows not the evidence. He must 
not believe that the earth rolls round the sun, 
until he shall have mastered the proofs of the 
Newtonian philosophy. He must not act on 
the opinion of his lawyer, till he has studied 
the law ; but must forfeit his property and his 
rights. He must not rely on the authority of 
his physician ; but study physic, and mean- 
while sacrifice his life. 



It has been made an objection to Chris- 
tianity, that, if a belief in it had been necessary 
for our future happiness, the proofs and evi- 
dences of it would have been clear and mani- 
fest to each individual, and capable of being 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 1 29 



comprehended by all mankind ; not such as 
can only be fully mastered by research and 
learning accompanied with leisure : — in short, 
that the mass of mankind would not have been 
left to rely in a matter of such importance on 
the authority of others — of a few learned men. 
We see, however, that this is no more than 
happens every day within our experience in 
the natural world. Our belief as to the most 
momentous questions is constantly dependent 
on the authority of those, who have opportu- 
nities and abilities for understanding particular 
questions : and our conduct, our lives, our 
properties, and all our highest worldly interests 
are made to depend on such belief. And just 
so it is with Religion ; the bulk of mankind 
must admit the evidences of it, as they swallow 
medicine — upon trust. Neither may be less 
efficacious for that reason : equally by receiv- 
ing either they may be saved, or by refusing 
either they may perish. 

And upon the same principle, when we have 
once admitted the truth of Christianity in 
general, we may also believe in the truth and 
efficacy of particular doctrines, though either 
the nature or the utility of these should be 
beyond the measure of our comprehension. 
When we rely on the authority of man, we 
believe, that he has grounds and reasons suffi- 
cient for his opinion ; and that, if we ourselves 

K 



130 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

had suitable time and abilities, we should be 
convinced by these reasons. Surely then we 
may believe as much, when our authority is God 
himself. Having once admitted, that Revela- 
tion proceeds from Him, we may admit, that 
He too has reasons sufficient for all His insti- 
tutions, however arbitrary they may appear to 
us. For we may be sure, that, if Revelation is 
true, it must really agree perfectly with 
Reason ; and that whoever should fully com- 
prehend the latter, must also comprehend the 
former, as a part of it. We have not indeed 
faculties at present sufficient for either; and 
we cannot therefore of course perceive the in- 
variable connection between the two. 



CHAPTER XII. 
That all our Speculative Knowledge is limited. 

AS human knowledge has in no one of its 
branches ever attained, or even ap- 
proached to, absolute perfection, it is obvious, 
that in this respect it must be considered as 
limited on every side. And this is equally 
the case with those parts of knowledge which 
contain merely objects of speculative curiosity, 
and with those which are most immediately 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



131 



essential to human happiness, such as Moral 
and Political Philosophy : and it is equally 
true of Science, whether physical, mental, or 
mathematical. It cannot be doubted too, that 
there are many individual questions in every 
branch of Philosophy, of which we are in total 
ignorance—such as the nature of the vital 
principle, the intimate constitution of matter, 
the existence of evil, and various others. The 
first origin of all things is a total mystery, as to 
which we can learn nothing from the light of 
Nature. We can very imperfectly understand 
that which concerns us more intimately than 
anything else — the Moral Government of the 
world. The uses of things are equally hidden 
from us : for there is obviously no one thing 
in Nature of which it can be said, that we 
know all its uses. 

Our knowledge is justly considered to be 
more clear, definite, and certain, in the several 
departments of Science, than elsewhere. Yet 
every one of these contains things quite beyond 
our comprehension : and not only this, but 
the causes of this ignorance are such, that 
they must continue to operate, however greatly 
the sciences shall be extended. This will 
appear from a very slight examination. 

The Sciences are classed under three great 
divisions ; those relating to Matter, or Natural 
Philosophy ; those relating to Mind, or Mental 



132 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

and Moral Philosophy ; and those relating to 
Number and Quantity, or Mathematics. 

I . Natural Philosophy is employed in two 
inquiries, the first of which regards the compo- 
sition of bodies, as they exist at any particular 
time, or of what elements they consist : the 
second regards the various changes which these 
bodies successively exhibit. In the language 
of metaphysicians, we inquire either how they 
exist in space, or how they exist in time. 

Of the first kind, chemical analysis is an 
example. The chemist first discovered that 
a salt was composed of an acid and an alkali. 
He was then ignorant whether these two were 
simple substances. After a time, he decomposed 
the alkali into oxygen and a metallic base. 
He now knows not whether these are capable 
of further decomposition or not : but, should 
he succeed in decomposing them, he will still 
be ignorant whether his analysis can be car- 
ried further. The same is true of course of 
all other substances ; nor does it appear at all 
probable, that we can ever be assured of having 
discovered the ultimate elements of any body 
in nature. We know, that we can decompose 
no further, and we know no more. Here is an 
impassable barrier fixed to our knowledge. 

The other great object of physical inquiry 
is to examine into the succession of pheno- 
mena, or what are commonly called physical 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



133 



causes and effects, and the laws by which 
these are regulated. And with regard to these, 
our knowledge is equally bounded by limits 
hitherto impenetrable. As to the manner in 
which causes operate to produce their effects, 
it is now generally admitted among speculative 
writers, that w r e are quite in ignorance. We 
can perceive only sequences of events, inva- 
riably succeeding each other according to 
certain laws : but we can discover nothing as 
to the nature of the connection, by which any 
two are tied together as cause and effect. We 
are utterly ignorant how any one change in 
the Universe is produced ; and it seems likely 
that we shall ever remain so. For if we could 
understand this in any case, we might expect 
such a case would be that of our own muscular 
movements being produced by our own will. 
Yet we are equally in the dark here. We know 
that we will to move our finger, and the 
motion of our finger follows the will : hoiv the 
will produces the motion, we are just as igno- 
rant, as we are how impulse produces motion 
in a ball or a stone. 

But in our investigation of causes, our igno- 
rance is not confined to this abstruse point, of 
the manner in which causes operate. In the 
more legitimate object of physical inquiry — 
the mere succession of phenomena — limits are 
in the same way everywhere set to our know- 



134 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



ledge. In the first place, it is quite obvious, 
that in tracing any series of phaenomena to 
its source, we invariably arrive at some link, 
which resists our attempts at further discovery ; 
while we nevertheless feel assured, that some- 
thing more still remains to be discovered. For 
no man can ever assert, that he has laid his 
finger on the last link — that he has arrived at 
that point, where the series of second causes 
merges in the Will of the Great First Cause. 
To take an example : before the time of New- 
ton philosophers were ignorant why a stone 
falls to the ground : Newton showed that it 
was in consequence of the attraction of the 
earth : thus he removed the difficulty one step 
further ; for the cause of attraction is still 
unknown. It has been conjectured that an 
elastic ether is the cause : should this be 
proved, the cause of this elasticity will still 
remain to be shewn. Suppose again, we set 
about inquiring, why the striking of a bell pro- 
duces in us the sensation of hearing. We find, 
that the blow causes the bell to vibrate — that 
the vibration of the bell makes the air vibrate 
— that this sets the drums of the ear in motion 
— and that this motion produces the sensation. 
But we still ask, Why does the vibration of the 
nerve produce the sensation ? We can give no 
answer : it is to us an ultimate fact, of whicli 
we can render no account, but that it has 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 135 

pleased the Deity to annex the one to the 
other. 

But besides being thus stopped in our dis- 
covery of the ultimate link in every chain of 
phenomena, we are equally arrested by a con- 
viction of our ignorance at each one of the in- 
tervening links. To take the first link in the 
series mentioned above : we enquire, Why the 
vibration of the air makes the bell vibrate ? It 
is answered, because the particles of both are 
elastic, or mutually repel one another. Why 
do they repel one another ? We cannot tell : 
this is again an ultimate fact, for which we 
can assign no physical cause. Still we can- 
not help believing, that some such cause 
exists. And so with regard to all the other 
phenomena in the series : between any two 
already ascertained we still search for some 
third one as yet undiscovered, which may serve 
as a bond of connexion between these two, and 
which we call a physical cause. And this, I 
think, is a proof, that we are ignorant, what is 
the immediate physical cause of any one phae- 
nomenon in Nature. For not only do we never 
feel assured, that any one of these phaenomena 
immediately precedes a subsequent one with- 
out the intervention of any concealed links ; 
but there is no instance in which we do not feel 
a conviction of the contrary — in which we 
hesitate to ask, why the first of the two produces 



136 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

the second ; that is to say, what third pheno- 
menon intervenes between them. If this is 
true, the inference, I think, is indisputable, — 
that we are in fact entirely ignorant of all second 
causes. And thus it may be truly said, that 
the greater our knowledge is, the greater is 
also our ignorance. The ignorant man can 
give no explanation of a phenomenon : he 
knows not its cause : he therefore has with re- 
spect to it one point of ignorance : the philoso- 
pher analyses this phenomenon into two others, 
beyond neither of which is he able to go : he 
therefore has two points of ignorance instead 
of one. But if we suppose him to be able to 
analyse these new phenomena, he will still be 
multiplying his points of ignorance : for each 
phenomenon in the last analysis must still ter- 
minate in some point of which he is ignorant. 

2. In the Philosophy of Mind we are equally 
ignorant of the manner in which things exist. 
How Mind is united to Matter — how these two 
act on one another — how any of the simple 
phenomena of Mind are produced — we know 
not. 

The Philosophy of Mind is employed on 
two branches of enquiry analogous to those of 
the Philosophy of Matter ; first, in the analysis 
of some state of Mind existing at a particular 
moment ; secondly, in tracing a series of several 
successive states. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 137 



In the first branch of enquiry, no man has 
attempted to analyse our sensations : they are 
admitted to be incapable of explanation : they 
exist on the presence of their respective objects : 
and here our knowledge of them ends. Our 
ideas have been analysed by some metaphy- 
sicians into more, by some into fewer, simple 
ones : but every analysis ends alike in some 
supposed simple state ; and this admits of no 
further explanation. 

In the same way with regard to the succes- 
sive phenomena of the Mind. It often requires 
the greatest sagacity to detect the hidden links 
in a train of associated ideas : but, discover as 
many as we may, we can never ascertain, 
whether others may not still remain undis- 
covered. Here too the ignorant man, who 
passes over all the intervening links between 
two associated ideas, has but one difficulty to 
explain — how one idea can suggest the other. 
The philosopher, on the other hand, who dis- 
covers many links in the chain, multiplies the 
points requiring explanation. 

3. In Mathematical Demonstration we 
come at last in the same manner to intuitive 
truths, of which no proof can be given ; such 
as, that the whole is greater than its part ; of 
which and of other axioms we can only say, 
that we believe them because we cannot help 
doing so. 



138 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

But in this science of proofs there are not 
only things admitted, which cannot be proved : 
there are theorems rigorously demonstrated, 
which are at least altogether beyond our com- 
prehension, if they are not very like contradic- 
tions. It demonstrates the perpetual approxi- 
mation of lines which never meet : it demon- 
strates the existence of quantities infinitely less 
than the least discernible quantity ; of others 
infinitely less than these infinitely small ones, 
and still of others infinitely less than these in- 
finitesimals ; and so on without end or limit, in 
a constant progression towards nothing, which 
you are continually approaching, and never 
arrive at. Nay, this science demonstrates f 
the possibility of finding an infinite space, 
which shall be equal to a finite space, or to the 
half or the third of a finite space. 

Thus then we find, that not only in the Philo- 
sophy both of Mind and of Matter do things 
everywhere present themselves, which are quite 
beyond our comprehension ; but in the science 
of Demonstration itself there are things, such 
as bear every appearance of utter impossibility, 
of being contradictory : and yet we do not and 
cannot refuse our assent to their reality and 
their truth. We find too, that there is not a 
single thing in the Creation, whose whole 



f L'Art de penser, Part. IV. Chap. i. p. 394. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 



139 



nature we can thoroughly comprehend — nay, 
in whose nature we do not find numberless 
and insuperable difficulties : nor is there any 
one thing in Nature, whose manner of existence 
we can understand at all. 



And yet it is made an objection to Chris- 
tianity, that it contains mysteries ; that is, that 
it requires us to believe things, whose nature 
and manner of existence we cannot fully com- 
prehend. Such are the doctrines of the Tri- 
nity, of the Incarnation, of Grace, of Original 
Sin, of the Foreknowledge of God. The ques- 
tion is continually repeated, " How can these 
things be?" No man can answer the question: 
and therefore we must not believe them. Why, 
then we must not believe, that a seed will pro- 
duce a blade of corn, that our blood is circu- 
lating through our veins, that our minds are 
able to act on our bodily frames, and a thou- 
sand other Mysteries of Nature. The very same 
reason holds for disbelieving all of these — 
they are above our reason — nay, those mathe- 
matical demonstrations with regard to infinite 
quantities may be said to be contrary to our 
reason. Yet these things we believe. 

It does not follow then, that we must disbe- 
lieve the reality of things, merely because we 
cannot fully understand them. But surely, if 



1 JO THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

we meet with so many mysteries both in our 
own minds and bodies, we may well expect to 
meet with some few such, when we attempt to 
fathom things relating to an unseen world and 
to the attributes of an Infinite Being. 

We can very imperfectly comprehend the 
scheme of God's physical government of this 
visible world : yet we do not doubt, that it is 
carried on by Him with perfect wisdom. How 
then can we think, that our not understanding 
many things in His Moral Government can be 
any objection to the reality of it? We cannot 
possibly expect fully to comprehend it, to com- 
prehend the whole scheme of it, since we can 
see only a small part : and such ignorance 
must alone render it impossible for us to com- 
prehend all the uses or the relations of any one 
part of it. 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 141 



CHAPTER XIII. 



That Knowledge increases our Speculative 



Vl> ; their pursuit of knowledge, but what are 
easily answered. They ask, Who made the sun 
and stars ? They are told, that God made thein : 
and there is an end of their difficulty. When 
they begin to think a little more, they enquire, 
out of what God made them : and when told, 
that He created them out of nothing, they see no 
difficulty in this. And so it is with every man 
in proportion to his knowledge. The vulgar 
can see nothing hard to understand either in 
creation or annihilation : for they believe they 
every day meet with instances of both — of 
creation, for instance, in the growth of a tree, 
or in the formation of a cloud — of annihilation, 
in the consumption of their fuel. 

But this does not happen to children and to 
the vulgar alone. In the infancy of Natural 
Philosophy men employed themselves in fram- 
ing arbitrary hypotheses and inventing names, 
and persuaded themselves, that in so doing they 
had resolved all difficulties, and explained the 



Difficulties. 




meet with few difficulties in 



142 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



phenomena of Nature. Thus, according to 
Orpheus, all things were caused by love and 
strife ; according to Pythagoras, by numbers ; 
according to Aristotle, by matter, form, and 
privation. Some more modern philosophers 
taught, that what they called the Nature 
of things was the universal active cause. 
Others escaped from their difficulties by as- 
serting that all things happened by chance. 
The followers of Bacon saw the vanity of these 
idle terms, and set themselves to discover by 
observation and experiment the actual laws 
of Nature, or the series of visible causes and 
effects. But while they were thus investi- 
gating second causes alone, they too fancied, 
that they knew much more than they really did: 
they fancied they were discovering in each of 
these second causes what contained some real 
and active power, sufficient of itself to work its 
effect. And this persuasion still very com- 
monly prevails among them, notwithstanding 
that it has been unanswerably shown, that we 
really know nothing more, as to the operation 
of causes either on matter or on mind, than 
that they uniformly precede their effects — that 
we know not any real or properly efficient 
cause (excepting the will of the Deity) of 
anything whatever. And if the reasoning of- 
fered on the subject in the preceding chapter 
is valid, we are equally ignorant what is the 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 143 

immediate physical or second cause of any- 
thing. 

Thus did Philosophy in her infancy believe 
that she understood, and was explaining, the 
causes of all things : but in proportion as she 
has advanced, new and successive difficulties 
have presented themselves in her successive 
creeds, and she has come at last to be con- 
vinced, that all that knowledge, on which she 
chiefly prided herself, was but imaginary. She 
has indeed accumulated a vast body of facts, 
most interesting in themselves and most useful 
to mankind in a practical view : but her specu- 
lative knowledge of the operation of Causes 
has dwindled away to nothing. 



Now, it has been a source of disquiet to 
many persons, that men of acknowledged sa- 
gacity and talent have rejected Christianity on 
account of difficulties contained in it, which 
they could not explain. But the case of 
Christianity has only been the same with 
that of natural and philosophical knowledge. 
Plain practical Christians find no difficulties 
in their religion ; but the speculators begin to 
meddle with it : the shallowest and weakest of 
these pretend to understand all its mysteries 
and difficulties, and to explain them by 
using hard and unintelligible words. Others 



144 



THE ACCORDANCE OK RELIGION 



with a little more sagacity, perceive the folly 
of these expounders : but as they themselves 
can see no satisfactory way of solving the diffi- 
culties, they are staggered in their faith : 
whatever they cannot comprehend is to them 
incredible. The truly philosophic Christian, 
like Locke and Newton, can perceive the 
difficulties clearly enough; but he can also 
perceive, that difficulties do not make things 
incredible. 

Now all this happens, just as we have seen, 
that it happens with regard to philosophic 
knowledge. Practical men find no speculative 
difficulties at all in Nature ; speculative men 
have perceived her difficulties, and attempted, 
during a long course of ages, to explain them 
by unintelligible phrases : others with more 
sagacity, seeing that these phrases have in no 
degree solved her mysteries, have themselves 
attempted it ; but have always in the end 
arrived at barriers impenetrable to their saga- 
city. Some of these, like the sceptics of reli- 
gion, have refused to believe in the existence 
and reality of things, merely because they 
could not comprehend and explain all their 
phenomena. Thus Zeno was led to deny the 
existence of motion, Berkeley and the Carte- 
sians that of matter. And Berkeley was 
certainly sincere in his denial ; though such 
scepticism is equally incredible to plain com- 



WITH OUR MENTAL CONSTITUTION. 145 

raon sense, and ridiculous in the eyes of true 
philosophy. 

These things may surely be to us a lesson 
in religion : they may teach us, that there is 
no need for us to be troubled or to be driven 
from our faith, either because theorists in Re- 
ligion cannot explain all its mysteries, or be- 
cause these theorists have become sceptics in 
consequence, or because some of these sceptics 
have been men of sagacity and ingenuity : — 
unless indeed we are also prepared to surren- 
der our belief in the existence of the material 
world, because theorists have not been able 
to expound all its phenomena, or because 
some of these theorists have been able to per- 
suade themselves that it did not exist, or 
because the theorists have been men of in- 
genuity. Their ingenuity has indeed been in 
either case the very cause of the greatness of 
their errors ; as the traveller who goes astray, 
will wander further from his path in proportion 
as he is vigorous and active. 




PART III. 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION WITH 
OUR MORAL CONDITION. 

T^ROM the general consideration of that 



JL uniformity of design, which pervades the 
Universe, physical and moral, and the Laws by 
which it is governed ; we should be led to ex- 
pect, that, if we are to exist hereafter in ano- 
ther state of being, that state would probably 
bear some general resemblance to what we ex- 
perience here. But if our present life is also 
(as Religion affirms, and as Reason too leads 
us to suppose) a state of preparation for a future 
one ; this would be a distinct additional and 
more particular argument to lead us to the same 
conclusion. We are Moral creatures, and to 
Moral creatures as such that only can be a state 
of preparation, in which their Moral habits and 
characters are formed : but these are formed 
only (as far as our experience reaches) by acting 
and by suffering— by acting and suffering, f 




f Part iv. chap. xii. 



OUR MORAL CONDITION. 147 

not of course in circumstances and situations 
entirely different and unlike, but resembling, 
those in which these habits and characters are 
eventually to be exercised. Supposing then 
that we were really destined for another state, 
reason itself would, I think, lead us to expect, 
that any prior and preparatory state would 
probably be some such state of moral disci- 
pline, as this to which we are here subjected. 

But such an expectation would have some- 
thing more to rest on than this general conjec- 
ture. For we see, that such is in fact the 
method adopted by Nature in preparing us for 
whatever we have to do here. It is a Law of 
our nature, that none of our powers, whether 
bodily or mental, can be improved but by a 
process of exercise and of practice : but this is 
more especially and remarkably the case in 
that process, by which we are laboriously 
prepared and fitted for performing all our 
most important duties here — the process of 
education. It is obvious that this cannot pos- 
sibly be rendered effectual, except by exer- 
cising those Moral and Intellectual faculties, 
which are afterwards to be employed in active 
life ; and that it is more or less effectual in 
exact proportion as these are exercised in 
circumstances and situations more or less re- 
sembling those future ones. 

Nor, again, are we without analogies, which 



148 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

justify us in believing, that all this may be true, 
though we shall be transferred to another and 
a somewhat different state of being — that still 
that other state may probably resemble our 
present one in many respects. For this too 
actually happens in all those instances, which 
have ever come within our experience, of living 
creatures changing their state of being — such 
as the instances of insects. The caterpillar 
and the moth exist in different states of being 
■ — those states too are separated by an interval 
of unconscious existence. Yet the two states 
manifestly bear a general resemblance to one 
another — so great a resemblance, that to enu- 
merate all the points of it would require a long 
description : it is enough to say, that in both 
states they are insects ; and this name in itself 
includes an innumerable multitude of resem- 
blances. 

But what is more to the present purpose, 
they are subject in these two different states 
of being, to the same physical and organic 
Laws — the only Laws, to which they are sub- 
ject at all. What then, if we. who are subject 
to a Moral Law in our present state, shall also 
be subject to a similar Law in our future 
condition ? And this is what Religion teaches 
us, we shall be. Now though the Light of 
Nature cannot supply us with direct and posi- 
tive proofs, that surh will be the case ; yet it 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



149 



may suffice to show us (and that without any 
doubt) not only that our Moral condition here 
is generally analogous and of a piece with the 
general scheme of Religion, but also that the 
particular circumstances of this our present 
condition comprise those very things, which 
are objected to in the several doctrines of Reli- 
gion as being incredible. 

And if it can show this, then of course it 
shows, that neither Religion in general, nor 
the doctrines of Revelation in particular, are 
(so far as these objections go) in themselves 
absurd or incredible : that is to say, it is not, so 
far, incredible, that they may have proceeded 
from the Author of Nature. 

It will be the object of this Third Part to 
show, that the Analogy of our Moral con- 
dition here does actually supply us with such 
proofs. 



150 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



CHAPTER I. 



That we are subject to a Moral Government. 
L 4TORAL government is distinguished from 



over inanimate passive matter, which must 
obey the Laws imposed upon it : such is that 
of men over a ship for instance, or a steam en- 
gine, and over all matter, as far as their power 
over it extends ; and such the Deity exercises 
over the whole material Universe by the Laws, 
which He has imposed on it. Moral govern- 
ment is that over intelligent beings, to whom 
the Governor in like manner prescribes Laws 
and rules of action ; but who have also power 
either to obey or disobey these Laws. And 
since such government must be ineffectual, if 
no evil follows disobedience, therefore Moral 
government holds out promises of reward for 
obedience, threats of punishment for dis- 
obedience. Moreover, to prevent the govern- 
ment from falling into contempt, these rewards 
and punishments must be actually distributed 
— if not universally, at least with sufficient fre- 
quency to render them distinct objects of hope 
and of fear. 




The latter is exercised 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



151 



Now mankind are manifestly placed by 
Nature under a government of this kind. 
Laws and rules of action, recognised and ac- 
knowledged as such, are given them in various 
ways — by their consciences ; by the light of 
reason, commonly called the Law of Nature ; 
by civil and domestic government : for all 
these are parts of that scheme and constitution 
of things, in which the Deity has placed man- 
kind, and by which he rules them. 

But he has also taken care to make it known 
to us, that we shall be rewarded for obedience 
to these Laws, and punished for disobedience. 
For all mankind know, or may know, by the 
Light of Nature, that, if they obey the dictates 
of prudence, of temperance, of virtue, they 
may expect to be rewarded by the natural 
consequences of these, by worldly prosperity, 
by health, by the respect and good offices of 
others, and by their own consciences : — that, 
if they disobey these dictates, they may on the 
other hand expect punishment for such con- 
duct. 

And as these promises and threats are held 
out to us beforehand by Nature, so are they 
actually in the way of Nature fulfilled — ful- 
filled according to certain and definite Laws,| 



f The reader will find this very fully proved in Combe's 
"Constitution of Man," before referred to. 



1-52 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

and to an extent quite sufficient to induce pru- 
dent men to act from the hope and from the 
fear of them. These Laws are of three kinds, 
Physical, Organic, and Moral. It is, for in- 
stance, a Physical Law, that, if a man puts to 
sea in a ship unfit to weather a storm, and a 
storm arises, he is wrecked, and suffers the loss 
of property, perhaps of life. It is an Organic 
Law, that if he swallows poison, pain and ulti- 
mately death will follow. It is a Moral Law, 
that, if he is guilty of injustice towards his 
fellow men, he will be exposed to their enmity 
and resentment; his own conscience will re- 
proach him ; and in some cases he will pay 
the penalty of death. These Laws, though the 
punishments adjudged by them are sometimes 
mitigated, or even altogether avoided, by cer- 
tain natural means appointed for that purpose, 
are themselves invariable and unbending in 
their operation : that is to say, their operation 
can be averted only by the use of these na- 
turally appointed means. 

Thecondition of mankind then in this present 
life is naturally such, that laws and rules of 
action are prescribed to them ; that they are 
made acquainted beforehand with these laws 
and rules, and know the rewards of obedience 
and the penalties of disobedience : and these 
rewards and penalties actually follow accord- 
ingly. Now these are the circumstances, 



WITH OUR MOKAL CONDITION. 



15.3 



which go to make up the proper notion of a 
Moral Government. We are then the subjects 
of a Moral Government in this present life. 



If therefore we are to exist as Moral beings 
in a future life, it cannot be incredible, that 
the same God, who, Himself a Moral Being, 
thus exercises a Moral Government over us 
here, may continue to govern us on similar 
principles there — on a system of rewards and 
punishments allotted to obedience and to dis- 
obedience. But such a supposition is surely 
rendered something more than not incredible, 
when we reflect, that in as far as Virtue and 
Vice fall short of their respective rewards and 
punishments in the present life, so far this 
Moral Government is only imperfectly exe- 
cuted ; and that therefore if it is really to end 
here (though the principle and tendency of it 
are righteous, yet) it is unrighteously executed : 
nor can anything, as far as we can imagine, 
possibly render it righteous, if the subjects of 
it, who are so manifestly unrequited at their 
departure out of this world, shall never be 
requited afterwards. 



J 54 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



CHAPTER II. 

That we transgress the Laws of this 
Government. 

TF mankind are in truth subjects of a Moral 
Government, little argument is required 
to show, that they transgress its Laws, and set 
their Governor at defiance. If the laws of 
civil government, the law of nations, of reason, 
of conscience, are really a part of that scheme 
of things established by the Author of Nature ; 
and if an obedience to these laws is also en- 
joined us by the natural constitution of our 
own minds : then every infringement of them 
is an act of rebellion against this our Natural 
Governor. And these Natural Lawsf are 
habitually and daily transgressed by an im- 
mense majority of mankind ; chiefly indeed 
in ignorance that there is any systematic code 
of such Laws in existence — yet not generally 
without some consciousness on the part of 
every man, that he is acting imprudently, 
when he transgresses them in particular cases. 
The amount of property and the number of 
lives annually sacrificed by British merchants, 

+ P. 151. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 155 

who send to sea ships unseaworthy, com- 
manded by unskilful captains, and manned 
by crews addicted to drinking in rough wea- 
ther, are enormous. Multitudes are daily en- 
tailing on themselves and their posterity 
diseases arising from intemperance and many 
kinds of imprudence. Others are bringing on 
themselves the hatred and resentment of their 
fellow-creatures, especially of their children, 
by their own misconduct. And all these per- 
sons, instead of looking on the sufferings thus 
brought upon them, in the light of punish- 
ments naturally following from their own 
transgressions of the Natural Laws, and as ad- 
monitions to another conduct, are content idly 
to lament their unhappy lot, and to ivonder- at 
the inscrutable ways of Providence, who thus 
inflicts on them by shipwreck, by broken 
health, by undutiful children, such unavoid- 
able misfortunes. 

But instances are not wanting of more direct 
and audacious rebellion than these ; such as 
idolatry, impiety, and blasphemy, enacted not 
only by ignorant individuals, but by civilized 
and enlightened nations. In revolutionary 
France the existence of the Deity was formally 
disavowed by the National Convention. Re- 
ligion of every kind was proclaimed to be the 
offspring of ignorance 5 and it was decreed to 
be the duty of the Convention to assume the 



156 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

honourable office of disseminating Atheism 
over the world. Public worship was utterly 
abolished : atheistical and licentious homilies 
were delivered in the churches : and in the 
same buildings women of the most abandoned 
character, having been installed with the 
most profane ceremonies as representatives 
of the Goddess of Reason, received the adora- 
tions of the public officers and of the multitude. 
And the atheistical doctrines which led to 
these public acts, were first broached and 
deliberately enforced by men of education and 
philosophy. 

Nor have there been wanting other such, 
who, instead of denying the existence of a 
God, have asserted, that He is a wicked and 
malicious being, that He is the author of sin, 
and that His Government is exercised unjustly 
and iniquitously. There is, in short, scarcely 
anything impious or profane, or rebellious, 
which has not at some time or other been said 
or done against the Natural Governor of the 
world. 



Nevertheless it has been brought as an ar- 
gument against Religion, that if it were true, 
the Author of it would not permit Himself to 
be dishonoured and insulted by the rejection 
of it among men : much less would He allow 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 157 

it to be ridiculed, blasphemed, and scoffed at, 
as Natural Religion is by sceptics and atheists, 
and as Christianity is both in Heathen (espe- 
cially Mahomedan) countries and in Christen- 
dom. 

We see however, that the Natural Governor 
of the Universe does permit, independently of 
Religion, His natural authority to be set at 
nought, and His name to be deliberately blas- 
phemed by men — by whole communities of 
men : for both those who transgress the Law 
of Nature, and the Atheists and blasphemers 
mentioned above have denied, and blasphemed, 
and rebelled against, the actual Governor of 
this present world, as well as against the God 
of Religion and of a future life. His permit- 
ting such conduct among men can therefore be 
no sufficient proof in the one case, that Reli- 
gion, either natural or revealed, does not pro- 
ceed from Him ; unless it is also a proof, in 
the other case, that He is not our Natural 
Governor now, and that no reverence is natu- 
rally due to Him as such. 



THE ACCORDANCE OE RELIGION 



CHAPTER III. 

That we are accountable for our Actions. 

IF a man has been wounded by a stone or a 
tree having fallen on him, he never thinks 
of imputing guilt to these objects — of consider- 
ing them as accountable for what has hap- 
pened, or as deserving punishment if it could 
be inflicted. But when he has suffered an in- 
jury at the hands of one of his fellow men, the 
case is immediately changed : he does look upon 
him as accountable for his actions, and there- 
fore as deserving of punishment, if guilty. 
And this view of the case is quite independent 
of any calculation as to the expediency of 
punishment with a view to deter others from 
offending : for if punishment were inflicted 
solely as matter of expediency, and without 
any feeling of its being merited, then we 
should always merely pity the object of it, as 
an innocent victim sacrificed to the public 
good : whereas on the contrary there obviously 
arises in us a feeling of resentment and indig- 
nation against his moral guilt considered 
merely as such. And again our indignation 
rises in proportion as the crime has been com- 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 159 

mitted with premeditation, with slight temp- 
tations, or against a benefactor : we are less 
indignant, if the opposite circumstances have 
existed. On the other hand, the indignation 
does not exist at all in the case of a madman, 
who may have perpetrated the very same 
deed, and entailed the same evils on the suf- 
fering party. 

Now this feeling of indignation against vice 
as such, being a part of our natural constitu- 
tion, is obviously an intimation to us from the 
Author of that constitution (and one which we 
cannot resist) that we are accountable creatures, 
and that vice is really deserving of punish- 
ment. And that mankind in general are in 
fact convinced not only of the fact of their 
being accountable creatures, but also of the 
justice of their being so, is sufficiently shown 
by this, that though men are constantly 
brought to account for what they have done, 
yet none (not even a believer in Necessity) 
ever thought of complaining of it as unjust 
that it should be so. 



We are sure then, that we are accountable 
creatures here : and there arises, therefore, a 
general presumption, that we may continue to 
be so in any future state. But this presump- 
tion is immeasurably increased, when we con- 



1()0 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

sider, that, though we are thus proved account- 
able both by our internal constitution and by 
our external condition, yet that for numberless 
actions we are never actually brought to any 
account during our present lives. We cannot 
indeed comprehend why we were ever made 
accountable creatures at all — not that this is 
any proof, that we are not justly made so : for 
we cannot contradict the justice any more 
than the fact of our being so, without contra- 
dicting our very nature — but our being so here 
does supply us with an additional reason, in- 
dependently of that drawn from Analogy, why 
we should continue to be so hereafter : because 
upon leaving this present scene, we have never 
actually rendered up our account. 

It seems therefore, that there is still greater 
reason for our being accountable then, than 
for our being so now. But there is sufficient 
reason for our being so now : for we actually 
are so. 

It has been sometimes said, that men are too 
insignificant in the eyes of an Almighty Being, 
for it to be supposed, that they will hereafter 
be made objects of vengeance and of punish- 
ment by Him. Independently of other an- 
swers, which may be given to this, we may, I 
think, draw two from the Analogy of Nature. 

1. We see here that the lowest of mankind 
may draw attention upon himself merely by 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



1(31 



committing a crime. He has only to murder 
a fellow-creature, and he is at once the object 
of attention to thousands, and that in propor- 
tion to the enormity of his crime. But if he 
wishes to become still more conspicuous, let 
him only increase the flagrancy of his guilt : 
let him commit treason ; and the attention of 
the civilized world and of all its sovereigns 
will be immediately fastened upon him. 

This shows us, that it is not the way of 
Nature to suffer wickedness to escape notice, 
merely because the agent may be insignificant ; 
but rather, contrariwise, to bring an insignifi- 
cant agent into notice in proportion to his 
guilt.t 

2. Men are, as has been shown above, 
actually punished every day for their trans- 
gressions by the Natural Governor of the 
world. It is plain, therefore, that neither 
guilt, nor the punishment of guilt, is really 
beneath His notice. 



t This argument is urged in " The Saturday Evening :" 
but I have not the book by me to refer to the page. 



M 



162 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



CHAPTER IV. 

That our Happiness depends much o?i ourselves. 
I. On our Exertions. 2. O n our Habits . 3. 
On the Supremacy of our Moral Faculties. 4. 
On a prudential Regard to our own Welfare. 
5. On our Religion. 6. On our Knowledge. 
7. On our Opinions. 8. On our JBelief 9. 
On our Observance of arbitrary Institutions. 

THOUGH we all occasionally meet with 
happiness and with suffering, which are 
altogether independent of our own conduct ; 
yet in the great majority of instances it is mani- 
festly otherwise. And accordingly, whenever 
we inquire into the causes, which have led to 
the happiness or misery of others, their own 
conduct is constantly made a principal object of 
our inquiry. We examine, whether they have 
been prudent or imprudent. And these very 
words imply the dependence of our happiness 
upon ourselves ; since Prudence is only another 
name for that practical wisdom, by which we 
regulate our conduct with a view to secure our 
happiness — Imprudence is that recklessness, 
which leads us to act without any such view. 
We cannot indeed pursue any line of con- 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 163 

duct, nay, we cannot perform any single ac- 
tion, even to the regulation of a thought, which 
will not be followed by a chain of consequences, 
of which no human foresight can foresee the 
whole extent. And these consequences will 
often affect the happiness of many individuals, 
almost always that of the agent himself. 

It is to be observed too, that, though we 
cannot always escape from suffering by our 
own exertions ; yet that our happiness is always 
so far placed in our own power, that we may 
at any time destroy it, if we will. Any man 
may be quite sure of bringing pain and suffering 
upon himself by many kinds of imprudence, 
as by intemperance, for instance, or by crime : 
and vast multitudes are doing it every day. 
It is obvious, that we may bring bodily pain 
upon ourselves at any moment that we please. 
On the other hand, hardly any pleasure at all 
is to be obtained without our doing some- 
thing towards acquiring it : for human enjoy- 
ment is made to spring (with comparatively 
few exceptions) entirely from the active exer- 
cise of our several faculties. 

All this is true of individuals ; though they 
indeed are constantly liable to be affected by 
the conduct of others, as well as by their own. 
But it is still more generally and more exclu- 
sively true in the case of large bodies of men, 
such as civil communities: for though these 



10 i THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

may be occasionally affected by the conduct of 
neighbouring nations, this happens compara- 
tively but seldom : so that if a whole people 
were to act both in their public and private 
capacities with perfect virtue and prudence, it. 
cannot be doubted, that the happiness of such 
a community, both public and private, would be 
increased to a very great degree. But let this 
supposition be extended to the whole human 
race, and it seems impossible to say to what 
pitch their happiness might not be raised. 



But it cannot be incredible, that our happi- 
ness may at any future time be regulated on 
the very same principle, as it is at present. 
We cannot indeed understand, why our con- 
duct in this life should have anything to do 
with our happiness in a life to come — why we 
may not be permitted to be happy then inde- 
pendently of anything we have done here. 
But neither can we any better understand, 
why our present happiness is in the same way- 
made to depend on our own conduct. And 
yet it is so arranged now ; and therefore it may 
be equally so then. We experience now what 
is still more unaccountable than this, and 
would therefore be still more incredible, did 
we not actually experience it — that our happi- 
ness is made to depend on others as well as on 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



1C5 



ourselves — sometimes on the most wicked or 
the most capricious of mankind. Now Reli- 
gion does not assert that this will be the case 
hereafter. This more unaccountable circum- 
stance of what we experience here, will be 
done away with then : and it cannot surely be 
incredible, that that only, which is the less 
wonderful, may still remain. 

Nor is it any reason for disbelieving, that 
these consequences of our conduct may ensue, 
merely because they are distant : for we see, 
that in our present state natural punishments 
are often long deferred ; and then at last they 
come upon us suddenly and with violence. 
Men often suffer little for drunkenness and 
debauchery for years ; but the natural punish- 
ment of these courses overtakes them neverthe- 
less at last, in the form of sudden and violent 
disease. In the same way they sometimes 
contrive to escape civil punishment for long 
periods of time ; but are overtaken by it, 
when they least expect it, and when they think 
perhaps, that their crime has been utterly for- 
gotten. In numberless cases the consequences 
of what we do in our youth pursue us to extreme 
old age : indeed the way in which we have 
passed the one, will always in a great degree 
influence the happiness of the other. But 
our happiness here is often influenced by 
what others have done long before we were 



160 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

born. Many a man has passed a life of misery 
in consequence of some hereditary disease, in- 
troduced perhaps into his family, and entailed 
upon himself, by the misconduct of an ances- 
tor many generations ago. The people of 
France are now suffering, and will probably 
suffer for many years, the punishment of follies 
and crimes committed by a former generation. 
When we see these things happening, how can 
we possibly feel assured, that we shall be 
rescued from the consequences of our own mis- 
conduct by the mere lapse of time? 

This then is the general principle, by which 
our happiness in this life is mainly regulated: — 
it is made to depend chiefly on our own con- 
duct. But let us further examine, on what 
particulars in that conduct it thus depends. 

1. It depends on our exertions. He who 
hopes to win the prize, must run the race. No 
man dreams, that it can be won by sitting still : 
" So run, that ye may obtain." And this is 
equally the case, whether we fix our eye upon 
the attainment of any immediate object of 
desire, or upon success in the general scheme 
of life. 

The constitution of all Nature points to the 
same truth — that we are intended for a state 
of active exertion. Neither food nor clothes 
nor habitations (all absolutely necessary to us) 
are prepared ready for our use. The earth 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 167 

produces corn : but not until we have ploughed 
it, and scattered the seed. Corn is fit for food : 
but not till we have reaped and threshed, 
ground and baked it. The wild carrot and 
celery are altogether unfit for food : but by 
care and culture their juices are sweetened, 
their esculent parts enlarged, and their nutri- 
tious properties developed. The wild peach 
of Media is absolutely poisonous : but culti- 
vated in the plains of Ispahan it becomes a 
delicious fruit : and so with a great variety 
of others. Again, all our most valuable fruit- 
trees require to be grafted by human art. Even 
flowers, which are merely objects of luxury, 
can be brought to perfection and beauty only 
by the same means of human labour. Nor is 
the first perfecting of either the fruit or the 
flower in this manner sufficient : for they 
quickly degenerate again, if left to them- 
selves, and even if they are not continually 
transplanted from one soil to another. 

The Moral world teaches us the same lesson. 
In the arts, which supply us with the orna- 
ments, the conveniences, and the necessaries of 
life ; in the sciences, even those most nearly 
concerning our welfare, as those of Political 
Economy, of Medicine, of Morals, of Legisla- 
tion, not only are the first discoveries made by 
the active exertions of original inventors ; but 
these discoveries must be learned with care 



168 THE ACCORDANCE OF KELIGION 

and attention by every succeeding generation 
which is afterwards to practise them. Know- 
ledge cannot even be poured into our minds by 
the exertions of others, while we are mere pas- 
sive listeners. A wise and virtuous manhood 
can be attained only by a youth of study and 
of discipline : neither are wealth and power 
and fame to be won without a course of toil 
and labour. Why else so many exhortations to 
industry and activity and perseverance ? 

Our minds and our bodies are alike unfit 
for idleness : as total inactivity is the most 
fatiguing condition of the mind, so is standing 
still the most tiring of all things to the body. 
And not only are the truest and most lasting 
pleasures of either derived from the active 
exercise of their several faculties : but this 
exercise is absolutely necessary for the health 
of both. 



If the constitution of inanimate Nature, and 
the structure of our own minds and bodies, 
thus conspire to show us, that we were intended 
by our Maker for a state of activity and exer- 
tion ; and if in accordance with this constitu- 
tion of things all the great objects of our de- 
sires and of our wants are in fact acquired 
by these appointed means : then it is surely 
not incredible, that the same may be the case 
in that instance, of which we have as yet had 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



169 



no experience — the attainment of happiness in 
a future life. Nay, if the most paltry desires 
of worldly ambition or caprice cannot be 
gratified, except through our own active exer- 
tion ; much more may we expect, that exertion 
may be necessary for the attainment of that 
happiness, which is infinite both in duration 
and degree. And this is the argument used by 
the apostle : " Every man, that striveth for the 
mastery, is temperate in all things:" he, that 
is, who hopes to conquer in wrestling or in 
running, goes through a course of laborious 
discipline for the purpose. " Now they do it 
to obtain a corruptible crown ; but we an in- 
corruptible." t 

Again, more particularly, we see, that know- 
ledge most important to our welfare here, as 
well as other temporal good, can be gained 
only in the same way of labour and exertion. 
We may therefore well think it probable, that, 
if Religion be true, some attention and study 
may be necessary on our part to acquire a 
knowledge of this also : we shall not conclude, 
that, if the knowledge of it be necessary for our 
happiness, then God will be sure to give it us 
without any care of ours. 

2. Our happiness depends on our habits. 
And that this must be the case, is suggested 



t 1 Cor. ix. 24. 



170 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

by the word itself ; since Habit is a name for 
our habitual (that is our most constant) occu- 
pations, and pursuits, and ways of acting and 
of thinking : and if these have any influence 
at all over our happiness (which no man can 
doubt) that influence must of course be greater 
in proportion as it is constantly operating ; 
that is, in proportion as our habits are strong 
and inveterate. " Now there are habits not 
only of drinking, swearing, and lying, and of 
some other things, which are commonly ac- 
knowledged to be habits, and called so ; but 
of every modification of action, speech, and 
thought. Man is a bundle of habits." 

" There are habits of industry, attention, 
vigilance, advertency ; of a prompt obedience 
to the judgment occurring, or of yielding to the 
first impulse of passion ; of extending our views 
to the future, or of resting upon the present ; 
of apprehending, methodizing, reasoning ; of 
indolence and dilatoriness ; of vanity, self-con- 
ceit, melancholy, partiality ; of fretfulness, sus- 
picion, captiousness, censoriousness ; of pride, 
ambition, covetousness ; of overreaching, in- 
triguing, projecting : in a word there is not a 
quality or function, either of body or mind, 
which does not feel the influence of this great 
law of animated nature." f 



t Paley, Philos. i. 48. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



171 



The very extensive influence of habit, both 
on the body in the establishing of a healthy 
constitution, and on the mind in the formation 
of the intellectual and moral character, is con- 
sidered in a subsequent chapter of this Essay. | 
It is unnecessary to show, how essential to 
happiness is such a good bodily constitution, 
of which good spirits are a part : and the great 
influence of moral and intellectual character 
on happiness is manifest from considering, that 
not only the general tenour of our lives quite 
to old age, but each particular thought and 
action, are more or less determined by this 
character. But our happiness depends almost 
entirely on our thoughts and actions. 

The influence of habits in this respect is 
so well known, that all ethical writers have 
given precepts for the regulation of them with 
a view to our happiness. Thus, if we set our 
enjoyment on things in our own power, such 
as some engaging pursuit, we shall derive 
more happiness from these, than from what is 
commonly called pleasure, for which we are 
greatly dependent on circumstances or on 
other persons. If we form our habits to some 
occupation, of which the pleasure does not cloy, 
we shall be happier, than in the pursuit of 
sensual pleasure, which is immediately ex- 
hausted. If we " set " our habits in a proper 



I Part IV. chap. xii. 



172 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

manner, this will contribute to our happiness. 
" The art," says Paley, " in which the secret 
of human happiness in great measure consists, 
is to set the habits in such a manner, that 
every change may be a change for the better. 
The habits themselves are much the same ; for, 
whatever is made habitual, becomes smooth, 
and easy, and nearly indifferent. The return 
to an old habit is likewise easy, whatever the 
habit be. Therefore the advantage is with 
those habits, which allow of an indulgence in 
the deviation from them. The luxurious re- 
ceive no greater pleasure from their dainties, 
than the peasant does from his bread and 
cheese : but the peasant, whenever he goes 
abroad, finds a feast ; whereas the epicure must 
be well entertained, to escape disgust. Those 
who spend every day at cards, and those who 
go every day to plough, pass their time much 
alike : intent upon what they are about, want- 
ing nothing, regretting nothing, they are both 
for the time in a state of ease : but then what- 
ever suspends the operations of the card-player, 
distresses him ; whereas to the labourer, every 
interruption is a refreshment : and this appears 
in the different effects that Sunday produces 
upon the two, which proves a day of recreation 
to the one, but a lamentable burthen to the 
other. "f — "A reader, who has inured himself to 

t Paley 's Philos. i. 37. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



173 



books of science and argumentation, if a novel, 
a well-written pamphlet, an article of news, 
a narrative of a curious voyage, or a journal 
of a traveller, fall in his way, sits down to the 
repast with relish ; enjoys his entertainment, 
while it lasts, and can return, when it is over, 
to his graver reading, without distaste. Ano- 
ther, with whom nothing will go down, but 
works of humour and pleasantry, or whose 
curiosity must be interested by perpetual 
novelty, will consume a bookseller's window 
in half a forenoon : during which time he is 
rather in search of diversion, than diverted ; 
and as books to his taste are few, and short, 
and rapidly read over, the stock is soon ex- 
hausted, when he is left without resource from 
this principal supply of harmless amusement, "f 

What Paley says here, is particularly true 
of habits of expence. We should set them 
low in proportion to our means : for they can 
be raised at any time with additional enjoy- 
ment ; they cannot be lowered by most men 
without pain. 

There is another habit of mind still more 
important perhaps to happiness, than any 
which Paley has mentioned — what is familiarly 
called, taking things by the right handle. 
Most things, that befall us, have a mixture of 



f Paley 's Philos. i. 39. 



174 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



good consequences, and bad, neither of which 
can be fully foreseen without directing our at- 
tention to them : and the difference between a 
cheerful and a gloomy habit of mind, is, that 
the one will pick out all the good consequences 
for contemplation, and the other all the bad : 
and by so doing the one will really convert 
good into evil, the other will change evil into 
good. 

But again, supposing two individuals to cal- 
culate on the same consequences, as likely to 
ensue from any event; still their happiness 
may be affected in very different ways, if one 
is in the habit of considering all things as re- 
gulated for the best by the Great Disposer of 
events, and the other has no such habit. 

In short, however greatly opinions may differ 
as to what habits will make a man most happy, 
it cannot be doubted, that his happiness is in- 
fluenced by them one way or the other ; unless 
we assert at the same time, that all men are 
equally happy except as to external circum- 
stances — an opinion too absurd to be refuted. 



If then we are to exist hereafter, it will be 
but according to the Analogy of what happens 
to us here, if that character and those habits, 
which have been formed during this early 
stage of our career, shall influence the happi- 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



175 



ness of all future parts of it. The habits 
formed during our childhood have so very ex- 
tensive an influence here, that they suffice, ac- 
cording as we have formed them, to render our 
manhood and old age happy or miserable: — the 
more inveterate they are, the more surely and 
extensively they do this. It cannot therefore 
be absurd to think, that they may still have 
this same effect, when they shall have been 
still further confirmed by time. 

3. Happiness depends on the supremacy of 
our moral faculties. 

Our faculties are all calculated, when duly 
exercised, to produce happiness. What Paley 
has observed of our bodily structure, that no 
anatomist ever thought of saying, " This part 
was made to ache, this to irritate, or that to in- 
flame," is equally applicable to our mental 
constitution. Every faculty is intended to 
produce good : it is only the inactivity or the 
abuse of it, which produces evil. If this is 
true, then must the proper exercise of our 
Moral Faculties be adapted to make us happy. 
But if it is also true, | that these faculties were 
clearly intended by Nature to hold a supre- 
macy over all the rest, and that they alone 
are never punished in their excess — that is, 
that they cannot possibly be in excess ; then 



t See Part II. chap. viii. 



170 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

we may be sure, that the world is so arranged, 
as to be in harmony with their supremacy, and 
with their unrestrained exercise : and this is to 
say, that in no other way can man's happiness 
be more effectually promoted, than by his being- 
virtuous. And I believe, that what we should 
thus be led by reason to expect, is confirmed 
by the real facts of the case — not of course in 
the sense of the ancient Stoics, who asserted, 
that Virtue is able to render us independent of 
all external evils, and therefore perfectly 
happy — but merely that, all other things being- 
alike, a virtuous course of conduct is better 
adapted to make us happy, than any other. 

We may consider the matter as regarding 
the case of individuals, and of communities. 
And first, with regard to individuals. 

The immediate gratification arising from the 
performance of virtuous actions has been a 
copious subject for declamation : but as such 
declamation is adapted rather to work upon 
the feelings of those, whose reason has already 
been convinced, than to produce the convic- 
tion ; and as similar declamations might easily 
be made on the pleasures of vice ; I shall con- 
fine myself to topics drawn from reason, rather 
than imagination, and which are therefore 
likely to have equal weight with all. 

It will be allowed then, I think, that the 
virtuous generally enjoy greater serenity and 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 177 

cheerfulness of temper, than the wicked. Hap- 
piness of this kind is not indeed of the same 
boisterous nature as mirth and joy ; and does 
not, like them, force itself on the notice of 
mankind : yet it cannot be denied, that there 
is some degree of pleasure attached both to the 
performing of virtuous actions, and to the after 
recollection of them.f It cannot at least be 
doubted, that a troubled conscience is a source 
of misery. When the mind is haunted with a 
deep sense of guilt, it is well known to be one 
of the most intolerable punishments, to which 
human nature is exposed ; so that the recol- 
lection of a single crime has often rendered 
the greater portion of a man's life a state of 
intense suffering. 

Then virtue is very generally esteemed, and 
favoured, and rewarded by mankind on its 
own account, both in public and in private 
life. Even the vicious are in some degree 
compelled by decency to treat it thus. Vice, 
on the contrary, very generally meets with 

f In Mariner's Account of the Tonga Islands, the following 
statement is made: " Many of the chiefs, on being asked by 
Mr. Mariner, what motives they had for conducting themselves 
with propriety, besides the fear of misfortunes in this life, 
replied, ' The agreeable and happy feeling which a man expe- 
riences within himself when he does any good action, or con- 
ducts himself nobly and generously, as a man ought to do.' 
And this question they answered, as if they wondered such 
should be asked." — Vol. ii. p. 131. 

N 



178 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

scorn and detestation ; is always conscious of 
deserving it : when it reaches the form of 
crime, it is visited by civil society with punish- 
ment, the immediate object of which is to 
inflict pain. It is never under any circum- 
stances rewarded on its own account. 

There can hardly be a stronger proof, that 
virtue is calculated to produce happiness, than 
that one school of moralists has denned it to 
be the doing good to mankind, or the doing 
that which promotes their happiness : and 
much as this definition has been controverted, 
no one has been able to produce a single in- 
stance, in which virtue and human happiness 
are really at variance : which would have set- 
tled the controversy at once. In the same 
way vice has been said to be the doing ill to 
mankind, or producing their misery. But 
that virtue and vice do have these effects, is 
more manifest in the case of communities. 

Secondly therefore, with regard to public 
happiness. If we take the above definition of 
virtue, as the doing that, which will produce 
the greatest happiness to mankind ; and con- 
sider it, not as exhibiting the only proper mo- 
tive to virtue, which it does not ; but as sup- 
plying one true criterion of virtue, which it 
does ; then it is manifest, that the more virtue 
there is in any community, the more happi- 
ness there will be. Butler has eloquently 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. ] 79 

shown the power of virtue, to promote public 
prosperity in the following passage : " But let 
us return," says he, "to the earth our habita- 
tion ; and we shall see this happy tendency of 
virtue, by imagining an instance not so vast 
and remote : by supposing a kingdom or so- 
ciety of men upon it, perfectly virtuous, for a 
succession of many ages ; to which, if you 
please, may be given a situation favourable 
for universal monarchy. In such a state there 
would be no such thing as faction : but men 
of the greatest capacity would of course, all 
along, have the chief direction of affairs wil- 
lingly yielded to them ; and they would share 
it among themselves without envy. Each of 
these would have the part assigned him, to 
which his genius was peculiarly adapted ; and 
others, who had not any distinguished genius, 
would be safe, and would think themselves 
very happy, by being under the protection 
and guidance of those who had. Public de- 
terminations would really be the result of the 
united wisdom of the community ; and they 
would faithfully be executed by the united 
strength of it. Some would in a higher way 
contribute, but all would in some way contri- 
bute, to the public prosperity ; and in it each 
would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And 
as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would 
be unknown among themselves ; so they 



180 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

would be sufficiently secured from it in their 
neighbours. For cunning and false self-in- 
terest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight, 
and accompanied with faction and intestine 
treachery ; these, on one hand, would be found 
mere childish folly and weakness, when set in 
opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union 
inviolable, and fidelity, on the other : allowing 
both a sufficient number of years to try their 
force. Add the general influence, which such 
a kingdom would have over the face of the 
earth, by way of example particularly, and 
the reverence, which would be paid it. It 
would plainly be superior to all others, and 
the world must gradually come under its em- 
pire : not by means of lawless violence ; but 
partly by what must be allowed to be just 
conquest; and partly by other kingdoms sub- 
mitting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout 
a course of ages, and claiming its protection, 
one after another, in successive exigencies. 
The head of it would be a universal monarch, 
in another sense, than any mortal has yet 
been ; and the Eastern style would be literal- 
ly applicable to him, that all people, nations 
and languages should serve him."')" 

Imagine what is here said of a single nation, 
to be the case of the whole human race ; and 



f Analogy, Part I. chap. iii. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 181 

it is obvious, that the sources of human misery 
would be in great part cut off, their happiness 
increased almost indefinitely. Such a picture 
shows us, not of course what human virtue is 
likely to effect under its actual circumstances, 
but what it is in its own nature adapted to 
effect, if freed from the obstacles and counter- 
acting influences of folly and wickedness, and 
carried freely and fully into action. It there- 
fore shows us, what are the real and actual 
tendencies of virtue. And it is particularly to 
be observed here, that these tendencies belong 
to the intrinsic nature of virtue, and are essen- 
tial to it ; the obstacles are extrinsic and acci- 
dental. 



Now Religion teaches us, that our future 
state will bring with it a more perfect measure 
of happiness to the good, and a lot of greater 
misery to the wicked : that is to say, it teaches 
us, that the essential tendencies both of vir- 
tue and of vice, such as we see them here, 
will then be more fully and completely deve- 
loped ; the obstacles to each, which exist 
now, being removed by the more complete 
separation of the good and the wicked. The 
good, no longer thwarted and opposed by the 
wicked, will be free to work out their own 
and each other's happiness, merely by having 
scope given to their own habits and charac- 



182 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RKLIGION 



ters of virtue : while the wicked, unawed and 
unrestrained by the presence of the good, will 
be equally at liberty, and equally ready, to 
torment and injure themselves and one ano- 
ther, by indulging in every possible way their 
malicious and evil propensities. 

The actual tendencies, therefore, of virtue 
and of vice, as we see them in the present 
constitution of Nature, so far confirm, and 
render credible, the promises and threats held 
out to us by Religion. 

4. Happiness depends on a prudential re- 
gard to our own welfare, or on what is com- 
monly called Prudence, when applied to our 
worldly interest. And this requires no further 
proof, than a consideration of the meaning of 
the word ; which expresses that practical wis- 
dom and foresight, which are employed in 
taking the measures most likely to secure our 
own happiness. To assert, that Prudence 
does not in general effect this object, would 
be to assert, that it is not real Prudence, but 
something else falsely so called. 

It has been sometimes asserted, that all 
mankind alike act from this principle, that no 
man ever does, or can do, anything whatever, 
but with a view to his own advantage, either 
present or future. This is the foundation of 
the selfish system of Morals : to which it 
seems to be a sufficient objection, that, if the 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



183 



assumption, on which it is founded, were just, 
then we should regard the most prudent or 
even the most selfish man and the most vir- 
tuous, with precisely the same feelings. 

Common sense and common observation as- 
sure us, that men may be, and constantly are, 
hurried away by their passions and appetites 
to do things in opposition to the dictates of 
Prudence ; and that the most grievous calami- 
ties are often entailed upon them by such 
conduct ; that a prudential regard to our own 
interest does therefore really promote our hap- 
piness. 



And in the same way, Religion assures us, 
that our future interests may be promoted or 
retarded, according as we are attentive or in- 
attentive to them now : that, if we are hurried 
away by passion and short-sighted views, 
leaving out of our consideration the ultimate 
consequences of our actions, we must hereafter 
pay the penalty of such improvidence. This 
is surely in accordance with our whole experi- 
ence in the present life. 

5. Happiness depends on Religion. 

It can hardly be doubted, that a belief in 
Religion is adapted to support and encourage 
virtue : this has indeed been allowed by most 
unbelievers ; and many, induced by the same 
consideration, have asserted, that Religion was 



184 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



invented by kings and rulers, for the purpose 
of keeping the people in their duty. That 
such is in fact the effect of Religion, is shown 
too by the immoral lives and characters of the 
greater number of modern infidels. But if 
Religion promotes virtue, and virtue promotes 
happiness, then of course Religion must itself 
promote happiness. The miseries and horrors 
of the French Revolution (the only instance, in 
which irreligion has been publicly professed, 
and actively promoted, by the government of 
a country) sufficiently prove, how much of 
the security and tranquillity of states is owing 
to a sense of Religion among the people. It 
was by the destruction of this feeling, that 
men's minds were prepared for all the atroci- 
ties then perpetrated ; and the restoration of a 
public profession of Religion was one of the 
means adopted by Napoleon, (himself an in- 
fidel,) for bringing them back to a sense of 
public duty and subordination. 

All the great Lawgivers of antiquity made 
it a principal object to impress on the people 
a sense of religion, considering it as the 
strongest foundation of public prosperity. Ma- 
chiavelli * and Montesquieu, f not themselves 



* Considerate adunque tutto conchiudo, che la Religione 
introdotta da Numa fu tra le prime cagioni della felicita di 
quella citta. perche quella causo buoni ordini, i buoni ordini 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



185 



religious, held the same doctrine. Gibbon £ 
too has given his testimony to its beneficial 
effects : " The pure and genuine influence of 
Christianity may be traced in its beneficial, 
though imperfect, effects on the barbarian pro- 
selytes." The long stability of the Roman 
Empire is commonly held to have been 
greatly owing to their sense of public duty 
arising from religious motives. 

But religion is still more essential to private 
happiness than to public. Paley reckons it 
to be " a main article of human happiness," 
that we should have some interesting object 
always in view, in the pursuit of which to 
engage our activity. Now nothing can supply 
us with an object of such paramount import- 
ance, as religion : nor can the interest of any 
other object be so lasting; for the interest of 
this will increase to the very latest moment 
of our lives, when all other objects fail en- 
tirely. 

Nor is it only as an interesting object of 
pursuit, that it adds to our happiness : it is 
also a never failing source of comfort and con- 
solation in the troubles of life to those, who 
place reliance on it, by assuring them, that 

fanno buona fortuna, e dalla buona fortuna nacquero i felici 
successi delle imprese. — Discorsi, lib. i. cap. xi. 

f Esprit des Loix, 1. xxiv. chap. 2. 

I Decline and Fall, vol. vi. p. 410. 



186 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



these troubles are inflicted with a purpose mer- 
ciful and beneficial to themselves. And here 
again Atheists and Sceptics admit, how com- 
fortable a doctrine that of Religion would be, 
if credible.* 



If then Religion promotes our happiness 
here, if it does this only in the very smallest 
possible degree ; then it cannot be absurd to 
suppose, that it may have the very same effect 
hereafter. 

If, on the other hand, a belief in Religion 
is thus useful to us in promoting our present 
happiness, and is nevertheless founded in 
falsehood ; this would be an instance of a want 
of harmony, of an anomaly, we may almost 
say, of an untruth, in God's creation, such as 
requires the very strongest proofs, before it 
can be admitted — that a belief in falsehood is 
more useful and beneficial to man than a 
knowledge of truth. 

6. Happiness depends on knowledge. 

* Las Cases records these words to have been used by Na- 
poleon at St. Helena : " However, the sentiment of Religion is 
so consolatory, that it must be considered as a gift of Heaven : 
what a resource would it not be for us here to possess it !" 
Vol. iv. 131. 

And again, on another occasion : " Perhaps I shall again be- 
lieve implicitly ; God grant I may. I shall certainly make no 
resistance, and I do not ask a greater blessing : it must in my 
mind be a great and real happiness."— Ibid. v. 201. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



187 



Whenever a man acts with a view either of 
obtaining any good, or of avoiding evil ; then 
he may be said to be so far dependent for his 
enjoyment on his knowledge ; since it is only 
by knowing what means are adapted to effect 
his purpose, that he can designedly attain that 
purpose. However strong may be his sense 
of duty, his regard for his own interest, or any 
other motive, these will be all obviously use- 
less, without knowledge to direct him in the 
choice of means. 

A great part of this knowledge indeed, and 
that the most essential part, is possessed by 
all mankind alike. We could not live without 
knowing that food will nourish us, and fire 
destroy us, and ten thousand other things of 
the same sort. But there is also a large portion 
of knowledge, such as is acquired by some 
men, and not acquired by others, and by 
means of which enjoyment is procured to its 
possessors. In the several professions, and in 
the different branches of trade and commerce, 
it is chiefly superior knowledge, which enables 
some men to outstrip their fellows, and to rise 
to fame, and wealth, and honour : and these 
(especially when earned by a man's own ex- 
ertions,) are undoubtedly sources of enjoyment. 
Authors attain celebrity and often wealth by 
the same means : and in their case knowledge 
is still more obviously and immediately the 



188 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

source of these. In the arts and sciences it 
is the same : many a man has made his fortune 
by the possession of some secret in the arts : 
and this is so far from being thought unfair, 
or hard upon others, that the law of patents is 
enacted to protect the rights of such persons. 
Others, again, are enabled to attain the objects 
of their wishes by their superior knowledge of 
the world. 

As good things are procured, so are evils 
avoided, by knowledge. Instances of this are 
occurring every day in common life. How 
many a man has suffered the most grievous 
pains, or lost his life, through ignorance of the 
use of fire-arms — by ignorantly swallowing 
poison — by not knowing how to manage an 
unruly horse. In all these cases a little addi- 
tional knowledge might have saved him. 

But what seems more inscrutable to us, our 
happiness here often depends on the know- 
ledge of others. The ignorance of a physician 
or a surgeon causes men the most severe and 
protracted tortures ; which would have been 
alleviated or prevented by greater knowledge 
on their part. In public life how often has 
the ignorance of a civil or a military leader 
entailed the horrors of war or of famine on 
millions of their fellow-creatures. How con- 
stantly and entirely does the public prosperity 
of every community depend on the knowledge 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 189 

possessed by its rulers, of Political Economy 
and of the whole art of government. 



And thus, if God has really appointed some 
certain means whereby happiness in a future 
life may be attained; there is nothing in- 
credible in the supposition, that it may be 
necessary for us, as far as it is in our power, to 
acquire a knowledge of these means,— that, if 
we refuse to acquire this knowledge of the 
means, we cannot hope to attain the end. 
This is what happens to us in our present life ; 
why may it not happen equally with regard to 
the next ? 

7. Happiness depends on our opinions. 

In the common transactions of life, every 
man's conduct is constantly influenced by his 
opinions. The merchant, when he embarks 
his capital in one speculation rather than 
another, is guided by the opinions which he 
may happen to entertain as to the probable 
course of public affairs : and these opinions, 
again, must be dependent on various others en- 
tertained on political and commercial subjects. 
If his opinions are correct, he is successful ; 
if otherwise, he may be ruined. The sailor 
puts to sea according to his opinion of the 
weather ; and his safety depends on the cor- 
rectness of it. Many of our actions are deter- 



190 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

mined by the opinions, which we entertain of 
our neighbours; and these actions produce 
their effect, bad or good, upon our happiness. 

Again, our happiness is influenced by our 
speculative opinions on the most abstract ques- 
tions of metaphysics or philosophy. Turkish 
sailors will sit still during a storm without ex- 
ertion, because they think it decreed by Pro- 
vidence, whether they are to be lost or saved. 
This speculative opinion on predestination 
must of course lead many to their destruction ; 
and if it were universally adopted as a prac- 
tical guide of conduct, it would obviously con- 
vert the world into a scene of reckless crime 
and intolerable misery. 

The man, who has persuaded himself by 
metaphysical arguments, that the human soul 
is mortal, has a very different prospect before 
him from another, who is persuaded of its im- 
mortality — a prospect, which cannot but affect 
his happiness here. A good man, who en- 
tertains this latter opinion, has a source of 
constant comfort during life, which the other 
is without. He, again, who believes in the 
Benevolence of the Deity, will certainly endure 
calamity with greater resignation and cheer- 
fulness, than another, who considers his misery 
as the wanton infliction of a cruel and tyran- 
nical Being. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



191 



And so we are informed, that the specula- 
tive opinion, which we form as to the truth or 
falsehood of Revelation, may affect our happi- 
ness hereafter. And if it does so, this will be 
of a piece with what we actually experience 
now. 

8. Happiness depends on belief. 

Belief may be considered under the two 
heads, of belief resting on the authority, and 
that resting on the testimony, of others. 

To consider the first. Children must rely 
on the authority of their elders every hour of 
their lives. They are told, that fire will burn 
them, that water will drown them, that hem- 
lock will poison them : if they believe these 
things, no evil ensues : if they choose to dis- 
believe them, they reap the consequences, 
perhaps in the endurance of pain and suffer- 
ing for their lives, perhaps in the loss of life 
itself. But we are all children in many re- 
spects all our lives : when we are sick, we 
must swallow medicine on the authority of the 
physician ; our health depends on our doing 
so : when we go to law, we must act on the 
authority of our lawyer ; our property depends 
on our doing this : when we put to sea, we 
must rely implicitly on the captain of the ship; 
our lives depend upon it. 

Secondly, we must believe in testimony as 
to matters of fact. 



192 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



If in travelling we come to a swollen river, 
and the persons on the banks assure us, that it 
cannot be forded ; we may perhaps disbelieve 
them ; but we may sacrifice our lives to our 
incredulity. The property, and happiness, 
and lives of men are every day affected by the 
decisions of courts of justice : but these are all 
founded on belief in testimony. Take away 
this belief, their proceedings are at an end ; 
and the bands of civil society are at once dis- 
solved. 

In learning a science, if a man should set 
out on the principle of disbelieving the testi- 
mony of his predecessors ; he must of course 
repeat every single experiment, on which the 
science has been built, before he would admit 
its truth. It is obvious, that such a learner 
could never master any one of the sciences 
(the mathematics excepted) in their present 
state. 

A man's success in life may even depend on 
his believing, on the faith of testimony, facts of 
a miraculous nature. If a student in Geology 
should discredit all those facts, which establish 
the successive creation of plants and animals, 
until he could verify each for himself ; he would 
not only make himself ridiculous by so doing, 
but human life would be too short for him ever 
to reach that point, at which the science is now 
arrived : and if he rests his hopes of honour 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 193 

and distinction on his eminence as a geologist 
(which many a man has done), these hopes will 
be utterly blasted merely by his disbelief of 
these miraculous facts. 

Religious Belief itself too affects men's hap- 
piness in this life ; and that quite indepen- 
dently of the truth or falsehood of religion.! 
Whether true or false, millions of men do 
believe in it : and it can hardly be thought, 
that it makes no difference in a good man's 
happiness here, whether he believes, that he 
shall be hereafter rewarded, or not ; or that a 
bad man's peace is not disturbed by believing, 
that he is doomed to endless torment. Infidels 
too very generally suffer by being exposed to 
public odium, and are more or less shunned 
by society. 



It appears therefore, that in this life men's 
happiness is made often to depend upon their 
belief: and Revelation teaches us, that the 
same is the case with regard to our happiness 
in the next — that, according as we believe or 
disbelieve now, we shall be happy or miserable 
in consequence. Why should it be more in- 
credible in the one case than in the other ? 

But it may be further observed, that in all 



f The words of Napoleon are equally applicable here, as on 
a former occasion. See p. 186. 

O 



194 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

the instances above mentioned an implicit be- 
lief, whether founded on authority or on testi- 
mony, is necessary to us in proportion to our 
ignorance of any particular subject. Children 
must believe everything, because they can 
form no opinions of their own : and in a variety 
of cases, where we are all in effect children, 
that is, quite ignorant, we must all do the 
same. The sick man must believe his phy- 
sician, the litigant his lawyer ; because he 
understands not law or physic himself. Now 
no man can doubt, that Religion, both Natural 
and Revealed, contains many things which 
quite surpass our comprehension. Let us then 
only apply to the case of religion that rule, 
which we all observe in the common affairs of 
life ; and, where we are incompetent to judge, 
let us believe ; provided only that the testi- 
mony and the authority are good. With re- 
gard to the latter, if our belief can securely 
rest on the authority of the physician and the 
lawyer, it may surely rely on the Word of 
God. 

9. Happiness depends on our observance of 
Arbitrary Institutions. 

Arbitrary Institutions make up a great part 
of the manners, customs, and laws of all nations, 
whether barbarous or civilized. None probably 
were purely arbitrary in their origin ; since 
some reason must have existed for their first 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 195 

establishment : but they have become so by 
time, either because the reasons of them are 
unknown to those who practise them, or be- 
cause these reasons have ceased to operate. 
Now, whenever men are entirely ignorant of 
the utility of such institutions, they are apt to 
think them at least matters of no importance ; 
if they do not hold them to be absurd and 
ridiculous. And yet on the due observance 
of such matters men's comfort and happiness 
are every day made to depend. Such is the 
case with those conventional modes of show- 
ing respect common in all countries ; with 
antiquated legal forms existing in most ; with 
superstitious rites and ceremonies both among 
barbarous and among many civilized nations. 
If a man in this country were to set at defi- 
ance the custom of uncovering the head, when 
he comes into the presence of others, he would 
be driven from society, perhaps be subjected 
to personal chastisement. Yet nothing can 
be more purely arbitrary : for in Turkey a 
man may stand before his sovereign with his 
head covered : but he will be bastinadoed or 
bow-strung, if he refuses to uncover his feet. 
If a man should neglect to comply with any 
of those forms or ceremonies (such as the cut- 
ting of a turf or a twig) which our own law 
prescribes in the transfer of landed property, 
he will forfeit his rights, and perhaps be re- 



V96 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

duced to poverty, by such neglect ; and many 
a man has been so ruined. In some copyhold 
tenures a tenant must receive from the lord a 
glove or a rod, before he pays his fine ; if he 
neglects to do so, his fine is forfeited. Some 
large estates are held on condition of sending 
a flag to the sovereign on a particular # day 
in the year. The legislature has lately been 
employed in doing away with many of these 
arbitrary institutions — in itself a proof, that 
they are merely arbitrary. 

Different forms of Government are adopted 
arbitrarily ; since every nation was at liberty 
originally to adopt any. Yet when once estab- 
lished, national happiness generally depends 
on their observance ; and they cannot be 
changed without the most disastrous conse- 
quences often ensuing. 

Numberless Christian Martyrs, like Cyprian, 
Bishop of Carthage, have endured imprison- 
ment, tortures, and death, because they have 
refused to comply with the ceremonies of burn- 
ing incense and offering sacrifice to Heathen 
deities :f and others have preserved their lives 
by so complying. In our own country the 
receiving of the Sacrament of the Eucharist 
was for years the test, whereon depended 
men's admission to temporal power and the 



f See Gibbon, Chap. XVI. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 197 

highest offices of the State, or their exclusion 
from these. 



Yet it has been said, that, the Christian 
Sacraments being merely arbitrary (and this 
is quite a gratuitous assumption, drawn entirely 
from our own ignorance), therefore it is alto- 
gether incredible, that our future happiness 
should be made to depend on our compliance 
with them. Yet we see, that similar ceremo- 
nial observances, including these very sacra- 
ments, are constantly made to be the means 
both of promoting and of thwarting our highest 
temporal interests. This is just as much be- 
yond our comprehension, and would appear, 
if we did not actually experience it, just as 
incredible as the other. Therefore our mea- 
sure of incredibility must in this case be ab- 
surd and incorrect : for it is contradicted by 
experience. 

The objections, which have been often urged 
against the ceremonial laws of the Jews, may 
be answered in the same way ; though they 
are still weaker in this case, than in the former: 
for we are able to see, that many parts of 
this law were adapted, as mere political insti- 
tutions, to answer very beneficial purposes. 
Now we cannot see this in many of those cases 
mentioned above, taken from the natural 



108 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



world. One thing however we can see in all 
such cases, that ceremonies are adapted, and 
partly devised, to make an impression on the 
minds of men through their external senses. 

It is in the earliest and most barbarous 
stages of society, (which many are pleased to 
call our natural state, t) that mankind are most 
shackled by arbitrary institutions : they are 
freed in great measure from them, in propor- 
tion as knowledge and civilization advance. 
Among many barbarous nations, superstitious 
notions and practices abound so much, that 
the observance of them very greatly interferes 
with the comfort and enjoyment of men's lives.f 
The progress of knowledge gradually lessens 
the number of these. Our own legislature has 
lately been employed in sweeping away many 
useless legal forms, which have long been 



f " How misapplied are the epithets natural and artificial, 
when employed, as they often are, to characterize the savage 
and civilized state ! It is the former, in truth, which is by far 
the most artificial ; and much of civilization consists in the 
abolition of the numerous devices, by which it has falsified 
and perverted the natural dispositions of the human heart and 
understanding, and in the reformation of society upon principles 
more accordant with their unsophisticated dictates." — New 
Zealanders : Library of Entert. Knowledge, p. 206. 

\ See for instance the account of the taboo among the is- 
landers of the South Sea, by which persons are prohibited, for 
the most frivolous reasons, from having any intercourse with 
their fellow-men, and even from eating with their own hands, 
sometimes for months together.— Ibid. 152. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



19.9 



sources of expense and annoyance. Many 
arbitrary forms must however still be retained, 
since there could be no security for rights or 
property without them. If, however, men 
were perfectly wise and honest, they would be 
altogether unnecessary. And the same would 
be the case with all the other arbitrary insti- 
tutions of society ; such, for instance, as those, 
by which we shew our respect for others : 
these are merely external signs ; and if we 
could be sure of the existence of all proper 
and becoming feelings, the sign might just as 
well be abolished. 

The same distinction, which thus exists be- 
tween the rude and the more perfect stages of 
society, may be observed between individuals. 
Men of weak and frivolous minds are com- 
monly most given to form and ceremony ; 
while men of great ability and virtue are ge- 
nerally remarkable for their simple bearing 
and character and manners. 

Arbitrary institutions then seem naturally to 
belong to the less perfect condition of man ; 
and to disappear in proportion as he is elevated 
in the scale of being. Now in accordance 
with this constitution of things, we find from 
Revelation, that, while he was in a state of 
innocence, his religion was unencumbered 
with any arbitrary forms of worship whatever. 
One arbitrary commandment was imposed on 



200 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



him, that of abstaining from the fruit of the 
tree of knowledge : and when our Spiritual 
enemy " beguiled" the woman to transgress it, 
he succeeded by the same sophistry which is 
employed at the present day against the 
Christian Sacraments : " Ye shall not surely 
die" — God cannot have annexed so severe a 
condition, as that of life and death, to a com- 
mand so arbitrary and unimportant in itself. 

They had no sooner yielded to the sophistry 
and fallen from their innocence, than certain 
positive institutions, as that of Sacrifice^ the 
setting apart of special places of worship, and 
the division of animals into clean and un- 
clean ,| were appointed by the Deity : and 
these seem to have sufficed, as long as the 
worship of God was maintained in compara- 
tive purity. But as, notwithstanding the 
terrors of the general Deluge, wickedness and 
idolatry again increased, circumcision § was 
also enjoined : and when at length almost the 
whole world became immersed in a state of 
Religious darkness and barbarism, the Jewish 
Dispensation was introduced, abounding with 
numberless external ceremonies, and arbitrary 
institutions. Again, when the time had ar- 
rived for establishing a more perfect order of 



f Gen. iv. 3. J lb. viii. 20. § lb. xvii. 9. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 201 

things ; these ceremonies were done away 
with, and a simpler religion was given to man- 
kind under the form of Christianity. Still 
this contains some positive institutions and 
ceremonies, necessary for us in our imperfect 
state. Perhaps in our future and more perfect 
condition, all such may be entirely taken 
away, and we may then be permitted to pay 
our worship only in spirit and in truth. 

Now all this is in perfect accordance with 
those facts in the constitution of human so- 
ciety, which were mentioned above. 

The analogy of Nature confirms too the re- 
lative importance attached in Scripture to 
the substantial duties of religion, and to its 
external rites and ceremonies. For as a sub- 
ject, who should faithfully serve his earthly 
sovereign, and execute his wishes to the ut- 
most (even though he should be deficient in 
external marks and expressions of respect) 
would prove his real loyalty and devotion better 
than he, who should abound in the expres- 
sions and outward signs of reverence, but in 
nothing else ; and yet perfect loyalty requires 
both kinds of service : so too the Scriptures 
represent the doing the will of God in " the 
weightier matters of the Law," as far more 
important and acceptable to Him, than mere 
lip-service and observance of outward ordi- 
nances : " Not every one, that saith unto me, 



202 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of 
heaven ; but he that doeth the will of my 
Father which is in heaven. "| But never- 
theless the Scriptures too require both kinds 
of service at our hands : " Woe unto you, 
Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! for ye pay 
tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and 
have omitted the weightier matters of the 
Law, judgment, mercy and faith : these ought 
ye to have done, and not to leave the other 
undone."| 



CHAPTER V. 

That our Happiness depends partly on others. 

AND this appears to us still more unac- 
countable, than that it should be made 
to depend on ourselves : yet we cannot pass a 
day without experiencing that it is so. We 
are made to feel, not only that we are depen- 
dent for a large share of our comfort and en- 
joyment on the conduct of others, on their 
affection and kindness, on their virtues and 
prudence ; but still more, that their hatred or 
malice, their vices or follies, or even their 



f Matthew, vii, 21. J lb. xxiii. 23. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 203 

caprice, may, and often do, bring pain and 
suffering upon us. For it is very remarkable, 
how much greater is our power of doing evil 
to others, than of doing good. But few indi- 
viduals comparatively have it in their power 
to confer any great or lasting benefit on their 
fellows : but any man may commit a murder, 
and so cause misery to a whole family ; or he 
may set fire to a town, and spread terror and 
devastation among thousands; or commit trea- 
son, and alarm a whole nation. 

However, both good and evil are brought 
upon us by the instrumentality of others. 
How often has the safety of kingdoms turned 
on the conduct of a statesman or a general ! 
How many nations of the earth are at this 
moment dependent for their lives and proper- 
ties on the caprice of absolute sovereigns ! 
Who can calculate the amount of misery, 
which the ambition of Napoleon alone pro- 
duced throughout Europe ? 

And not only happiness and misery, but 
vice and virtue, knowledge and ignorance, are 
spread through the world by the instrumen- 
tality of others. We are continually led into 
the path of virtue, or tempted to commit sins, 
by example and advice. Knowledge and civili- 
zation are never advanced, except by means 
of the exertions of those, who are already more 
or less in possession of them. 



204 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

As individuals, we are especially dependent 
for our happiness on our parents. They entail 
upon us a healthy or a sickly constitution ; 
they nurse and educate us with care and skill, 
or with negligence and folly. If they are 
affectionate, we reap the fruit of enjoyment : 
if they are capricious and ill-tempered, the 
burden falls upon us. But these are the least 
important parts of our dependence. On the 
care and instruction of our parents our future 
characters chiefly depend : they sow in us the 
seeds of wisdom or of folly, of virtue or of 
vice : these will spring up and bear fruit ; and 
we shall be in great part wise or foolish, good 
or bad, happy or miserable, accordingly, during 
our whole lives. 



Yet it has been objected to Revelation, that, 
if it had been true, God would have made it 
known to mankind in general, or to those who 
would be benefited by it, according to some 
certain and obvious rule ; and not have per- 
mitted the spreading of it to be dependent, as 
it seems, on the will or caprice of men. This 
kind of objection, however, applies equally to 
almost all other advantages, which man is ca- 
pable of enjoying. If any good is fit and proper 
for me, why does not God give it to me, with- 
out making me to be to all appearance depen- 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 205 



dent upon others for the enjoyment of it? 
We cannot answer the question ; but we do 
know, that the thing is so. And if it is so in 
Nature, it may be so in Religion. 

A particular objection has been made to 
those passages in the Old Testament, in which 
God is represented as declaring, that He will 
visit the sins of the fathers upon the children. 
How this may be reconciled with Divine jus- 
tice, it may be hard for us to understand ; but 
it is not a proof, that the Bible is not the 
Word of God ; unless our now suffering for 
the conduct of our parents is a proof, that the 
constitution of Nature is not His work. 



CHAPTER VI. 

That our Happiness depends partly on External 
Circumstances. 

ADVANTAGES of almost every kind are 
distributed among men unequally and 
arbitrarily ; that is, not according to their 
merit or demerit, but according to rules and 
reasons unknown to us. Some are born to 
health and to hereditary riches and honours ; 
some to sickness, and poverty, and contempt : 
some have the benefit of good education and 
example, and are brought up to wisdom and 



206 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



virtue ; others are left to struggle through life 
in ignorance and vice. Whole nations have 
the light of civilization, and knowledge, and 
virtue diffused among them, and live in peace 
and security ; while others are lost in igno- 
rance, and superstition, and barbarity; are 
ravaged by war and pestilence, or carried into 
slavery. 



And so with Religion. — Millions are born 
beyond the pale of Christianity ; and in Chris- 
tian countries millions are practically Heathens. 
But shall we assert, that Christianity cannot 
be given by God, because it is thus partially 
given ? — because many apparently derive no 
benefit from it, without any fault of their own ? 
Not certainly, until we are able to prove, that 
worldly happiness and advantages of every 
kind are not distributed with equal inequality 
for reasons equally inscrutable to us. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 207 



CHAPTER VII. 

That Punishment is sometimes averted, 1. By 
Supplication; 2. By Repentance and Refor- 
mation; 3, By the vicarious Atonement of 
others. 

WE have seen in a former Chapter, that 
punishments are perpetually inflicted 
on us for our vices and our follies in the way 
of Natural consequences : sometimes directly, 
by what are commonly considered as Natural 
consequences, as disease is the consequence of 
intemperance ; sometimes through the instru- 
mentality of our fellow-creatures, as hatred, and 
obloquy, and civil punishment are the conse- 
quences of crime : both however being equally 
appointed by the Author of Nature. But, as 
these punishments are naturally inflicted on 
us, so we also find, that they may sometimes 
be naturally averted, and that in several ways. 
1. Punishment is averted by Supplication. 
Instances of this occur every day in the 
education of children. They are adjudged to 
suffer punishment for some offence ; but they 
supplicate for mercy, and the punishment is re- 
mitted. This may be done, perhaps, because 



208 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

their governors may think their begging for 
mercy a sign, that they have been sufficiently 
alarmed by the fear of punishment, or a proof 
that they are sorry for their offence ; or it may 
be done only from the weakness of a fond 
parent, who cannot withstand tears and en- 
treaty : but whatever be the cause, the fact 
remains, that the punishment is averted, which 
would have been inflicted, had it not been for 
entreaty on the part of the child. In the 
administration of civil justice it is the same: 
the mercy of the Sovereign is obtained by 
petition on the part of the culprit : when the 
punishment of imprisonment is inflicted by 
Parliament, it is never remitted, unless the 
prisoner humbly sues for it : his petitioning is 
an indispensable condition. 

The natural punishment of idleness in one, 
who has nothing to maintain him, are poverty 
and starvation : yet these are every day averted 
by beggars, who obtain their daily bread by 
asking alms. The effects of anger and resent- 
ment are continually mitigated or averted by 
the same means of entreaty in common life : 
and men's lives are saved in battle by their 
begging for mercy. In all these cases prayer 
is a Natural means, by which the punishment 
is averted : if it were not so, supplication and 
entreaty, as they are humiliating and galling 
to our pride, would, of course, never be used. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



209 



2. Punishment is averted by repentance at- 
tended with reformation. Whenever mercy is 
extended to an offender, as in all the above 
instances, it is always made a point to ascer- 
tain, whether or no the offender is sorry for 
what he has done. Men cannot indeed dive 
into the thoughts of others : they must be con- 
tent with the best proofs of repentance they 
can obtain, such as the profession of it by 
words, the acknowledgment of guilt, but espe- 
cially subsequent reformation. In all the above 
cases — of education — of the administration of 
civil justice — of imprisonment by Parliament, 
— of private resentment — these proofs of repen- 
tance on the part of the culprit operate towards 
the averting of punishment : if it were believed, 
that he were not sorry for the offence, the 
punishment would not be remitted; and it would 
be considered a certain sign, that he was not 
sorry, if he continued to offend. 

3. Punishment is averted by the vicarious 
atonement of others. 

In barbarous times and countries, where in- 
dividuals take the redress of private wrongs 
into their own hands, it often happens, that 
they are unable from various causes to take 
vengeance on the person of the offender him- 
self. In such cases they inflict it on his inno- 
cent parents, or his children, or his friends: 

p 



210 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

their revenge is then satiated, the injury is 
forgotten, and the offender himself thus escapes 
unhurt. And he so escapes merely by the vi- 
carious sufferings of others ; for if. none of his 
relations or friends can be found, to satisfy the 
vengeance of his enemies, he himself is still 
pursued for the purpose. 

In some countries vicarious punishments are 
established by law. In Japan, not only are 
parents held to be accountable for the offences 
of their children ; but the inhabitants of each 
street are answerable in a body for offences 
committed by any one of their number ; and 
the punishments are most severe and horrible.* 
In Burmah a man's servants are seized instead 
of himself for debt or any other offence. The 
servant receives the punishment due to his 
master : should it fail in producing the desired 
effect, his wives are next seized — in short, 
everything he possesses, before his own per- 
son.! In China, whose population comprizes 
a third of the human race, " every town is 
divided into tithings of ten houses, and these 
are combined into wards of one hundred. The 
magistrate is responsible for his whole district, 
the hundreder and tithing-man each for his 
respective charge, and the householder for the 



* Malte-Brun's Geography, vol. ii. 531. 

t Two Years at Sea — by Jane Roberts, p. 147. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



211 



conduct of his family."^ The very same sys- 
tem was established in England by Alfred — 
of which a proof still remains in the present 
division of the country into hundreds and ty- 
things. 

But our own times, as well as our own coun- 
try, will supply us with instances. School- 
boys, on whom tasks are imposed by way of 
punishment, compel their juniors to perform 
them, while they themselves care nothing for 
the pain thus inflicted on their substitutes. 
Men of generosity have not unfrequently re- 
duced themselves to poverty by discharging 
the debts of spendthrift relations or friends ; 
thus taking on themselves that distress and 
want, which are the natural punishment of ex- 
travagance ; while the offenders have escaped 
altogether free. 

Such sufferings for the faults of others are 
commonly thought to be cases of hardship : 
nor do we see on what principle they can be 
reconciled with justice. And yet there seems 
to be some feeling natural to the human breast, 
which leads men to act, as if they thought such 
things justifiable : as in the well-known story 
of Damon and Pythias, where the tyrant ac- 
cepted of Pythias as a substitute for his friend 
for the satisfaction of public justice. Traces 



I Davis's Chinese, i. 281. 



212 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

of this feeling are to be found too in the prac- 
tice of duelling : for if an offending party is 
disabled from lighting by age, or sex, or other 
circumstances, the nearest relation is called 
upon to take his place. And this is another 
instance, in which vicarious punishments are 
actually inflicted on the innocent, the offenders 
themselves escaping unscathed. And in these 
cases, not only does the thing happen by the 
over-ruling power of Natural Law, where men 
can do nothing but submit : but they them- 
selves recognize and act upon the idea of vica- 
rious atonement. Juries will not convict men 
of murder committed in duels ; though the 
murdered party may have had no quarrel with 
the murderer, but may have been led by the 
usages of society to take the place of some 
relative disabled from fighting. 

The universal prevalence of sacrifices through- 
out the Heathen world is a proof of the same 
feeling among men. And these sacrifices too 
may be said to be in some measure really vi- 
carious : for those, who offer them as expiations 
for sin with a real belief in their efficacy, are 
by so doing in great measure freed from the 
stings of conscience, one natural punishment 
of sin : which punishment is thus transferred 
to the unoffending victim. 

National punishments are very frequently 
indeed vicarious ; either because the punish- 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 213 

merit is deferred, until the offending genera- 
tion has passed away ; or because the offence 
is usually committed by the governors, while 
the punishment falls upon the governed. The 
people of France are now suffering the natural 
punishment of the crimes committed during 
the Revolution, and of her unjustifiable wars 
of aggression. The last generation set public 
morality and justice at defiance : but the 
wicked principles, which she then fostered, are 
turned, now that she is restrained from foreign 
conquest, to her own destruction, and find their 
vent in conspiracies and civil dissensions. 

The people of Britain are paying the penalty 
of twenty millions of money, incurred by the 
crime of their ancestors, when they instituted 
slavery in the West Indies, and sanctioned and 
encouraged the slave-trade. But History is 
hardly anything else, than a story of the punish- 
ments suffered by nations for the crimes and 
follies of preceding generations. 

National punishment is not however always 
deferred, till another generation comes upon 
the stage. Yet, even when it is not thus de- 
layed, it is nevertheless very commonly suffered 
vicariously by the innocent. Public hostages 
are given and accepted among barbarous na- 
tions on this express understanding, that they 
are to be sacrificed, if such and such things 
are done : and they are sacrificed accordingly. 



214 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

In the wars of modern Europe the injury is 
commonly committed (and injury there must be 
on one side or the other) by the national rulers : 
yet how seldom does the punishment fall upon 
them. An inroad is made upon the territory of 
the offending party, or perhaps on some distant 
colony : fields are ravaged, towns plundered, 
and the inhabitants massacred ; not one of 
whom had personally anything to do with the 
offence given : perhaps they do not even know 
the merits of the question. If the assailants 
are strong enough, this is continued, till satis- 
faction is given, perhaps in the form of a 
pecuniary fine. This fine is levied upon the 
people at large, and probably the rulers, being 
among the wealthiest, feel the punishment least 
of any. If an absolute monarch is the offender, 
he feels it not at all. 

We find then, that, as the Author of Nature 
has appointed certain natural punishments for 
offences committed against his laws ; so He 
permits these punishments in many cases to be 
averted by certain appointed means and on 
certain conditions ; and amongst these ap- 
pointed means are prayer, repentance attended 
with reformation, and the vicarious atonement 
of others. 



Now these are all Doctrines of Revelation ; 
and they have all been cavilled at and ridi- 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 215 



culed by sceptics, as giving an absurd and 
incredible account of God's dealings with man- 
kind. With regard to Prayer, God's decrees, 
they say, must be dictated by perfect wisdom 
and justice — if punishment is deserved, it will 
be inflicted by a perfectly just God ; and it is 
impossible to suppose, that it can be averted 
by man's entreaty. Other answers may be 
found to such an argument : but to establish 
the credibility of the doctrine this answer is 
sufficient, that the thing itself is done in the 
natural world ; the natural punishments of of- 
fences are continually averted by the prayers 
of the offending parties. And the thing is 
more wonderful in the natural world, than in 
the case of Religion : for in the former case, 
those, who grant or reject the petitioners' 
prayers, are often not swayed (as we suppose 
the Deity to be) by motives of justice and fit- 
ness; but grant them perhaps to get rid of 
importunity ; or reject them out of anger and 
passion. The case of prayer addressed to the 
Deity, therefore, is similar to what we ourselves 
see to be matter of fact here ; only divested of 
its most wonderful circumstance in the former 
case : it cannot, therefore, be the more in- 
credible of the two. 

Similar arguments need not be gone through 
for the purpose of applying the argument to 
the Scripture doctrines of Repentance, and 



216 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

the Atonement of Christ. They are mani- 
festly in accordance with what we experience 
here : but these too are, I think, in some res- 
pects less wonderful than their counterparts 
in Nature. For men may often be deceived 
as to the sincerity of repentance ; and, there- 
fore, the supplicant often obtains a remission 
of his punishment merely by adding lies and 
falsehood to his other offences : this cannot 
happen with the Deity. In respect of the 
Atonement" of Christ, inasmuch as it was a 
voluntary Sacrifice, it is so far less revolting 
to our feelings of justice, and, therefore, so 
far less wonderful, than many of the above 
instances of vicarious Atonement in the na- 
tural world : the most wonderful circumstance 
in these last, being, that they are often in- 
voluntary. 

But, let it not be thought, because these 
doctrines thus have, as it were, their counter- 
parts in the constitution of Nature, that there 
is, therefore, any natural or necessary efficacy 
in these things of themselves to avert our future 
punishment, independently of the Will of God. 
In the natural world, as well as in Religion, 
they are only the conditions on which punish- 
ment may be averted, provided the offended 
party is willing to accept of them. They are 
not urged as claims on justice, but as appeals 
to mercy. When a man cries for mercy to his 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



217 



enemy, he never thinks of claiming it as a 
right ; nor when he pleads either his own 
sorrow for the offence, or the atonement made 
by a friend in his behalf, does he urge either 
of these, otherwise than as a plea for compas- 
sion. Here too, Nature is in accordance with 
Revelation. 

Neither should it excite our incredulity, be- 
cause the same God is represented in Scrip- 
ture, as willing that we should be happy, and 
yet as punishing us for sin, and also appointing 
the means of our redemption. For the God of 
Nature does what is similar. He confers upon 
us whatever happiness we enjoy in the course 
of Nature : and yet He also punishes us for 
transgressing His natural laws ; as Avell as 
appoints means, whereby we may in many 
cases escape that punishment. 



218 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



CHAPTER VIII. 

That ^Benefits are obtained by Supplication. 

rpHE several instances mentioned in the 
A preceding Chapter of punishments being 
averted by entreaty, may obviously be con- 
sidered with equal truth, as instances also of 
benefits obtained (for such they are) by these 
means. But besides these, it is still more 
common for other and positive benefits to be 
thus obtained, where no offence has been com- 
mitted. The Peer, who offers his petition to 
the Parliament or to his Sovereign, and the 
beggar asking alms from door to door, alike 
obtain by their entreaties what they would not 
obtain, if they did not make use of these 
means. But the fact of benefits of various 
kinds being thus obtained happens so con- 
stantly, that it is unnecessary to produce more 
instances of it. Nor is entreaty thus effectual, 
merely because we thereby make known our 
wants to our fellow-creatures, who might other- 
wise be ignorant of them : this is sometimes 
the case, but by no means always. For in the 
instance before mentioned, of one committed 
to prison by Parliament, the merits of his case 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



219 



are generally made known to the house by other 
means : yet he is always compelled to petition 
before he can be set at liberty. It happens 
every day, too, in private life, that men obtain 
benefits and favours from others by mere per- 
severance in asking, and without assigning 
any reasons for their being granted, which 
were unknown before. Sometimes this is re- 
quired as an acknowledgment of humility and 
dependence on the part of the petitioner : at 
other times the thing is granted merely to get 
rid of the trouble and importunity. Still it is 
not the less true, that entreaty is the means, 
by which the object is obtained. 



Yet similar objections (only of course more 
general) have been made to our offering prayer 
to the Deity for benefits of any kind, as to our 
deprecating punishment. He will, it is said, 
give us whatever is proper for us without our 
asking for it, since He is perfectly just and 
good, and knows our wants before we ask of 
Him. But both these things are equally true of 
those benefits, which the Deity gives us in the 
common course of nature, but yet through the 
instrumentality of our fellow-creatures, and 
in consequence of our addressing supplica- 
tions to them. If it is proper that a beggar 
should obtain alms when he begs, or that a 



220 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



man's life should be spared in battle when he 
cries for mercy ; we may be very sure, that 
these things will be done. But then let it not 
be forgotten, that they are done by the very 
begging for them — that this is the condition, 
without which they are not done. 

And here too what we see happening in the 
world appears still more unaccountable, than 
the Religious doctrine. For in the case of 
prayer addressed to the Deity, we can easily 
understand, that our praying may be a mark 
of our submission and dependence upon Him, 
which may itself make a benefit proper to be 
conferred on us : so that a thing may be very 
properly granted to us, when we do pray to 
Him for it, which may be as properly with- 
held, if we do not do so. But why should it be 
arranged in the natural world, that a beggar 
should obtain his alms merely by perseverance 
and importunity ? by tiring out men's patience, 
without any real humility or gratitude on his 
part? But if this is true in the natural world, 
it cannot be incredible, that a similar thing, 
only divested of its most unaccountable circum- 
stance, may be true in Religion. And hence our 
Saviour's argument : " If ye then, being evil, 
know how to give good gifts unto your chil- 
dren, hoiv much more shall your Father, which 
is in heaven, give good things to them that ask 
ask him?" If your heavenly Father has so 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



221 



ordained, that men obtain things by entreaty 
from their fellow-men, who are often unmer- 
ciful, and grant them only to get rid of impor- 
tunity ; much more may you be sure, that 
He, who is All-merciful, will grant you those 
prayers which are proper to be complied with. 



CHAPTER IX. 

That Excellence is best attained by aiming 
at Perfection. 

THE greatest masters in the liberal arts 
have always held it as a maxim, that he 
who desires to excel in them must not merely 
strive to imitate, or to equal, even the most 
illustrious of his predecessors. For none is 
to be found absolutely free from faults : and 
to propose such an one therefore as a model, 
would imply, that his faults are to be imitated, 
as well as his excellencies. The Apollo was 
not produced by an artist who was content 
even to copy Nature ; much less to imitate 
his predecessors : it was the work of one, who 
had formed in his own mind an ideal standard 
of perfection, which he himself never attained, 
and probably never hoped to attain. 

Literary eminence must be sought in the 



222 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



same way. " We must not,"' says Quintilian, 
" be content with that degree of excellence, 
which is to be attained by mere imitation. . . . 
Nothing can be improved upon by such means. 
If we are not allowed to outstrip our prede- 
cessors, how can we ever hope for a perfect 
orator?"')" Every imitation must fall short of 
what it strives to copy; just as the reflection 
in a mirror must always be less bright than 
the reality. That man would betray a spirit 
little likely to attain philosophical eminence, 
who should seriously resolve to labour, till he 
attained the sagacity of Newton, or the wisdom 
of Socrates ; and, if he succeeded, then to be 
content, and to strive for nothing higher. Not 
that there is any hope of any man's arriving at 
perfectiqn in any of these things : indeed, if 
he were able to do so, all his pleasure would 
be at an end ; since he would then be without 
an object to look forward to. But still Per- 
fection must be his aim. And led by these 
considerations, the Stoics, by far the noblest 
school of ancient philosophy, justly proposed 
as their standard of morality the character 



f " Turpe etiam illud est, contentum esse id consequi, quod 

imiteris Nihil autem crescit sola, imitatione. Quodsi 

prioribus adjicere fas non est, quomodo sperare possumus ilium 
oratorem perfectum ?" — Instit. Orat. X. 2, 7 — 9. 

" Necesse est enim, semper sit posterior, qui sequitur." 
—Ibid. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 223 

of their perfectly wise man ; though they ac- 
knowledged, that none could ever hope to 
attain to if. 



Yet such a high standard of moral excel- 
lence has been made an objection to Christia- 
nity. " Be ye perfect," it says, " as your 
father, which is in heaven, is perfect." Such 
perfection is unattainable by man. If, how- 
ever, the maxims stated above, as applicable 
to our other pursuits here, have any founda- 
tion in reason ; then this objection is so far 
from being a real one, that on the contrary, 
the proposing of any standard short of Per- 
fection would be a proof that it was ill adapted 
to the nature of man ; and it would also be 
absurd, as proposing imperfections for objects 
of imitation. 



224 



THE ACCORDANCE OV RELIGION 



CHAPTER X. 
That we must often act on pr obable Evidence. 

IT is only in the exact sciences, that we are 
able to attain to certain knowledge, strictly 
so called. Moral certainty is but the highest 
degree of probability. It is but seldom, how- 
ever, in the common affairs of life, that we 
can have moral certainty to act upon : we all 
act, and must act, on what is called probability 
by the world, often on the very lowest degree 
of it : and we should in many cases justly be 
thought guilty of the highest absurdity, if we 
refused to do so. We know, that men are 
frequently guilty of falsehood, often without 
apparent cause ; yet, when we are on a 
journey, we enquire of strangers as to our 
road, and must and do act upon their informa- 
tion. We know, that death may possibly 
overtake us, before we reach our journey's 
end ; or that this may happen to the friend, 
whom we are going to visit : but it is probable 
that neither of these events will happen so 
soon — so we act on this probability, and pro- 
ceed on our journey. And we may wisely act 
on much lower degrees of probability. If a 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 225 

lucrative office is to be given away, many a 
one exerts himself strenuously to obtain it, 
even while he knows that the chances are de- 
cidedly and greatly against him. The sick 
man anxiously expects his physician, and 
scrupulously obeys his directions, even when 
he knows there is no hope ; continuing to hope 
against hope. And he, who should in every 
case refuse to act, until he was morally certain 
that he should not act in vain, would be consi- 
dered as a madman, and would be quite unfit 
to live in this world. 



Now, no man can demonstrate, that Religion 
is false — that there will be no future state of 
rewards and punishments : no man pretends 
to be even morally certain of this : I think I 
may say, that there is no man, but believes 
that there is some degree of probability, that 
there may be such a state. Surely then he 
must be guilty of inconsistency and absurdity, 
who acts every hour of his life upon probabili- 
ties—sometimes where his highest worldly 
interests are at stake — who will strain every 
nerve to attain some object of worldly ambi- 
tion, even when the chances are greatly 
against him ; but who yet refuses to bestow 
any pains in pursuit of an object, confessedly 
of so great importance as to admit of no com- 

Q 



220 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

parison with any other ; only because the cer- 
tainty of it cannot be demonstrated. That 
must surely be weak reasoning, which main- 
tains, that Religion must be false, because God 
cannot have placed us in a situation, where we 
should be compelled to act, in a matter so im- 
portant, only on probable evidence : that must 
be weak reasoning ; for it is contradicted by 
every day's experience, which shews us, that 
we are in fact obliged to act in the most im- 
portant concerns of this life on the very lowest 
degrees of probability. 



CHAPTER XI. 

That Speculative Knowledge is not necessary 
for practical Purposes. 

SINCE our knowledge of causes and of the 
manner in which they operate, is so very 
narrow ;f it is happy for us, that such know- 
ledge is very little necessary for the practical 
purposes of life. For when we have learned 
that such and such things come to pass under 
such and such circumstances, we have learned 



t P. 132. 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 227 

what is of far greater importance to us, than 
any speculative knowledge as to their intimate 
nature and manner of existence. The hus- 
bandman knows not, how it is, that the grain 
which he casts into the furrow, brings forth a 
blade, and that blade an ear : yet there never 
was an husbandman, who for that reason 
doubted of the fact, or hesitated to act upon 
the belief of it. Little is known of the manner 
in which medicines relieve disease : yet 
neither the physician nor the patient rejects 
the use of them for that reason. As to the 
generality of mankind, the thought never once 
enters their heads in the common affairs of 
life, that they ought to refuse their assent to a 
thing, or not to act upon it, because they 
cannot fully comprehend it. If they did, they 
must obviously cease either to act, or to be- 
lieve, at all. 

Nor is such the case with the vulgar alone. 
Philosophers were ignorant for 5000 years, in 
M'hat manner the moon produced the tides : 
yet they were able to foretell with precision 
the hours, when the tides would ebb and flow. 
They are still ignorant, how muscular action 
is produced by the will : but do they therefore 
refuse to move their limbs? Do they, because 
they cannot explain Personal Identity, refuse 
to consider men as accountable for their 
actions? Or does he, who cannot form clear 



228 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

abstract notions of time, of number, or of 
force, refuse to act, as if they were realities ? 
No man has explained, why it is, that we ex- 
pect the course of Nature to continue as it has 
been — that we expect fire to burn, and food to 
nourish us, to-morrow, as they did yesterday. 
And yet every human being, philosopher, as 
well as peasant, performs every action of his 
life upon this presumption. 

And even when the theory of a thing may 
be known, it is generally of no importance to 
the practical man, whether he is acquainted 
with it or not. Among those, who make daily 
use of the common rules of arithmetic, not one 
man in ten thousand understands the rationale 
of them ; or knows, when he multiplies a sum 
by 100, how it comes about, that either the 
product or the proof comes out right : nor 
would the rule serve his purpose any the 
better, if he did. 

There are many cases on the other hand, 
where too great attention to theory unfits a 
man for practice ; as in farming, it is a common 
saying, that such a man is too much of a theo- 
rist to succeed in practice. But it may be 
said, this must be bad theory, which serves 
only to mislead. And this is true : and yet it 
is such theory, as experience shews us the 
generality of men are competent for : and 
therefore the assertion still holds good, that 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 229 

men in general are worse practitioners for 
troubling their heads about theory. 



As then in the common business of life our 
belief may be quite sufficient to induce us to 
act, or rather we are compelled constantly to 
act, upon it, although we may not fully com- 
prehend the nature of the facts, which we be- 
lieve: so too in the case of Religion, we may 
reasonably act on a belief of things, of whose 
nature and manner of existence we can com- 
prehend but little. We cannot comprehend 
how our spiritual part can pass into another 
state of existence after the present, or be 
united to another body : but neither do we 
know how it was united to its present body, 
or how it is retained in it by the use of food. 
Yet we act on the belief of these things. So 
with regard to a resurrection of the dead, "But 
some men will say, How are the dead raised 
up ? and with what body do they come ?'•' To 
which the Apostle gives no direct reply ; but 
shows, that in similar cases in the natural 
world, no such knowledge is necessary for us — 
that we act upon a knowledge of the fact 
alone. " Thou fool, that which thou sowest is 
not quickened, except it die : And that which 
thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that 
shall be : But God giveth it a body, as 



230 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

it hath pleased him" — without teaching thee, 
how it is brought about. And the same answer 
is equally applicable to all enquiries into the 
nature of mysteries. 



CHAPTER XII. 

That our Knowledge is not always in Proportion 
to its Utility. 

WE should naturally have been led to ex- 
pect, that in the progress of human 
knowledge, those regions of it would have 
been earliest and most completely explored, 
which are most immediately important to the 
happiness and welfare of mankind. Such, 
however, has by no means been the case. 
Chemistry has only within a very few years 
assumed the form of a science : and yet, till it 
had done so, we were shut out from the know- 
ledge of a multitude of facts highly important 
to our comfort and enjoyment, and in some 
instances to our safety. Medicine, considered 
as a science, was nearly as far advanced in 
the days of Hippocrates, as at the present 
time. But it is hardly necessary to remark, 
that the discovery of a just theory of it must 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 231 

be immediately followed by most important 
improvements in practice. 

The sciences of Political Economy, of Legis- 
lation, and of morals, are still in a most imper- 
fect state : yet there cannot be a doubt, that, 
if they were thoroughly understood, both 
national prosperity and individual happiness 
M ould be very vastly increased ; or that from 
ignorance of them, the nations of the earth have 
continually suffered, and are still suffering, 
the most enormous evils ; such as famine and 
pestilence, alternate over-speculation and stag- 
nation in commercial affairs, and many others. 
The little, which is known in these and other 
parts of useful knowledge, was acquired only 
by very slow degrees ; so that past ages de- 
rived no advantage from them. And it is 
equally certain, that many branches of know- 
ledge, highly important to our welfare, are 
still quite unexplored. 

While such is the state of these sciences, 
on which the comfort and happiness of man- 
kind so greatly depend ; the science of As- 
tronomy has attained what may be called 
perfection in its leading features. Yet this 
science chiefly regards those parts of the Cre- 
ation, with which we have least to do : and 
however beautiful and sublime may be the 
Laws, which it has unfolded, it is manifest, 
that a knowledge of them is by no means 



232 



THE ACCORDANCE OV RELIGION 



immediately important to our welfare or our 
comfort. It has failed indeed in some of those 
parts, which would be most practically useful 
to us — such as supplying our navigators with 
an easy method of ascertaining the longitude. 
While, however, the astronomer can accurately 
calculate the velocity with which a ray of light 
travels from the planet Jupiter, and can fore- 
tell to a second the eclipses of his satellites for 
ages to come ; the physician is unable to pre- 
diet with certainty the effect of a medicine, 
on which life depends, or the ultimate termi- 
nation of a disease ; though these things de- 
pend on Laws equally fixed and certain. 



It is very far therefore from being the ordi- 
nary method of Providence to discover to man 
that knowledge, which would seem to be most 
important to his happiness. 

Yet it has been asserted of Religion, that, if 
it had any foundation in reality, it would have 
been made known to all mankind from the 
first ages of the world — because it is a matter, 
which greatly concerns their welfare. Now, 
either this argument must be allowed to be 
without foundation, or else the assertors of it 
must also maintain, that our present welfare 
and happiness are in no degree affected by our 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 233 

knowledge, or our ignorance, of chemistry, of 
medicine, of political economy, of legislation, 
of morals. The two assertions must stand or 
fall together. 



CHAPTER XIII. 
That Good is distributed among us unequally. 

WHAT was said in the preceding chapter, 
tending to show that many things most 
important to our happiness, are either of late 
discovery, or still remain undiscovered, is 
equally a proof of the above assertion : for 
those, who lived before these discoveries, were 
entirely cut off from all the benefits which we 
derive from them ; and we are equally de- 
prived of all the advantages accruing from the 
discoveries of future ages. It is the same with 
other advantages : in some ages of the world, 
peace and plenty and the light of civilization 
have prevailed among mankind ; in others, 
war and famine and pestilence and barbarism 
have overspread the earth. 

Such has been the unequal lot of the differ- 
ent generations of men : but if we compare 
the several conditions of those living at any one 



234 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

time, whether nations, or individuals, we find 
the same inequality prevailing. Some nations 
enjoy a fertile soil and temperate climate : 
others are born in a barren country, frozen 
within the polar circle, or scorched under the 
line : some are free and civilized, others dwell 
in barbarism, or despotism, or perhaps in sla- 
very. Again, in each of these countries, there 
are individuals of every degree of wealth and 
power, of knowledge, and of happiness. Per- 
haps it may be thought, that wealth or poverty, 
knowledge or ignorance, make little difference 
in the comparative happiness of their pos- 
sessors: but it cannot possibly be thought, 
that the same equality exists between plenty 
and absolute want, between health and sick- 
ness, between a cheerful and an irritable 
temper. All these constitute real and un- 
doubted inequalities of happiness. 



The case is similar with regard to Revela- 
tion. Whole nations are without it; and 
among those who have it, many individuals 
derive no advantage from it. But this is no 
proof, that it is not important to our happiness ; 
unless it can also be proved, that no other real 
advantages are allotted unequally among man- 
kind. The unequal distribution of religious 
knowledge seems indeed less wonderful, than 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 235 

that of other advantages : for we can easily 
understand, that at the great day of retribution 
due allow ance will be made for real and una- 
voidable ignorance of religion : but we cannot 
comprehend, why some should be born to 
comparative ease and happiness here, while 
others are born to want and misery, without 
apparent merit or demerit on their part. 

Indeed, there cannot be a weaker objection 
against Christianity on the part of a deist, 
than this : for it recoils upon himself with a 
force proportioned to the number of Christians 
in the world compared to the number of deists. 
" If," says he, " Christianity were true, God 
would have made the knowledge of it universal 
among mankind." Now, there are, I suppose, 
ten thousand Christians in the world, for one 
philosophical deist. Much more, therefore, 
must the creed of the deist be false according 
to his own argument. 



230' 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 



CHAPTER XIV. 

That the Reception of Truth is often retarded 
by Prejudice. 

TT^HE progress of knowledge is not only 
JL retarded by passive stupidity and igno- 
rance : it has also to fight against the more 
active opposition of prejudices, those idols of 
the mind, which are continually attracting the 
homage which is due to truth alone. And 
how very powerfully and extensively this in- 
fluence must operate against the reception of 
truth, is evident, when we consider, that every 
man entertains some prejudices on almost all 
subjects, probably on all : and if any one is 
unconscious of this in his own case, he may 
yet be convinced, how widely they prevail 
among mankind in general, by observing 
what different opinions are entertained on al- 
most all subjects by the different professions 
and classes of men ; and again, what different 
opinions prevail in different countries and in 
different ages. 

Natural Philosophy made no progress for 
ages, because men attempted to establish it on 
the foundation of arbitrary maxims, which 



WITH OUR MORAL CONDITION. 



•237 



were drawn only from their own preconceived, 
but false, opinions — that is to say, their pre- 
judices. And when these maxims had once 
obtained vogue, they kept their place by the 
prejudice of authority. The Copernican sys- 
tem was rejected for years, and Galileo per- 
secuted for maintaining it, because prejudices, 
both philosophical and religious, were opposed 
to it. The circulation of the blood was es- 
tablished by Harvey, on the same proofs on 
which it is now universally received : but it 
was in opposition to preconceived opinions ; 
and every physician in Europe, who had 
passed the age of forty, rejected it. Geology 
and Political Economy are at this moment 
struggling, the one against Religious preju- 
dices, the other against the prejudices of those, 
who raise a clamour against theory, and cry 
up practical knowledge, as though the two 
were in their nature inconsistent ; or as though 
just theory were anything but practical know- 
ledge reduced to a system according to the 
universal principles of reason : or as though 
in all arts and sciences the most general and 
best practical rules had not been devised by 
men of enlarged and philosophical views — by 
men of theory, rather than by merely practical 
men. However, the fate of these two sciences 
will be decided in the same way as that of all 
other doctrines and opinions : if they are 



238 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION. 

founded in falsehood, though they may be 
supported for a time by the zeal of partizans, 
they will be exploded in the end : but, if they 
are " strong with the strength and quick with 
the vitality of truth, " they must ultimately 
triumph over all opposition. 



We may, therefore, safely infer, that the 
rejection of Christianity, whether by the Jews, 
wedded to their prejudices in favour of a tem- 
poral Messiah ; or by the Heathen, wedded to 
their ancient superstitions ; or by philosophers, 
wedded to their sceptical philosophy — in short 
that the rejection of Christianity to the extent 
that it has been actually rejected in the world, 
affords no proof, that it is false. For oppo- 
sition and rejection have been the fate of truth, 
since the world began. 

It is therefore but according to the Analogy 
of Nature, that the Gospel, though true, yet 
opposed as it is to many of the most cherished 
prejudices both of vice and ignorance among 
men, should be rejected for a time, like the 
Copernican system : but it is also equally ac- 
cording to that Analogy, that, if true, it should 
nevertheless finally prevail over all opposition, 
as that System has also done. 




PART IV. 



THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION WITH 
THE GENERAL CONSTITUTION 
OF NATURE. 

XTHEN we have discovered any general 



» T Jaw to prevail in the works of Nature, 
we are naturally led to expect, that this same 
law will probably be also found to prevail in 
other and unexplored cases, in which the cir- 
cumstances are similar. We seem to be led 
to form this expectation from having been 
impressed, sometimes consciously, sometimes 
unconsciously, with that Uniformity which 
prevails in all the works of the Creator. But 
whatever be the foundation of the expectation, 
there can be no doubt, that it exists in men's 
minds. It is indeed the sole foundation for all 
probable arguments drawn from Analogy ; and 
it is confirmed and strengthened, and the jus- 
tice of it shown, by each fresh discovery which 
is rationally made in the secrets of Nature ; all 
such discovery being prompted by, and founded 
on, this conviction of Analogy. 

It is equally evident, that, in proportion as 




240 THE ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION 

any Law is known to prevail more generally 
in Nature, so we are led to expect with more 
assured confidence, that it will also be found 
to operate in analogous cases as yet unex- 
plored. It was on this foundation that Newton 
first built his argument as to the nature of the 
Laws which regulate the Heavenly bodies. 
He laid down this principle, " That a property 
found in all bodies, and which has always 
been found in its quantity to be in exact pro- 
portion to the quantity of matter, is to be held 
as an universal property of matter." And 
having found by experience, that all bodies 
within his cognizance possessed the property 
of Gravity, he therefore inferred, that the Hea- 
venly bodies also were probably endowed with 
it : and he was afterwards enabled to demon- 
strate the justice of his inference, by showing 
that their motions are in exact accordance 
with the Laws of this property. Had he ob- 
served the property of Gravity only in some 
one kind of body within his experience, he 
never would have drawn such an inference. 
It was from the universal prevalence of the 
property, as far as he could observe, that he 
thought it likely, that it extended still further 
to untried cases. 

The same reasoning holds in the argu- 
ment from Analogy as applied to the case of 
Religion : in proportion as any general Law 



WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. '241 



is known to prevail more extensively in the 
constitution of Nature, whether physical or 
moral, so may we surmise with greater con- 
fidence, that it probably extends to any analo- 
gous and untried case — as that of Religion, if 
indeed Religion be true. 

In this Fourth Part, therefore, it will be 
my object to show, that the several doctrines 
of Religion, natural and revealed, which are 
here considered, are in fact no other than 
instances of Laws known to prevail through- 
out the general constitution of Nature ; that is 
to say, both in the physical and the moral 
worlds. And wherever this is really the case, 
there is a positive probability, greater in pro- 
portion to such wider prevalence, that these 
same Laws may likewise extend to the case 
of Religion — that Religion is so far likely to 
be true. 

At the same time let it not be thought, that 
the arguments derived in the foregoing Parts 
from Laws prevailing by their very nature f 
less universally throughout the whole of Na- 
ture, are in any degree weakened by such 
want of universality, as far as the answering of 
objections goes (and to this alone they have 
been there applied) : for if a Law is proved to 
prevail in any one instance in Nature, all ob- 



f See page 3. 
R 



242 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

jections to it, as in itself incredible and absurd, 
are as completely overthrown, as if it held 
good in a thousand. But on the other hand, 
in proportion as these Laws do prevail in 
Nature more widely, in that proportion they 
become arguments, not merely for the refu- 
tation of objections, but for the positive proba- 
bility of the truth of Religion. They will, 
however, be applied in this, as in the former 
Parts, only to the answering of objections — for 
therein consists the irrefragable strength of all 
such arguments. In the conclusion, however, 
the reader will find, that I have attempted to 
show, that from the Accordance between Laws 
of Nature, so numerous and so universally 
operating, and all the great doctrines and evi- 
dences of Religion, a cumulative argument 
may be drawn fairly amounting to a strong 
proof of positive probability : and it is chiefly 
with this view that I have shown the very 
wide extent in which these Laws prevail. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



243 



CHAPTER I. 



That Means are used to effect Ends. 



E can scarcely doubt, that the Deity, if 



" ▼ He had so pleased, could have accom- 
plished the several purposes, which He has in 
view in the moral government of the Universe, 
by immediate acts of Power, without having 
called to his aid a long series of second causes, 
or of means. We see, however, that He has 
not chosen to do so : He has chosen to work 
out His purposes by the contrivances of wis- 
dom, as well as by the operations of power. 
We cannot understand, but that the percep- 
tions of light and of heat might have been ex- 
cited in our minds without any material sources 
of either, or without the intervention of our 
bodily frames. Indeed, Berkeley maintained, 
that such was actually the case. But things 
are nevertheless done by these appointed 
means. Food, and raiment, and dwellings, 
might have been produced ready for our use, 
by an act of creation : — but they are in fact 
slowly prepared by the gradual operations of 
Nature and of human labour. Whatever 
Nature does, is done in the same manner; 




244 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

one operation is but a step to another ; and 
the whole of visible Nature is, as far as we 
know, nothing but a series of such means, 
adapted to the purposes of the moral creation. 
If any proof of this is required, it is supplied 
by the fact, that all our knowledge and reason- 
ings about Nature are confined entirely to a 
consideration of causes and effects, or in other 
words, to examining how means are connected 
with their several ends. 

In the moral world, whether we regard the 
case of individuals, or the destinies of mankind 
at large, we find the same method of govern- 
ment adopted. Our pleasures and our pains 
are all produced in the way of natural effects, 
by natural means : and so our intellectual and 
moral acquirements are made by means of 
education, of experience, of books, and other 
instruments. In the same way, the progress of 
mankind in civilization and knowledge, since 
the first ages of the world, has been brought 
about by the use of means adapted to the end ; 
such as the invention of writing and printing, 
by the institution of schools, by national edu- 
cation. Past generations have been instru- 
ments, by means of which the present nations 
of the earth have been brought into the actual 
condition of society. 

In short, as far as we know, not a single 
thing is done throughout the Universe, without 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 245 

an apparatus of means fitted for effecting it : 
nor is the wisdom of the Deity, as far as we 
are acquainted with it, shown forth in any 
other way, than in the devising of these means 
for the purposes in view. This can hardly 
indeed be thought to be true in the same 
sense, as when we speak of means being used 
by ourselves : for means are of no further use 
to us, than to bring about the end we have in 
view : but we cannot think of means employed 
by the Deity, otherwise than as themselves 
containing some useful end, independently of 
their ultimate effect. For if it were not so, 
we should suppose Him to be doing something 
useless ; since He might have produced the 
end without using the means. 

However, the fact itself is manifest, that such 
is the method, as far as we can comprehend 
it, in which the natural world is governed. 



Now several things in Religion are rendered 
credible by such a constitution of things. 

First, with regard to Religion in general. 
It has been sometimes asserted, that, if God 
had designed mankind for any more perma- 
nent state of being, for which the present is 
only preparatory, He would have placed them 
in it at once — that all this scheme of second 
causes or of means, by the instrumentality of 



'246 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

which men are to be brought into another 
state of final happiness or misery, must be 
quite unnecessary to an Almighty Being, who 
might and would have effected His purpose 
by an immediate act of power. But is it not 
equally clear and certain, that, whenever in 
this life we are to feel pleasure or pain, the 
Deity might impart these by immediately 
producing the sensations in our minds, without 
any use of natural means, or of our bodily or- 
gans? Is it not equally clear, that He might 
have brought us into the world, prudent and 
wise men, without the toils of study and edu- 
cation — virtuous beings, without the discipline 
of childhood, or the bitterness of experience? 
Yet we see and feel, that He does not do so ; 
and whoever argues, that an Allwise Being- 
must have done so, argues falsely ; for all 
Nature contradicts him. But there are equally 
good grounds for the assertion in either case : 
therefore we may be sure, that it is equally 
false in both. 

Several of the particular doctrines of Reli- 
gion are similarly in accordance with this 
Law of Nature. Such are those bf a Mediator, 
of the Holy Spirit, of God's creating the 
world by the intervention of His Son, or Word. 
In all these, God is represented as using means 
to effect His purpose, when we might have 
supposed, that He would have passed at once 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



247 



to the effecting of the purpose without the 
means. The statements of Revelation are 
however confirmed by what we see in Nature. 

These considerations too should encourage 
us to make use of all means in our own power 
to promote the improvement and reformation 
of the world ; to do our best to hasten the 
bringing in of those better times, which are 
foretold in the Scriptures : not to sit idly by, 
and wonder when it will please God to inter- 
fere with His miraculous power for the doing 
of it. There can be little doubt, that He will 
use means to accomplish this, as well as all 
His other purposes — there can be little doubt, 
that, as it is a case of Moral government, 
moral means will be made use of — and as it 
is a case relating to His government of man- 
kind, we may expect, that mankind will be 
themselves, in great part at least, the means 
and instruments employed : for such has been 
the case in His government of them under all 
His dispensations hitherto. 



248 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



CHAPTER II. 
That these Means are apparently circuitous. 

THAT the means employed by Providence 
are in some measure circuitous to our 
apprehension, is implied in the very use of 
means by an Almighty Being ; since to say 
that He uses means, is to say that He proceeds 
by several and successive steps to effect ob- 
jects, which we are apt to think might have 
been effected at once. But further than this, 
natural means often seem to us to be cir- 
cuitous, even when considered as means. 

1. We may, I suppose, take it for granted, 
that rain is given for the purpose of supplying 
the wants of plants, and ultimately of animals. 
But why was not some method adopted of 
giving this supply in a less circuitous way, 
than that in which it is actually done by 
Nature ? Particles of water are raised by the 
heat of the sun into the air — in the air they 
are blown about as it were by accident, often 
in a contrary direction to that which they 
ultimately take ; and after travelling thousands 
of miles, they are perhaps deposited in a sandy 
desert, where there is not a trace of life, animal 
or vegetable, to be supported. So that they 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



•249 



have to run through the same round a second, 
or a third, or several times, before they fulfil 
what appears to us to be their destined pur- 
pose. 

In the vegetable world, a plant or a fruit is 
to be brought into existence. For this purpose, 
the seed must be sown in a suitable place, the 
earth must afford it a support, rain must sup- 
ply it with moisture, air and light must con- 
tribute their several helps ; and besides all 
these things, (and a vast number of others, which 
have not been mentioned) all the innumerable 
processes of the vegetable economy — processes, 
the investigation of which has occupied specu- 
lative men for centuries — must be carried on, 
often during several years, before the plant 
can come to perfection. 

But one of the great uses of vegetables, is to 
afford nourishment to animals. For this pur- 
pose, not only must all the above processes of 
vegetable growth be perfected ; but the plant 
must next be sought out and gathered by the 
animal — in the case of man, it must be culti- 
vated and prepared for food with care and 
labour — it must then be masticated, digested, 
and assimilated, (and in this one word " assi- 
milated" we know not how many steps and 
processes are included) before the animal can 
be nourished, and the destined purpose of the 
vegetable accomplished. 



250 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



2. In the moral world, how much is to be 
done before a man can become moderately 
wise, or prudent, or virtuous. He comes into 
the world in utter ignorance : every particle of 
knowledge must be acquired, and every step 
in virtue made, by the use of the means ap- 
pointed for these purposes. His first years are 
spent in learning the use of his own limbs 
and the most obvious properties of external 
objects : much must be done by the instruction 
of others, by his own thought and study, before 
any tolerable share of knowledge can be ob- 
tained. Prudence is not to be had without 
experience, and this generally accompanied 
with pain and suffering ; nor virtue without a 
course of trial, and temptation, and perseve- 
rance : no human being is reared to either 
but by means of discipline, frequently of pun- 
ishment, carried on through a series of years 
with pain and trouble to himself and to his 
instructors. 

Nations, in the same way, before they can 
acquire power and dominion, must arise from 
small beginnings, and a state of weakness ; 
before they become polished and civilized, they 
must be long barbarous and rude ; before 
they become free, they must generally be 
slaves. And these things are always the work 
of years, frequently of ages. Nearly six thou- 
sand years have been occupied in bringing 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 251 

man to his actual state of knowledge and im- 
provement. 

It is objected to Revelation, that it is a long 
and a complicated scheme. " The Deity," say 
the objectors, " if He had intended Christianity 
to be the religion of mankind, would have re- 
vealed it at the beginning of the world, and 
made it known to the whole race : for it was 
equally necessary then as now. Instead of 
which, your Bible represents him as giving 
two other Dispensations to mankind, only to 
be done away with and abolished for a third." 
Is this, how r ever, saying anything, but that in 
the case of Religion He has adopted means, 
which appear to us to be circuitous, for the 
accomplishment of his purpose? Is not this 
method similar to that, which we know that 
He adopts, when by a complicated process 
He produces vegetables only to be consumed 
by animals, and these again to be devoured 
by others ? and all this, when He might have 
made them to exist without requiring food at 
all? Does He not proceed in the same way, 
when He forms the weakness and ignorance 
of infancy, only to give way to the strength 
and wisdom of manhood? the barbarity of 
savages, to be succeeded by the refinement of 
a civilized people ? Are not we equally prone 
to think, that all these things might have been 
more wisely effected by some shorter process? 



252 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



CHAPTER III. 

That these Means are often apparently 
inadequate. 

I. TN the physical world, the most deadly 
X pestilences are carried through a king- 
dom — in our own time one has been spread 
through the fairest portion of the earth — 
by little particles of matter imperceptible to 
any of our senses, by the prevalence of an 
easterly or a westerly wind, and by other 
causes even too minute to be detected by phi- 
losophers. 

The quantity of rain which annually falls in 
England and Wales alone, is calculated to 
amount to J 15,000 millions of tons.* But take 
it at one half, or 57,000 millions of tons. Yet 
the sole process adopted by nature for raising 
this enormous weight of water, is that of eva- 
poration. Would any Man have thought that 
effects so prodigious could have been produced 
by what appears to us so insignificant an 
agent? 



* Rees's Cyclopaedia. Art. Rain. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



253 



The surface of our globe bears proofs of the 
most vast and extensive changes having been 
wrought upon it. Theorists have been specu- 
lating for ages on the mighty causes, by which 
these may have been wrought : some have 
thought, that the surface must have been vio- 
lently tossed about during the general deluge ; 
some, that whole continents were suddenly 
upheaved by extensive subterraneous convul- 
sions. For the ordinary operations of Nature 
seemed so entirely inadequate to produce ef- 
fects so amazing, that it did not even occur 
to any man to refer to them for a solution of 
the difficulty. At length, however, from a more 
careful examination of facts it has appeared, 
that such effects are constantly produced by 
common and well-known causes, such as the 
degradation of the old continents by the sea, 
by rivers, and by rain ; and the gradual eleva- 
tion of new by volcanic agency or by alluvial 
deposits. Perhaps the most surprising of 
all these agents, from its insignificancy and 
apparent inadequacy, is the coral insect — a 
creature so small, as to be scarcely visible to 
the naked eye. Yet by the labours of these 
little insects most, if not all, of the innumer- 
able islands of the South Sea have been raised 
from the bottom of the ocean. And naviga- 
tors have conjectured, that from the same 
cause these islands will, at some future time, 



254 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

be united into one vast continent, if the labours 
of the insect shall be continued.! 

2. In the moral world, effects the most 
important and extensive have been brought 
about by the invention of glass and of the 
compass ; both of them made by agents too 
insignificant to have had their names recorded. 
Yet the one not only adds greatly to the daily 
comfort of our lives ; but without it the Plane- 
tary System would not to this day have been 
unfolded. Without the other, the American 
continent would have remained undiscovered, 
or at least unconnected with us by intercourse ; 
our ships would be unable to traverse the 
ocean, and the civilization of the whole world 
would, as far as we can judge, have been 
greatly retarded. 

History is full of instances, which illustrate 
this subject. There can be no doubt, that the 
Reformation of the Church, considered merely 
as matter of civil history, has produced the 
most important changes in the state of Europe, 
and through Europe of the greater part of the 
habitable globe. This Reformation was pro- 
duced by a petty quarrel between the Augus- 
tine and Dominican friars as to the sale of 
indulgences. 

f It was calculated by Linnaeus, that three flies of the species 
Musca Vomitoria could devour a dead horse as quickly as a lion. 
Lyell, vol. ii. 141 . 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



255 



Consider too the origin of the church. Ac- 
cording to the creed of sceptics themselves, 
the state of the civilized world has been per- 
manently and utterly changed by the cruci- 
fixion of a carpenter's son, and the preaching 
of a few ignorant fishermen, eighteen hundred 
years ago. 

Yet the same men will not allow, that, if 
the Deity had intended to introduce a scheme, 
like that of Revelation, which should so greatly 
influence the destinies of mankind, he would 
have done it otherwise, than with magnificence 
and pomp. Their argument is, that, because 
the end to be attained is a momentous one, 
therefore the means and instruments to be 
used must be mighty in human estimation. 
The argument is contradicted by the whole 
scheme and Analogy of Nature. 



25(> ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



CHAPTER IV. 



That the real and the apparent Tendencies of 
these Means are often directly opposite to each 



UR knowledge of the course of Nature is 



V >^ so entirely the result of experience, that 
we should be altogether unable, if deprived of 
it, to foresee, what natural effect would be 
produced by any one natural cause. But 
even when experience has enabled us to form 
certain general principles, by which, judging 
from analog3% we form opinions, as to what 
effects are likely to result from any particular 
causes, we still very frequently find, that the 
effects are in reality directly the reverse of 
what we had anticipated. Instances of this 
are abundant both in the material and the 
moral worlds. 

1. In the material world. 
If we raise a pendulum towards the right 
hand, it immediately swings by natural con- 
sequence nearly as far to the left. Would 
any man have anticipated this by reasoning ? 
A man can strike the hardest blow, by first 
withdrawing his arm to the greatest distance 



other. 




CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 257 



in an opposite direction. The more forcibly 
we drive a ball towards an elastic surface, the 
farther and the more forcibly it will be driven 
back again : and the like happens in all cases 
of impulse, so as to have given rise to an 
axiom in mechanics, that " action and re- 
action are always equal." The Planetary os- 
cillations correct themselves ; the deviations 
of the orbits from a regular circle being the 
very causes, which ultimately produce the 
correction of those deviations. The most vi- 
gorous health is most liable to violent dis- 
ease. Trees are brought to their full size and 
strength most quickly by being cut back. 
The decay of vegetables produces new vege- 
tation ; and seeds must begin a process of 
decay, before they germinate. The cater- 
pillar, and numberless other insects, must pass 
into their perfect form through a state of in- 
action and apparent death. Many of the most 
deadly poisons are equally the most efficacious 
medicines. Intense cold produces upon plants 
the same effect as fire. A solution of the salt 
called nitrate of silver, and that of the hypo- 
sulphite of soda have each of them separately 
a disgustingly bitter taste : if they are mixed 
together, the taste is one of intense sweetness. 
Tungstate of soda, when first tasted, is sweet, 
but speedily changes to a strong and pure 
bitter. 



s 



258 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



2. In the moral world. 

There are few cases, in which any great or 
permanent good can be procured without pains 
and labour as well as the sacrifice of some 
lesser and temporary interest ; that is to say, 
some degree of evil is generally the appointed 
means, by which we must procure ultimate 
good — the very opposites to each other. La- 
bour and fatigue naturally lead to rest and 
sleep ; rest and sleep to renewed activity. So 
too excitement of every kind is naturally fol- 
lowed by proportionate depression. The most 
rapturous pleasures are soonest followed by 
satiety and disgust; while past pain on the 
other hand heightens pleasure.! Therefore 
we sometimes voluntarily subject ourselves 
to pain, solely with the view of increasing 
pleasure afterwards : as for example in music, 
where discords are purposely introduced, be- 
cause, though positively disagreeable in them- 



■f" 'flf tZTOTrov some ri stvai tsJo, b KaXacriv bi txv9pco7T0t iioV ue; 
Saufjuzcricos witpuHE wpog to Soxav svavliov stvai to Xu7rvgov' tco a-fta 
fxsv aula $e*e<v ^a.^aytvecrSai tco av9(>co7ru' eav cts t<s Stwxti to 
eIb^ov ntxi Xex.fA.0a.vyi, crx^ov ti avayHafccrOai xei "Kcxp^Mieiv km to 
Ylsc>ov, uo-TCtt] m /At<z$ Ho^vcpnt; ri/jLfMvco oV ovls. Platon. Phaedon. 
136. " What an extraordinary thing is this, which men call 
Pleasure : and how wonderful its relation to its apparent op- 
posite, Pain ! For they refuse to be present with us both to- 
gether ; and yet if we pursue and succeed in gaining the one, 
we are in a manner always compelled to feel the other also ; as 
though both sprung from one common source." 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



259 



selves, yet for this very reason they increase 
the pleasure on the whole by contrast. In 
almost all things (as with heat and cold, for 
instance,) a medium is agreeable, while both 
extremes of the very same thing are painful. 

The fondness of parents, intending the hap- 
piness of their children, leads often to their 
misery. The quarrels of lovers increase the 
violence of their love. The wants and evils of 
life are what put us upon exerting our in- 
dustry and activity in those various employ- 
ments, which are the truest sources of happi- 
ness. Our own sufferings produce compassion 
for others, and so lead to the mitigation of 
suffering : 

Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco. 

Excess of sensual pleasure entails upon us 
bodily disease and pain. Dangers produce 
prudence, and prudence in its turn produces 
freedom from danger. Recklessness and im- 
providence assist the prudence of the states- 
man in the defence of his country ; for fleets 
and armies would hardly be manned, if all 
men were directed entirely by the sober cal- 
culations of prudence. On the other hand, 
excess of caution defeats its own object, and 
produces by miscarriage the very evils of im- 
providence. 

History everywhere teaches us, that violence 



260 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

and danger have led to civil society, and so in 
their consequences have produced security to 
person and property —that tyranny and oppres- 
sion have produced liberty and patriotism — 
that blasphemy and faction are most effectually 
stopped by letting them run their course ; 
while the blood of the martyrs has been pro- 
verbially the seed of the church. Atheism 
leads in its consequences to superstition, and 
superstition to atheism. The pursuit of Phi- 
losophy itself continually leads us into error 
and folly, the very objects we are striving to fly 
from : a fact but too well attested by the multi- 
tude of contending sects and contradictory opi- 
nions, which have universally prevailed; where 
one side must have been in error; but where 
both have very frequently been convicted of it. 
Nay, the most ingenious philosophers have 
sometimes promoted the very objects they were 
striving against. Witness the acute and pious 
Berkeley, who, zealous to overthrow scepticism 
and infidelity, laid that foundation, on which 
Hume afterwards built the subtlest arguments 
that have ever been brought against religion : 
while on the other hand Hume, by inducing 
men more narrowly to examine both the 
grounds of his own sceptical conclusions and 
the principles of Berkeley, has, in fact, 
strengthened the cause of Religion, not only 
by his own defeat, but by causing the de- 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 261 

struction of a strong-hold, from which others 
might have led on similar attacks. 

In all these instances, I think, Nature pro- 
ceeds to effect her purposes by the use of 
means, which to human reasoning, arguing 
beforehand, would have appeared to have a 
directly opposite tendency. 



And these things should surely teach us 
caution, in judging dogmatically on points of 
Religion, of which we have as yet had no ex- 
perience : they should lead us to suspect, that 
here too, as in the natural world, " the foolish- 
ness of God" may be " wiser than men." 

From all the instances mentioned above, 
but particularly from those drawn from the 
physical world, it seems to be very credible, 
that the apparent death of man may be only 
the naturally appointed means of his passing 
to a renovated and a higher state of being.* 
" Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground 
and die, it abideth alone : but if it die, it bring- 
eth forth much fruit."-f Seeds and mosses and 
animalculse will revive, when they have lain 
torpid and been dead to all appearance for 
ages. The decay of the seed is the very means 
by which life is supplied to the future plant. 



* Chap. ix. 



f St. John, xii. 24. 



*2b'2 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

" So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is 
sown in corruption ; it is raised in incorrup- 
tion : it is sown in dishonour ; it is raised in 
glory : it is sown in weakness ; it is raised in 
power."! 

The caterpillar, having finished its course 
in that condition of being, retires into the 
earth, loses all its active powers, and wrapped 
as it were in a shroud, lies in a state of ap- 
parent death. These are however only the 
natural means, by which it becomes a new 
and more perfect creature. For at the ap- 
pointed time it bursts from its cerements, and 
casting them aside, rises fresh and vigorous to 
a second and a higher life. Now the Scrip- 
tures assert, that the same thing will happen 
to ourselves — that the earth will by and by 
render up its human, as it does its insect, 
prisoners — that they too will at their appointed 
time cast off their cerements, and come forth 
to a new state of being. This very analogy 
was sufficient to induce the Heathen to con- 
jecture,^ (having no direct evidence, such as 
we have, from Revelation) that such might be 
the destiny of man. The argument certainly 
suffices to show, that the supposition, that death 
may be the natural means of our passing to 

f 1 Cor. xv. 42. 

| The same word in Greek signifies both a soul and a 
butterfly. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE 



263 



another life is not incredible, merely because 
the two are of an opposite nature to each 
other. 

Again, these analogies make it credible, that, 
though our present life entails much misery 
upon us, yet it may be the means, if properly 
used, of finally producing our happiness : just 
as almost every great object of desire here 
must be obtained at some cost of temporary 
ease and present gratification ; and according 
to our Saviour's promise, " He that loseth his 
life for my sake, shall find it." But if the 
happiness of a future life will greatly over- 
balance the miseries of this, then it is not 
merely, that these last are to be reckoned as 
nothing by comparison ; we may conclude, 
that we should have been less happy on the 
whole without them: just as in the instance 
given above of discords in music; which, 
though in themselves adapted to give pain, 
do yet produce more pleasure on the whole 
by their presence, than their omission would 
have done. 

So again, our very liability to vice, (as it 
lays us open to temptation, and so gives prac- 
tice to self-denial), may be the means, if we 
use it properly, of building up our virtue ; just 
as in the natural world the most deadly poisons 
are, if skilfully applied, the means of saving life. 

And though Christianity has in its progress 



204 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

given rise to persecutions and martyrdoms 
and wars, to superstition and to enthusiasm ; 
yet may these be the appointed means, by 
which it will in the end produce universal love 
and true Religion : just as in the actual moral 
world we have seen opposites produce their 
opposites ; and just as the blood of the martyrs 
has been the seed of the visible church. 

In the same way it is very credible, that 
the general Deluge, the destruction of the Ca- 
naanites, and many other such events, though 
productive of misery at the time, may yet have 
been the means of furthering the happiness 
of mankind in the end. The tree of religion 
may require to be pruned and cut back, like 
the natural tree ; and may thus attain a degree 
of health and vigour, which it would not other- 
wise have reached. We should no doubt have 
ridiculed the idea of cutting back the natural 
tree, in order to increase its growth, if we had 
had no opportunity of putting the thing to the 
test of experiment; but our ridicule would not 
have made the fact less real. 

We are told, that " the fear of the Lord is 
the beginning of Wisdom" — of that Wisdom, 
which is to bring us to the love of God : and 
yet, that " perfect love casteth out fear." That 
is to say, though love and fear are of natures 
directly opposite to each other, nevertheless fear 
is the means of producing love in the end. 



CONSTITUTION OF 



NATURE. 



265 



CHAPTER V. 

That in the best Things there is a Mixture 
of Evil. 

EVIL both physical and moral is scattered 
so largely throughout the world, that there 
is probably nothing whatever, which might 
not be shown to be in some degree accom- 
panied by it. To attempt to prove this, how- 
ever, by an induction of facts is obviously im- 
possible, since by the omission of any single 
instance the proof would be rendered incom- 
plete. I therefore only endeavour to show, 
that even those things, which are universally 
and justly considered as most beneficial to us 
in every kind, have some sprinkling of evil in 
their constitution. 

1. In the physical world. 
The sun, which gives life and beauty to our 
system, so that no creature could live without 
it, also parches the soil and dries up the waters, 
causing distress to plants and animals ; it ren- 
ders the climates of many countries oppres- 
sive and unhealthy, some altogether uninhabit- 
able. The winds, which prevent the air from 
stagnating, and equalize temperature, and 



266 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

transport our ships across the ocean, also pro- 
duce storms and hurricanes ; nor can they be 
favourable for one voyager without at the same 
time being unfavourable to another. The rains, 
which fertilize the soil, and minister to some 
of our most urgent wants, also bring floods 
and inundations. Romantic and rocky scenery 
is beautiful to the eye, but unproductive to the 
farmer ; while level and fertile plains are 
wanting in picturesque beauty. The soil, 
which conceals rich veins of ore beneath it, is 
barren on the surface. 

2. But chiefly in the moral world. 

The establishment of civil society brings 
with it its evils. The institution of property 
is attended by avarice and robbery, and in- 
justice of various kinds: the further progress 
of civilization leads to the very unequal dis- 
tribution of wealth, the luxury and indolence 
and ennui of some, with the excessive labour 
and degradation of others ; to diseases pro- 
duced by both of these, with other evils so 
many, that menf have even disputed, whether 
civilized or savage life be the happier con- 
dition. 

Among individuals, refined taste makes men 
fastidious, so that they receive pain from what 
gives others pleasure. Acuteness of intellect 



f As Robertson in his America. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



267 



makes men see difficulties, (as Berkeley did) 
where plain men find none. Good-nature by 
its passiveness encourages insolence and wick- 
edness. Affection leads to the spoiling, and 
so to the misery, of children. Charity exer- 
cised in almsgiving fosters idleness and impos- 
ture. Ease and happiness make us intolerant 
of labour and adversity, health impatient of 
sickness ; and the most vigorous health is 
most liable to acute disease. Personal beauty 
and excellence of every kind often bring with 
them vanity and conceit. Wisdom and virtue 
themselves entail envy and jealousy on their 
possessors : virtue has often obliged men to 
sacrifice their whole worldly interests; and 
constancy in religion has bound them to the 
stake of martyrdom. 



It can therefore be no proof, that Religion 
does not proceed from the Author of Nature, 
or that it may not be the very best of all 
things that exist; merely because it is not 
without its evils— such as persecutions and 
martyrdoms and wars — such as superstition 
and fanaticism — such as its perversion to pur- 
poses of hypocrisy or of ambition : for in being 
thus attended by evil, it has but the common 
lot of every good given to man. 



268 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



CHAPTER VI. 



That many Things do not fulfil the apparent 
Purpose of their being. 



LL things that exist must, according to 



\. our conceptions, have been created in 
order to contribute in some manner to the uses 
of sensitive beings. Mere senseless matter 
having neither wants to satisfy nor pleasures 
to enjoy, cannot, of course, have any interests 
of its own : whatever, therefore, begins and 
ends its course without in any way advancing 
the interest of any sentient creature, must ap- 
pear to us, as though it answered no purpose 
at all in the creation. Yet what numberless 
instances of this kind every day offer them- 
selves to our observation. 

Vast tracts of the earth are barren and un- 
inhabitable, not merely from being neglected 
by man, but from being exposed to the ex- 
tremes of heat and cold, from being rocky, 
sandy, or mountainous, or from being covered 
with perpetual snow or ice : yet on all these 
the sun and the rain descend. What multi- 
tudes of seeds, every one formed with con- 
summate skill to produce its proper plant, 




CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 269 

perish without ever being sown, or converted 
to the use of animals : of those which are 
sown, how many perish in the ground : of the 
plants, which spring up, how many are de- 
stroyed by heat and cold and rain and blight 
and disease. How many animals daily perish 
in the womb or in the egg, without either de- 
riving any enjoyment from their own existence, 
or contributing to that of others. How many 
are cut off before they come to maturity. How 
large a portion of the time of all is passed in 
sleep and inactivity, without consciousness of 
pleasure. Nay, how much of suffering is daily 
endured by the brute creation, of which we can 
divine no useful purpose. 

Those of the above instances, which are 
taken even from the inanimate world, are in- 
stances of a seeming waste and profusion on 
the part of Nature to us unaccountable : but 
in the instances of brutes, some of whom seem 
brought into the world merely to suffer pain 
and misery, there is something still more won- 
derful. And to the unbeliever in a future life, 
who can of course see no purpose for man 
beyond the attainment of present happiness, 
it must be most wonderful of all, that so many 
human beings should also perish both in in- 
fancy, and after lives passed in misery. 



270 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

It is however thought to be incredible, that 
a benevolent Creator should have formed sen- 
tient beings, of whom many were to be con- 
demned to a state of punishment hereafter. 
Now before this can be decided to be incredi- 
ble, two assumptions must be made : the one 
is, that everything in the creation must fulfil 
what appears to us to be the purpose of its 
being ; the other, that this purpose must, in 
the case of every sentient creature, be its own 
individual happiness alone. Both these as- 
sumptions are equally contradicted by the 
appearances of Nature : for the whole world 
is full of beings both animate and inanimate, 
which do not fulfil those purposes, which ap- 
pear to us most manifestly to be the purposes 
of their creation ; and more particularly, it 
abounds with animated beings, who pass their 
lives in misery. An argument, therefore, built 
on such assumptions can manifestly be good 
for nothing. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



27] 



CHAPTER VII. t 



That animated Beings everywhere abound in 
Nature, as far as our Experience reaches. 



HE invention of the microscope discovered 



JL to mankind as it were a new world, 
peopled with living beings, such as had been 
altogether unknown and unsuspected. The 
earth, the air, and the waters were found 
equally to be swarming with life : and as later 
improvements in the instrument have still 
brought to light thousands of animals before 
undiscovered, we can hardly doubt, that in- 
numerable others exist, though at present im- 
perceptible to us. Every drop of water has its 
inhabitant, every vegetable its proper insect : 
so that we can scarcely set our foot to the 
ground without crushing some of them. Other 
kinds find their abode in the bodies of animals 
themselves : the stomach, the liver, the intes- 
tines, the blood, the brain, almost every part of 
man and of brutes, supply a habitation for some 
particular species of animal ; and these again 
are often inhabited by others, and they in their 




f The arguments in this and the following- chapter are ap- 
plied in a similar manner by Addison, in the Spectator, No. 
519. 



272 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

turn by a third set ; nor do we know to what 
extent this system is carried. 

That provision of Nature, by which animals, 
from the largest to the smallest, are made to 
prey upon each other, seems to have been 
devised partly for this purpose of multiplying 
life ; since an infinitely larger number are thus 
supported, than if all were supported by vege- 
tables. 

Though the telescope has not enabled us to 
ascertain the existence of inhabitants in the 
other planets, it has nevertheless shown us, 
that these planets, being constituted in many 
respects like our own, are so far fitted for the 
abode of sentient creatures ; and for this, as 
well as for other reasons, we may reasonably 
infer, that they are probably inhabited. 



And, accordingly, revelation teaches us, 
that the universe is inhabited by innumerable 
hosts of other beings besides ourselves and 
those which we can perceive : it tells us 
that " thousand thousands" minister to the 
Deity, and that our Saviour might presently 
have brought down " more than twelve legions 
of angels for his defence." 

Now this is so far from being incredible, 
that it would manifestly be much more so, if 
we had been told that He, who has crowded 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



'273 



every part of this little world of ours with life 
and animation and activity, has yet created 
innumerable other worlds, many of them in- 
finitely larger than our own, to be left desolate 
and untenanted by any sentient creature. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

That a Principle of Gradation prevails in 
Nature. 

THOUGH the variety of Nature is without 
end, yet this variety is everywhere con- 
stituted on a principle of regular gradation ; 
so that in every department those extremes, 
which are most dissimilar to one another, are 
nevertheless united by links, each of which 
very nearly resembles those immediately con- 
nected with it. This is equally true of the 
various beings which fill the universe, and of 
their several properties and functions. 

1. In the physical world. The various pro- 
perties of matter, such as solidity, fluidity, 
ductility, gravity, opacity, and every other, 
exist in all degrees of intensity in different 
bodies, and are mingled in all proportions 
with one another. The different seasons run 
into each other by imperceptible gradations of 
heat and cold. There is every sort of climate 

T 



274 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



between the equator and the pole, every de- 
gree of fertility and barrenness, of beauty and 
of dreariness-t 

But it is among the different classes of 
organized beings, that this gradation is most 
remarkable ; so as to have given rise to an 
axiom among naturalists : Natura non per 
solium movet. All these may be arranged ac- 
cording to their different degrees of perfection | 
by a graduated scale, beginning from inorganic 
matter, and terminating in man. Many of 
the minute lichens are scarcely to be recog- 
nized as plants by an unscientific observer : 
yet are these connected by an uninterrupted 
gradation with the largest, and most beautiful, 
and most perfect, of the vegetable kingdom. 
Again, there are beings, with regard to which 
naturalists are still undecided, whether to 
class them with plants or animals, and have 
accordingly given them a doubtful name, that 
of zoophytes or animal-plants. " There are 
some living creatures, which are raised but 
just above dead matter. To mention only that 
species of shell-fish which are formed in the 

t Astronomy leads us to believe that there are worlds in 
every degree of gradual progress, from nebulae, or mere col- 
lections of hazy light, to solid masses, fit for habitation like 
our own. 

X By plants and animals more or less perfect, naturalists 
mean those, whose organization and functions are more or less 
complicated and more or less perfectly developed. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



275 



fashion of a cone, that grow to the surface of 
several rocks, and immediately die upon being 
severed from the place where they grow. 
There are many other creatures but one re 
move from these, which have no other sense 
beside that of feeling and taste. Others have 
still an additional one of hearing ; others of 
smell, and others of sight. It is wonderful to 
observe, by what a gradual progress the world 
of life advances through a prodigious variety 
of species, before a creature is formed, that is 
complete in all its senses ; and even among 
these there is such a different degree of per- 
fection in the sense, which one animal enjoys 
beyond what appears in another, that though 
the sense in different animals be distinguished 
by the same common denomination, it seems 
almost of a different nature. If, after this, we 
look into the several inward perfections of 
cunning and sagacity, or what we generally 
call instinct, we find them rising after the same 
manner imperceptibly one above another, and 
receiving additional improvements, according 
to the species in which they are implanted. 
This progress in nature is so very gradual, 
that the most perfect of an inferior species 
comes very near to the most imperfect of that 
which is immediately above it." t 



f Spectator, No. 519. 



276 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

2. In the moral world. If such a grada- 
tion exists in all the objects of Nature which 
surround us, it is a natural consequence of this, 
that the different parts of human knowledge, 
which regard these objects, should in the 
same way run into each other. If zoophytes 
belong equally to the animal and the vegetable 
kingdom, then botany and zoology must of 
course run into each other. In the same 
way botany and chemistry, chemistry and 
mineralogy, chemistry and medicine, and 
many others of the sciences, are so mutually 
interwoven and connect d w r ith each other, 
that no man can be eminently skilful in any one 
of the sciences, if he confines his attention 
to that one exclusively : but every addition 
to his stock of knowledge throws new light 
upon his former acquisitions, manifestly be- 
cause all departments contain so many things 
analogous to, and therefore illustrating, each 
other. And this is true in great measure of 
knowledge of every kind : no one truth stands 
single and unconnected with others. Hooker 
has even expressed an opinion, that by an 
infinitely wise being any one truth might be 
deduced from any other: but this can only be 
on the supposition, that links of real connexion 
exist between all truths, by which it may be 
possible to pass from each one to any other. 
The intellectual and moral powers and ac- 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



277 



quisitions of men are distributed in the same 
way in all different degrees : there is a grada- 
tion of genius and knowledge from the phi- 
losopher to the idiot, of virtue from the saint 
to the malefactor. There are men of all de- 
grees of activity, of courage, of prudence. 
Happiness is distributed by the same rule ; 
so are strength, and power, and riches. King- 
doms and nations rise above one another in 
every grade of power, of civilization, of virtue. 



Thus we see this law of Gradation perva- 
ding the Universe — extending to the most dis- 
tant regions of space, as far as we can discern — 
but prevailing in every part of that system of 
Nature which is more immediately subjected 
to our observation. Is it incredible then, that 
it may hold good in those parts which are now 
concealed from us? that the vast interval, 
which separates man from the Deity, may con- 
tain other beings more nearly approaching 
than ourselves to His perfections ? Or is it 
more probable, that that graduated scale of 
being, which we trace up from inorganic and 
senseless matter to reasoning man, should there 
be broken off abruptly ? " Since there is an 
infinitely greater space and room for different 
degrees of perfection, between the Supreme 
Being and man, than between man and the 



278 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

most despicable insect," we can hardly help 
thinking the former the more likely to be true. 
And, accordingly, the Scriptures teach us that 
there are such beings of a nature superior 
to man, though w r e know but little about their 
several ranks and offices. 

And when w r e see this gradation in virtue 
and in vice, that some men are guided in their 
conduct here by virtue as their leading and 
active principle, while others are impelled 
solely by their passions, often by the very worst 
of these ; these things render it not incredible 
that there may be still higher degrees of either, 
that there may be other beings elsewhere, 
either solely occupied in the pursuit of good, 
or entirely active in the doing of evil. And 
this too the Scriptures teach us to believe. 

Again, we see in this world innumerable 
gradations of happiness and of misery, chiefly 
dependent on men's own conduct. This may 
lead us to believe that there may be still higher 
degrees of both ; that we ourselves may be 
destined either to greater happiness or to 
greater misery than we see here, and that 
according to our own conduct. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



279 



CHAPTER IX. 

That a Principle of Progression prevails 
in Nature. 

IT is the constant method of Nature in con- 
ducting her operations, to bring her pro- 
ductions from states of lesser to those of greater 
perfection by progressive steps. Nothing ap- 
pears suddenly and at once under its most 
perfect form, without passing through some 
previous stages of preparation, as it were of 
discipline, for that further state. We find her 
equally pursuing this method, whether we re- 
gard her more minute and petty operations, or 
examine her manner of working those great 
changes and revolutions which are only com- 
pleted in a course of ages. 
I. In the physical world : 
1. Even particles of lifeless matter are thus 
raised in the scale of being by successive steps. 
When vegetation first commences on a barren 
rock, these particles are taken up by the 
vessels of mosses and lichens, and thus become 
constituent parts of these the lowest class of 
vegetables ; these, on their decay, produce the 
grasses, ranking higher in the scale. The 
grasses again afford nourishment to shrubs and 



280 



ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



trees, and all the more perfect plants. But 
the grasses are also applied to the nourishment 
of the less perfect animals ; and these last 
serve for food to the more perfect orders, and 
among them to man himself. 

2. The embryo of the future plant, as con- 
tained in the seed, and that of the animal in 
the womb, are at first altogether without ap- 
parent life or organization ; they are developed 
by imperceptible degrees, till they arrive at a 
state fit for their being born into the world. 
One law, by which this developement is regu- 
lated in the case of animals, supplies a remark- 
able illustration of this principle of Progres- 
sion ; that amongst all animals those organs are 
first formed in the womb which are common to 
all, the lowest as well as the highest classes; 
and that others are successively added, accord- 
ing as they belong to more perfect classes ; 
those peculiar to the most perfect being the 
last in order, t 



t " In reviewing this succession of changes during the 
progress of developement, we recognize each of them as a 
temporary or transition stage, which, while it lasts, bears a 
certain degree of analogy to a fixed condition of the circulating 
apparatus in some of the lower orders of animals. Thus, when 
in the embryo of a vertebrate animal, a single vessel without 
any cardiac dilatation runs along the back, it at once suggests 
the idea of the dorsal vessel in insects. When at the anterior 
part of this vessel an enlargement occurs where the ' punctnm 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



281 



The same gradual progress continues 
both with the plant and the animal, after they 
have passed into a state of independent exist- 
ence. They all enter upon this state compa- 
ratively small and weak : they all attain their 
ultimate size and strength by a progress made 
up of successive steps. In no animal is the 
contrast between these two states so marked 
and strong, as in man : absolutely helpless in 
his infancy, in his maturity he subdues all 
other animals to his dominion. 

4. Among the innumerable insects which 
undergo transformations, there is not one, 



saliens ' is seen, and which assumes the character of a ventricle, 
it is the analogue of what is found in the higher Crustacea. 
In the next stage, where two cavities exist, one just before the 
other, representing an auricle and ventricle, it corresponds 
with the condition of the central organ in the mollusca. When 
the auricle ascends and the ventricle comes forward, the bulbus 
arteriosus reaching upwards from its base, it is like the heart 
of fishes, in which it is called branchial or respiratory, from 
its sending the blood into the gills or respiratory organ solely, 
and therefore discharges the function of the right or pulmonic 
heart in higher animals. When the auricular cavity becomes 
separated into two chambers by the growth of the septum, the 
ventricle still remaining single, it passes into the condition of 
the organ of the batrachial reptile. In the next place, as the 
developement of the ventricular septum proceeds from the apex 
upwards to the base, before it is completed, a communication 
will still remain at this point ; the heart in this stage con- 
sisting of two auricles and a partially divided ventricle, repre- 
sents the condition of the organ in the ophidian reptile, and 
were its growth arrested at this point, (of which many instances 



282 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



which in this process is not advanced from a 
less to a more perfect rank of being. From 
its abode in the egg it passes into the larva or 
caterpillar state, next into that of a pupa or 
chrysalis, and lastly into the imago, or perfect 
form of being. The insect which begins its ex- 
istence as a grub, buried in darkness under the 
earth, with powers and functions adapted to its 
confined and loathsome condition, afterwards 
comes forth to the surface, raised to a higher 
grade. The caterpillar is confined to a single 
plant, or at the utmost to a few ; it is solely 
occupied in satisfying the excessive voracity of 
its appetite : but this is only for a time ; bye 
and bye it rises into the air, gifted with wings, 



have occurred) that form of congenital malformation will 
remain through life, in which the two sorts of blood are 
blended, owing to the imperfection of the septum. Lastly, 
even when all communication between the ventricular cavities 
is cut off by the completion of the septum, the streams issuing 
from them are still to a certain extent blended, by means of 
the current which passes from the pulmonary artery through 
the ductus arteriosus into the aorta. Hence, until this diver- 
ticulum is closed, an analogy will still remain between the 
conformation of the organs in the foetus of the human subject 
and the higher animals with that of the reptile. It is finally 
cut off at the moment of birth, when the condition of the 
circulating apparatus in the new being passes from that of 
the cold-blooded to that of the warm-blooded animal." — Ele- 
ments of Anatomy, by Jones Quain, M.D. p. 89. fourth 
edition. See also, Roget's Bridge-water Treatise, vol. ii. p. 
630—634. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



283 



endowed with powers unknown to it before, 
and adorned with external beauty ; its very 
instincts appear to have been raised and re- 
fined, for it has laid aside its ravenous pro- 
pensities, and is now satisfied with the lightest 
nutriment. 

The tadpole, having burst from the egg, 
becomes at first a fish ; after a time it lays 
aside the characteristics of this class, and 
assumes that of a reptile, ranking higher in 
the scale. There is no instance in which this 
progressive order is reversed, and where a 
more perfect animal is transformed into one 
less perfect. 

5. The discoveries of Geology shew, that 
there has been a progressive developement of 
organic life upon the surface of our globe, from 
very remote ages to the present time. In the 
lowest and most ancient formations no organic 
remains at all, whether of animals or of vege- 
tables, are found. In the secondary rocks the 
remains of a few sea-animals of the lowest 
tribes, such as shells and corals, are discovered. 
Above these we meet with fishes and oviparous 
quadrupeds, such as crocodiles and tortoises. 
Next in succession come birds and mammiferous 
quadrupeds : and it is only among these last 
that any remains of man himself are to be 
traced. So that in the great scheme of creation 
the order of events seems to have been regu- 



284 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

lated on the same principle with the common 
operations of Nature, that of advancing by 
successive steps towards a more perfect order 
of things. 

6. We see things somewhat analogous to 
these, taking place in the present state of the 
globe. Barren lands are first occupied by the 
lowest classes of plants, (a bare rock will 
support only mosses and lichens) by insects, 
and by birds ; then generally by reptiles and 
some of the quadrupeds ; lastly by man. 

7. Late discoveries in Astronomy lead us 
to suppose that the formation of worlds is 
constantly carrying on in a gradual and pro- 
gressive manner throughout the immeasurable 
regions of space : these worlds appearing at 
first as nebulae, or mere masses of hazy light, 
which gradually become condensed, and so 
assuming the form of solid bodies, take their 
appointed places in the system of the universe. 

II. Secondly, we may examine the moral 
constitution of Nature : and here we shall 
find the same principle prevailing. 

1. Our minds, equally with our bodies, must 
pass through a state of infancy, before they 
can reach one of maturity. Every faculty, 
weak and small at first, requires to be strength- 
ened by time and exercise, before it is fully 
developed : our appetites, and passions, and 
desires, our powers of reasoning and of imagi- 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 285 

nation, our moral powers; in short, all our 
principles, whether moral, intellectual, or ani- 
mal, come to perfection in this gradual and 
progressive way. 

And so with acquirements both of knowledge 
and of virtue: we come into the world in igno- 
rance ; our knowledge must be acquired and 
increased by single and successive additions : 
we are born without characters of virtue or 
of vice ; but the one character or the other 
gradually grows and gains strength during 
our whole lives. 

2. The order too, in which our several facul- 
ties unfold themselves, is progressive. Those 
which we have in common with the brutes, 
the appetites desires and passions, are first 
developed. The appetite of hunger is necessary 
to the infant ; and he has it accordingly. The 
desire of bodily activity, affection, anger, and 
resentment, make their appearance very early 
in childhood. But it is not till long after, that 
he begins to reason or abstract, or to have 
moral discernment between good and evil. In 
short, our earliest state is one merely of animal 
existence : when this has been established and 
confirmed, we begin by insensible degrees to 
be rational and moral creatures. 

3. It is the common course of things for 
men to raise themselves in the world, in re- 
spect of wealth and station and condition of 



286 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

life, as they advance in years. Exceptions to 
this must of course occur, as long as men are 
free agents : but these are only exceptions ; 
the contrary is the usual order of things ; it is 
the rule. 

4. As with individuals, so it is with nations. 
The most extensive empires have arisen from 
small beginnings: they have become great and 
powerful by degrees, often making their ac- 
quisitions only in a long succession of ages. 

5. The case has been similar with regard to 
the human race at large. The early genera- 
tions of man began their career on the globe 
in weakness and ignorance, in barbarity and 
crime. They have gradually advanced (with 
many temporary retrocessions) in power, in 
knowledge, in civilization, and in virtue ; and 
it is generally, I believe, allowed, that they 
are still likely to advance. Since, however, 
to discuss this question adequately would fill 
a volume, and at the end of it the inference 
might perhaps be still disputed; a conviction 
of its truth may probably be more certainly, 
as well as more readily, produced in the mind 
of the reader by the authority of Gibbon, 
rather than by a discussion necessarily insuf- 
ficient. His knowledge of history was most 
extensive, his abilities great ; and he will not 
be suspected of having taken any other than a 
cool and philosophical view of the subject, 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



287 



unbiassed certainly by any prejudices on the 
side of Religion. " The discoveries of ancient 
and modern navigators, and the domestic his- 
tory, or tradition, of the most enlightened 
nations, represent the human savage, naked 
both in mind and body, and destitute of laws, 
of arts, of ideas, and almost of language. 
From this abject condition, perhaps the pri- 
mitive and universal condition of man, he has 
gradually arisen to command the animals, to 
fertilize the earth, to traverse the ocean, and 
to measure the heavens. His progress in the 
improvement and exercise of his mental and 
corporeal faculties has been irregular and 
various; infinitely slow in the beginning, and 
increasing by degrees with redoubled velocit}' : 
ages of laborious ascent have been followed 
by a moment of rapid downfall ; and the several 
climates of the globe have felt the vicissitudes 
of light and darkness. Yet the experience of 
four thousand years should enlarge our hopes, 
and diminish our apprehensions : we cannot 
determine, to what height the human species 
may aspire in their advances towards perfec- 
tion ; but it may safely be presumed, that no 
people, unless the face of nature is changed, 
will relapse into their original barbarism." 
After having given several reasons for this 
opinion, he thus concludes his argument: 
" We may, therefore, acquiesce in the pleasing 



288 



ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



conclusion, that every age of the world has 
increased, and still increases, the real wealth, 
the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps 
the virtue of the human race."t 

In this progress no circumstance is more 
remarkable, than the increase of knowledge. 
To a man unacquainted with the inventions 
of writing and printing, it must have appeared 
absolutely and literally impossible, that a thou- 
sandth part of our actual knowledge should 
ever have been accumulated : it would seem 
to have been necessarily bounded by the powers 
of memory in individuals. Yet these wonder- 
ful effects have been wrought by the inven- 
tion of the letters of the alphabet. And this 
must in all human probability continue to be, 
as it has been, the great instrument of ad- 
vancement. By its means our knowledge of 
Nature, and consequently our command over 
the powers of Nature, will be continually en- 
larged : and by adding to the physical com- 
forts and alleviating the physical wants of the 
great mass of mankind, it will refine, as well 
as make them happier. There can be as little 
doubt as to the advance of moral and political 
science, or that the progress of these will pro- 
mote our moral improvement — that both classes 



f Conclusion of the Western Empire. See also on this sub- 
ject Sir J. Herschel's Discourse on Nat. Philosophy, p. 66. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



289 



of knowledge will react upon, and forward, 
each other — and in their combination increase 
the virtue as well as the happiness of the 
human race. Science is indeed much more 
surely and permanently progressive, than lite- 
rature and the fine arts. For these last are 
carried to their height by the genius of in- 
dividuals, and cannot be advanced by succes- 
sive additions: whereas in science, since the 
invention of printing, every conquest is a per- 
manent one, and the utmost limits reached by 
a preceding generation become the starting- 
place for their successors ; and so a permanent 
progress is ensured. 



Now several things, of which we are informed 
by Revelation, and which have appeared in- 
credible to some, because they represent a 
state of things different from what we see 
here, are in fact only a carrying on of this 
principle of Progression. 

1. As individuals we are taught to expect, 
that those habits and characters, whether of 
virtue or of vice, which we acquire here, shall 
in our future life be further developed, and ac- 
quire greater strength. But this will only be a 
continuance and completion of the very same 
thing, which is going on here ; for our charac- 
ters and habits, whether of virtue or of vice, 

u 



290 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

are actually gaining strength during our whole 
lives by the mere lapse of time. Why then 
should it be incredible, that they may do so 
still more, when farther time is given them 
for further developement? 

We are taught again, that the good will be 
hereafter infinitely happy, and the wicked in- 
finitely miserable. Now vice is certainly fol- 
lowed by some evil consequences in this world, 
such as the reproaches of conscience, the re- 
sentment of our fellow-creatures, and civil 
punishment : virtue is certainly attended with 
some advantages, such as a good conscience, 
the love and esteem of mankind. The tenden- 
cies of each are to bring happiness and misery 
respectively upon those who practise them.t 
What Religion teaches us, is therefore, that the 
natural tendencies and consequences of virtue 
and of vice, such as we see them here, will be 
respectively carried out into fuller and more 
complete operation and developement, when 
the actual obstacles, which now exist, shall be 
removed. Why should this seem incredible? 

Revelation teaches, that our actual nature 
and state of being will be advanced and im- 
proved hereafter, provided that certain present 
conditions are fulfilled: that is to say, it 
teaches, that our nature and condition are pro- 



f See p. 181. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



291 



gressive; and yet that this progression may 
be impeded by circumstances that take place 
now ; that it will depend, like all the other 
instances of progression mentioned above, on 
the fulfilling of certain conditions. If in our 
childhood we refuse the conditions necessary 
for attaining a healthy and a virtuous man- 
hood ; both our physical and moral advance- 
ment will be arrested : we may be cut short 
in our career by disease, or by natural death, 
or by civil punishment, and so never attain 
that state at all ; or we may be rendered 
miserable during the remainder of our lives, 
and become spectacles of contempt and dis- 
gust to those around us — shunned alike for 
some foul and loathsome disease, and for vice 
and wickedness. Just so our advancement 
to a happier and a better state hereafter is 
represented in Scripture as depending on what 
we do here : conditions are imposed for the 
attaining of it ; and if we fail in fulfilling the 
conditions thus required at our hands, then, 
instead of attaining that better state, we shall 
be degraded to a lower, and be punished dur- 
ing the remainder of our being, by suffering 
pain and misery, and being objects of contempt 
and loathing to others. Nor is it any just ob- 
jection to such a supposition, that, because we 
are to be transferred in the interval to a new 
and a different state of being, therefore it is 



292 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



unlikely, that what happens to us now, should 
affect us in this other state, as Religion sup- 
poses. The organs of our bodily frame, adapted 
for living in the world, are formed, while we 
are in the womb ; but their health and per- 
fection after our birth are greatly influenced 
by what happens to them there. The cater- 
pillar contains under its actual form, the wings 
and all other organs of the future butterfly, 
though useless to it in its present state, and 
imperfectly developed; and any injury now 
inflicted on these organs will be felt and con- 
tinued in its more perfect condition. 

Again, when we are advanced to this our 
future state, whatever either of our material 
bodies or of our moral characters more pro- 
perly belongs only to our mortal condition, 
will, of course, be laid aside. And such things 
as this too happen in Nature : for when the 
plant springs to life, when the chick is hatched, 
and when the insect is transformed, the inte- 
guments of the seed, of the egg, of the larva, 
and of the chrysalis (though before necessary 
to the support of life,) are cast aside and suf- 
fered to perish. And the same thing happens 
to the infant at birth. 

But we also expect, that to those moral and 
intellectual powers which we now possess, will 
be added others proper to beings of a higher 
order. This also is confirmed by the Analogy 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



293 



of Nature in the physical world : for we have 
seen above, how that in the womb those organs 
which are common to the inferior orders of 
creatures, are developed first, and those pecu- 
liar to the higher afterwards superadded ; and 
where analogous organs exist differently modi- 
fied and developed in different orders, how that 
they first take the form of the inferior types, 
and afterwards assume the form of, and are 
converted into, the higher — so that the higher 
animals (and we ourselves in the number) 
may be said to pass in this succession of 
changes through the permanent conditions of 
the lower classes. The infant, previous to 
birth, is really an aquatic animal both in 
structure and condition : both are exchanged 
at the moment of birth for those of a higher 
class. But those properties, which are most of 
all characteristic of man — his moral and intel- 
lectual powers — are added after he is born. 

This progressive developement of the infant 
in the womb is sometimes arrested from un- 
known causes at one of these earlier stages, 
before all the organs proper to the human 
being have been added : and hence the pro- 
duction of a monster; which generally there- 
fore resembles some one of the lower animals.* 



* The monsters produced by brutes never resemble human 
creatures. 



294 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



The wicked in a future life may be looked 
upon as a sort of moral monsters, whose natu- 
ral developement has never been completed ; 
but who are born into their second life in an 
imperfect state, marked and degraded by 
those characteristics of vice belonging only to 
their lower and mortal condition, and which in 
the natural course of things should have been 
obliterated and superseded by the moral attri- 
butes of a more perfect order of being-t 



f " The metal at its height of being seems a mute prophecy 
of the coming vegetation, into a mimic semblance of which it 
crystallizes. The blossom and flower, the acme of vegetable 
life, divides into correspondent organs with reciprocal functions, 
and by instinctive motions and approximations seems impatient 
of that fixture, by which it is differenced in kind from the 
flower-shaped Psyche, that flutters with free wing above it. 
And wonderfully in the insect realm, doth the Irritability, the 
proper seat of Instinct, while yet the nascent Sensibility is 
subordinated thereto ; most wonderfully, I say, doth the mus- 
cular life in the insect, and the musculo-arterial in the bird, 
imitate, and typically rehearse the adaptive understanding, yea, 
and the moral affections and charities of man. Let us cany 
ourselves back, in spirit, to the mysterious Week, the teeming 
work-days of the Creator : as they rose in vision before the 
eye of the inspired historian of ' the generations of the Heaven 
and the Earth, in the days that the Lord God made the Earth 
and the Heavens.' And who that hath watched their ways with 
an understanding heart, could contemplate the filial and loyal 
Bee; the home-building, wedded, and divorceless Swallow; 
and above all the manifoldly intelligent Antf tribes, with their 



t See Huber on Bees, and on Ants. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



295 



Lastly, as Death (the supposed passage into 
another state) is painful ; so the cries of the 
new-born infant shew us, that the change, 
which it undergoes when it passes out of its 
former into its present state, is in the same way 
not unattended by suffering. 

2. The above remarks are applicable to 
man considered as an individual : we may 
also consider the human race collectively. 

We are taught by Revelation, that the Al- 
mighty has thought fit to grant to mankind 



commonwealths and confederacies, their warriors, and miners, 
the husbandfolk, that fold in their tiny flocks on the honeyed 
leaf, and the virgin sisters with the holy instincts of maternal 
love, detached and in selfless purity, — and not say to himself, 
Behold the shadow of approaching humanity, the sun rising from 
behind, in the kindling morn of Creation ! Thus all lower 
Natures find their highest good in semblances and seekings of 
that which is higher and better. All things strive to ascend, 
and ascend in their striving. And shall man alone stoop ? 
Shall his pursuits and desires, the reflections of his inward life, 
be like the reflected image of a tree on the edge of a pool, that 
grows downward, and seeks a mock heaven in the unstable 
element beneath it, in neighbourhood with the slim water-weeds 
and oozy bottom-grass that are yet better than itself and more 
noble, in as far as substances that appear as shadows, are pre- 
ferable to shadows mistaken for substance ? No ! it must be 
a higher good to make you happy. While you labour for any- 
thing below your proper humanity, you seek a happy life in the 
region of Death. Well saith the moral Poet, — 

" Unless above himself he can 

Erect himself, how mean a thing is man !" 

Coleridge. Aids to Reflection, Part III. 



4 



296 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

several successive religious dispensations, the 
Patriarchal, the Jewish, and lastly the Chris- 
tian : in the first of which the light of religious 
truth was shed dimly and obscurely, but in the 
others was rendered brighter and clearer ; and 
we are assured, that this light shall hereafter 
spread over the whole earth ; and that the 
happiness, as well as the knowledge and virtue 
of our race, will be thereby very greatly in- 
creased ; and lastly, that when this present 
Dispensation is completed, we are destined for 
a more perfect state of being, when " this cor- 
ruption must put on incorruption, and this 
mortal must put on immortality." 

Surely such a course of things seems to be 
in exact conformity to that scheme of Provi- 
dence, which we see developed both in the 
physical and moral worlds. These successive 
Religious Dispensations are more particularly 
of a piece with the several Physical Dispensa- 
tions brought to light by the discoveries of 
geology. In all of these the prevailing prin- 
ciple seems to have been the same — that of 
bringing into existence beings, and conditions 
of being, of higher and higher degrees of per- 
fection. It is remarkable too, that though 
such has constantly been the rule in the gra- 
dual developement of the scale of organic life ; 
yet man is the only one of these races, which 
during its abode here has been allowed in any 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



297 



degree to advance from its original position in 
this scale. More perfect races have continually 
been added to the less perfect ; while many of 
these last have been obliterated to make room 
for the former. But man is the only race, to 
which promotion has been allowed. The gift 
of reason has enabled him to quit the rank, 
where he was originally placed, and to make 
those advances in knowledge, in power, in 
happiness, and in virtue, which constitute the 
difference between the naked savages of Aus- 
tralia and the inhabitants of civilized Europe. 

If then he is really destined for a condition 
here upon earth still further improved, and for 
a more exalted state of being elsewhere ; what 
do such destinations imply, but the completion 
of that scheme, in the progress of which he has 
already been so greatly advanced both in his 
external condition and in the best characteris- 
tics of his being ? What would this be, but a 
further application of the same principle of 
Progression, which we see so universally ope- 
rating throughout the whole physical and 
moral worlds ? Or how could we suppose, that 
the future Dispensations of Providence could 
be planned in a manner more conformable to 
this actual rule of His administration ? These 
things are indeed long in doing : man is slow 
in reaching this more perfect state. But that, 
again, is far from being any proof, that the 



298 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

thing will not be done at all : for on the con- 
trary we find it to be another general rule of 
natural operations both in the physical and 
moral worlds, that whatever is destined to 
attain the highest perfection, as well as to be 
most durable, also requires the longest time for 
enabling it to reach that state. 



CHAPTER X. 

That the usual Course of Nature is sometimes 
interrupted. 

1. r I ^HE early astronomers have handed 
_L down to us catalogues of the stars, 
which were visible in their days. It is proved 
by these catalogues, that several have disap- 
peared from the heavens : and all modern as- 
tronomers are agreed in thinking this a fact 
not to be disputed. It is equally undoubted 
that new stars have made their appearance. 
Many have both appeared and disappeared 
in modern, and even in our own times, t 

2. The discoveries of Geology have shown by 
the most satisfactory evidence, that the present 



t Herschel gives a list of several. Astronomy, p. 383. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



299 



races of plants and animals have not existed 
from eternity. Something, therefore, must 
have taken place at the first appearance of 
these, more than could have been effected by 
the present laws of Nature — these laws being 
clearly confined to regulating the succession of 
organic beings, but being inadequate to pro- 
duce them from inorganic matter. 

3. But Geology has also established the fact, 
that at several and distinct periods, vast num- 
bers of new classes of organized beings (man 
himself being among the number) have ap- 
peared upon the earth — classes of beings, such 
as could not possibly have been produced from 
those previously existing, according to the es- 
tablished Laws of nature — for these laws are as 
clearly confined to the producing of similar 
beings from their parent stock ; and not being 
adequate to the formation of new organs and 
functions, such as are necessary to constitute 
new species. t At the introduction of each new 



f It is not, I think, necessary to qualify this assertion, in 
deference to the authority of Lamarck and a few other French 
naturalists, however great their abilities. A doctrine which 
teaches, that the higher animals have all sprung from the 
lowest — that oysters have in a long series of generations 
become men, merely by " striving to ascend and ascending by 
striving" — can never gain the assent of more than a few 
speculative men, in whom common sense has been blindfolded 
by the habit of propping up a preconceived theory with inge- 
nious reasons. 



300 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

species there must therefore have been the in- 
terference of an overruling power. 



These are all instances then, in which the 
usual course of Nature has been suspended, 
and anomalous events have taken place, that is 
to say, miracles have been wrought, in the 
physical world. Yet when such suspensions 
and miracles are asserted to have taken place 
in the moral world, we are told by sceptics, 
that we are forbidden both by all experience, 
and by the character of the Deity as collected 
from the works of Nature, to believe that He 
ever proceeds in any other manner, than 
what we call the common course of Nature. 

But a more particular analogy may be 
traced between the two cases. For these in- 
terventions are represented in the case of Re- 
ligion to have chiefly taken place, first, at the 
introduction of the whole scheme or system ; 
and secondly, whenever any great changes 
were to be wrought therein, that is to say, at 
the bringing in of a new Dispensation — at the 
first revelation to Adam — at the establishment 
of the Patriarchal — of the Jewish — of the 
Christian Dispensations. 

Just so, the Natural world teaches us to be- 
lieve, that an intervention of Almighty Power 
took place, when the whole scheme of organic 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



301 



life was first introduced upon the globe ; since 
the actual laws of Nature are unequal to the 
task : and that as often as successive changes 
in this scheme have been required — as often as 
new Dispensations have been brought in — so 
often there have been similar extraordinary, 
that is, miraculous interventions. 

Nor would it be any objection to the argu- 
ment, though it should be maintained, that all 
these changes in the natural world may really 
be only the results of some very general laws 
enacted by the Creator from the beginning, 
and unknown to us ; and that they are thus no 
proofs of any extraordinary interpositions : for 
the very same thing may be said with respect 
to the miracles of Revelation ; they too may 
be only analogous results of very general Laws 
in the moral world equally unknown to us. 
There is equal reason for such a supposition in 
both cases ; in both we should merely argue 
from our own utter ignorance of the matter, 
and from an assumption, that the Deity never 
does interfere for the suspending or the alter- 
ing of any of the laws of Nature. But Butler, 
without being led to it by any such course of 
argument as the above, has actually sug- 
gestedj-f that the Scripture miracles may pos- 
sibly be the results of such very general Laws. 



f Analogy. Part. II. Chap. iv. 



302 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

But, whichever be the truth as to this point, 
the difficulty of believing in these interpo- 
sitions is solved equally either way. If there 
have been real instances of miraculous interpo- 
sition in the organic world, then it is quite as 
credible, that there may have been such in the 
moral world also ; and it becomes wholly a 
question of evidence. \ If these seeming mi- 
racles are but the results of very general Laws 
in the one case, they may be so equally in the 
other ; and then there are no miracles to be 
either believed or disbelieved at all. 

However, even though this last supposition 
should be speculatively true, yet mankind in 
general will always continue practically to 
consider as miracles, what are so called, (and 
therefore they will continue to answer their 
purpose as sufficient proofs of a Revelation) 
because this is the obvious way of considering 
them, and because there is no chance what- 
ever of our ever comprehending the very 
general Laws thus conjectured to exist, or of 
our proving therefore, even speculatively, that 
they are other than miracles. 



I As to the sufficiency of testimony on such a question, see 
p. 121. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



303 



CHAPTER XI. 

That the Deity constantly superintends the 
Universe. 

SOME persons, who have believed that the 
Universe was created by an All wise and 
Almighty Being, have nevertheless entertained 
an opinion, that, when that creation was once 
completed, and the laws, by which it was 
to be regulated, had been established, the 
Creator immediately abandoned all care and 
superintendence of it, and left it to be en- 
tirely governed by those laws. Others, again, 
have supposed, that the Deity is attentive 
to its great and important, but not to its little, 
matters ; for that it is beneath His dignity 
to concern Himself about every petty occur- 
rence relating to the affairs of such beings as 
men. 

Each of these opinions seems to be absurd, 
since each is maintained on the supposition, 
that an Infinite Intelligence is liable to such 
defects and weaknesses as we ourselves are. 
It is supposed, that He requires His attention 
to be specially directed to an object, before He 
can have knowledge of it — a supposition mani- 



304 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

festly absurd. And again, it is supposed to 
be derogatory to His dignity, to be attentive to 
little matters. Now attention to trivial things 
is indeed justly held derogatory to the dignity 
of a wise man : but this is only, because he 
must be withdrawn thereby from weightier 
concerns. But it is obvious, that this does 
not apply to the Deity : on the contrary, one 
of the attributes, which chiefly exalt Him in 
our estimation, is His all-seeing wisdom, by 
which He is able to comprehend all things, 
past, present, and future, at a glance. 

But these opinions are equally overthrown 
by the appearances of Nature. The several in- 
stances, mentioned in the preceding chapter, 
of the appearance of new stars and comets, 
and the disappearance of others ; but especi- 
ally the successive creation of new classes of 
beings, both animal, and vegetable, upon the 
earth at distinct periods, are all proofs, that 
the Deity did not, after having created the 
Universe, forthwith abandon all care and 
thought of it ; but that He has, on the con- 
trary, thought fit at various times to interpose 
with His almighty power, in order to effect 
changes in the existing order of things. But, 
if He has done this, it is evident, that His 
creation must be the constant object of His 
care and attention : for otherwise He could 
not have known (to argue about the Deity, as 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



.305 



these objectors have done; and it is sufficient 
to do so, in order to answer their objections), 
He could not have known what was the fitting 
time for His interposition. 

As to His being attentive to great things, 
and not to little ; first of all, it is manifest, that 
in the act of Creation, as well as in the enact- 
ment of His natural Laws, He was employed 
equally in the ordering of the least things, as 
of the greatest — for all are planned with equal 
care and skill. And the supposition is also 
overthrown by that intimate connection and 
dependence, which exist between things the 
most trivial and the most important, equally 
in the physical and the moral worlds. Espe- 
cially is it inconsistent with the fact, that the 
most mighty and important events are conti- 
nually brought about by means in our eyes 
the most insignificant.! To say, therefore, 
that the Deity takes no cognizance of little 
things, is to say, that He is ignorant or care- 
less of the means, which He himself adopts to 
effect his purposes. 



If then it appears, that the Deity thus con- 
stantly superintends both the material Uni- 
verse in general, and even the very lowest 



t See Chap. III. of this Part. 
X 



306 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

classes of the animal and vegetable worlds, it 
certainly cannot be incredible, that He should 
take at least equal care of His reasonable and 
moral creatures. And such is our Saviour's 
argument : " Wherefore if God so clothe the 
grass of the field, which to-day is, and to- 
morrow is cast into the oven, shall He not 
much more clothe you, Oh ye of little faith ?" 



CHAPTER XTI. 

That many Capacities and Powers are developed 
solely by Habit. 

IT appears to me, that the influence of habit 
extends to the inorganic, as well as to the 
organic and moral worlds ; — that is to say, that 
by this principle, even in unorganized matter, 
capacities and powers are sometimes developed, 
which would not have existed without its ope- 
ration. 

A wheel revolves more easily, merely by re- 
volving : it acquires, therefore, by mere repe- 
tition of the process, a power of continuing its 
revolution, after any given impulse, longer and 
quicker, than it would otherwise have done : 
in complicated machinery this effect becomes 
more remarkable in proportion as the points 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



307 



of friction are more numerous. The powers of 
magnets are increased by their being kept in 
action, and diminished by inaction ; and they 
are kept constantly " armed" with " keepers" 
for that reason. A river will continue to flow 
in its ancient bed, after this has been raised 
far above the surrounding country ; while, if 
it were to begin its course afresh, it would of 
course choose the lowest level. 

Vegetables are confessedly influenced by 
Habit. It is well known, that they must be 
gradually transplanted from a poorer to a richer 
soil, or the contrary ; that so they may have 
time to adapt their habits to the change. So 
too plants indigenous to a hot or a cold climate 
must be inured to an opposite one by gentle 
degrees or in successive generations. Rice 
may be raised in Germany, from seeds grown 
there; while seeds brought from India, their 
native country, refuse to germinate. Deci- 
duous plants, when carried across the equator, 
will put forth leaves at the approach of winter ; 
evidently because it is their habit so to do 
after settled intervals of time ; for after a while 
they learn to accommodate themselves to the 
change. 

Animals must be habituated to changes of 
climate or of food in the same gradual manner. 
It is only by the formation of new habits, that 
the ox is subjected to the yoke, and the horse 



308 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

broken to the bit. The very instinct of the 
pointer is suppressed and changed by habit, 
when he is taught to stand steady to his game, 
instead of running in upon it and devouring it. 
But none of these animals can be thus trained, 
when they have grown old: their natural habits 
have then become too inveterate. 

Health and disease are greatly influenced 
by Habit : whence the phrase of a good or bad 
Habit of body. Acute diseases differ from 
chronic, in that the former are but sudden and 
brief disorders of the bodily functions ; and 
they are therefore (supposing them to be only 
of the same degree of severity) comparatively 
easy of cure. But if a disordered function is 
permitted to continue, till a habit of disease is 
formed, the disease is then become chronic, 
and is much more difficult of cure. The dis- 
eased habit, if not broken through, will gradu- 
ally destroy the structure of the part ; and so 
will become structural disease. For this there 
is no cure : amputation is necessary to stop 
the spreading of the mischief ; and if the organ 
is a vital one, so that amputation is impracti- 
cable, death ensues. In the same way, acute 
disease of the reasoning powers, or delirium, 
is speedily subdued, as the bodily health re- 
turns : madness, or the chronic disorder, is 
cured in nine cases out of ten, if properly 
treated within three months after the com- 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 309 

menceraent of the attack : when of some years 
standing, it is scarcely ever cured. f 

In health, as well as in disease, man is most 
especially and remarkably the creature of 
habit. As to his mere bodily powers, we see the 
arms of the smith, and the legs of the runner, 
strengthened and enlarged by practice — they 
become fitted for their habitual employments. 
It is by habit, that the mind acquires the 
power of directing the muscular movements 
of the body ; as when the child learns to walk, 
and the rope-dancer to balance himself on the 
rope. In these cases the habit is everything : 
for the muscular movements are performed 
without any attention of mind at all. This is 
the case too with the habit of articulating. In 
childhood the utterance of each syllable re- 
quires attention and labour : when the habit 
has been formed, the syllables arrange them- 
selves without care or trouble to the speaker. 
It is but seldom, that he troubles himself about 
the choice of words: but he never thinks for 
an instant, how he is to pronounce them : this 
comes of itself, because his muscles are en- 
tirely disciplined by habit to do it. If, how- 
ever, the same man attempts to acquire a 
foreign language, he is again compelled to at- 
tend laboriously to the articulation of every 



| Prichard's Treatise on Insanity, p. 129. 



310 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

syllable. We are told by a very competent 
judge,* that a practised public speaker is ac- 
customed, not only, while he is delivering one 
sentence, to be planning that which is to follow, 
but to be looking forward to successive topics; 
paying therefore but little, if any, attention to 
what he is actually delivering. So that habit 
gives a man a power of performing, as it were 
instinctively, a most complicated process, of 
which every step must yet have been learned 
with care and labour. 

How greatly our intellectual character is de- 
pendent on Habit, is acknowledged in the care 
we take in the process of education to form the 
intellectual habits. " He would be laughed 
at, that should go about to make a fine dancer 
out of a country hedger at past fifty. And he 
will not have much better success, who shall 
endeavour at that age to make a man reason 
well, or speak handsomely, who has never 
been used to it, though you should lay before 
him a collection of all the best precepts of 
logic or oratory."! 

And as a general intellectual character is 
thus stamped upon the mind by Habit, so are 
particular opinions also engraven by it. Even 
the most abstract speculative judgments are 
thus fixed for life by early association. Hence 



* Lord Brougham. 



f Locke. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



311 



most of the opposite opinions held by men of 
different professions and parties, all equally 
believed by their respective champions to be 
indisputably true : as for example, the soldier 
holds honour to consist in bravery, while the 
merchant understands it to mean punctuality 
of payment. 

But even when we have been convinced, 
that an opinion long entertained is indeed 
erroneous, it is not all at once, that we are able 
to root out the cherished prejudice : there is 
still a hankering after the old belief ; and the 
new one can be thoroughly fixed and esta- 
blished in our confidence, only by often medi- 
tating on it, and so accustoming the mind to 
it. Some opinions can only be, as it were, 
worked into the mind by practice. The strong- 
est speculative conviction, that I am able to 
cross a chasm on a plank, or to look from a 
precipice with calmness, will vanish at the 
moment of trial, if practice has not been added 
to conviction, to strengthen and confirm it. 

The association of ideas (or the combination 
of these formed by Habit), is a law of the 
mind so extensively operating, that very acute 
writers have attempted to resolve all other laws 
into it ; and the combinations formed by it are 
at the same time so close and indissoluble, 
that many of them have baffled all attempts 
to analyse them. Some of these associations, 



312 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

formed early in life, can never be got rid of 
either by time, or by the joint influence of 
reason and subsequent habit. Such is a fear 
of ghosts and goblins in the dark. 

That our moral and practical characters are 
most strongly influenced, if not entirely mould- 
ed, by our habits, is a point so evident and so 
universally allowed, that it is needless to bring 
proofs of it : the conviction of it has passed 
into a proverb ; " Studia abeunt in mores," 
" A man's habitual pursuits end in forming his 
character." The power of conscience itself, 
by which we discern between good and evil, 
is strengthened by being practically exercised, 
and deadened by inactivity : which is what 
St. Paul seems to mean, when he speaks of 
" those, who by reason of use have their senses 
exercised to discern both good and evil."t 
Meditating and speculating about virtue, with 
a view to form our moral habits, are of no sort 
of use without the practice of it. " A man may 
improve his courage more," says Tucker, " by 
one campaign, than by any lectures he can 
receive upon fortitude, and confirm himself in 
his religion by some difficult obedience to its 
dictates better than by all the arguments or 
meditations in the world." What has been 
said of life, may be said still more aptly of 
virtue — that it is a problem, not a theorem. 



f Hebrews v. 14. 



CONSTITUTION OF 



NATURE. 



313 



Butler goes further ; " Going over the theory 
of virtue in one's thoughts," says he, " talking 
well, and drawing fine pictures of it; this is 
so far from necessarily or certainly conducing 
to form an habit of it, in him, who thus em- 
ploys himself ; that it may harden the mind in 
a contrary course, and render it gradually 
more insensible, that is, form an habit of insen- 
sibility to all moral considerations, "f 

And Butler is thus led to point out with his 
usual acuteness a remarkable difference be- 
tween our active habits and those passive im- 
pressions, which usually impel us to action ; 
viz. that the active principle constantly gains 
strength by use and exercise ; while the pas- 
sive impression is by the same process dulled 



t Analogy. Part I. Chap. V. This truth appears to me to 
set in the strongest light a glaring defect in our present national 
system of education. The moral and religious training of the 
children consists almost entirely in " going over the theory of 
virtue (and religion) in their thoughts, talking well, and 
drawing fine pictures of it." Not only is the formation of 
practical habits of virtue entirely neglected, but as soon as 
they have finished their appointed task of thus " talking 
about virtue," they are daily turned adrift to witness, and to 
follow, the grossest examples of wickedness and depravity. 
Thus does their instruction " form in them an habit of insen- 
sibility to all moral considerations," while the overpowering 
influences of practice and example combine to form in them 
habits of active vice. 

The infant schools organzied by Mr. Wilderspin form an 
exception to this remark, and afford proof of the good effects 
of an opposite system. 



314 



ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



and blunted. As for instance with benevo- 
lence : this, considered as a practical principle 
of action iti a man habitually employed in re- 
lieving the distresses of others, will continually 
acquire fresh vigour, while at the very same 
time the painful feeling of compassion, which 
sets the active principle at work, becomes at 
every repetition less sensitive and painful. 
We see daily instances of this among surgeons, 
many of whom are very benevolent men, and 
most anxious to relieve suffering; and yet they 
feel little or no repugnance to perform the 
most painful operations. 

Other examples of the same law are sup- 
plied by our Appetites, when these are allowed 
to gain the mastery over us. The epicure and 
the dram-drinker deaden the sensibility of 
their palates by every act of indulgence ; 
while yet the power of the habit, considered 
as an Active Principle, increases by the same 
repetition. It may be observed, by the way, 
that the tendencies of these laws of Habit are 
equally favourable to the cause of virtue, in 
both the above kinds of instances. Where 
the habit is virtuous, as in the case of bene- 
volence, the active pleasure of it increases by 
exercise ; while the painful feeling, which ex- 
cites it to action, is in the same way dimi- 
nished : and thus virtuous habits become their 
own reward. Where the habit is vicious, (as 
in the case of sensual indulgence,) the plea- 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



315 



sure, being solely derived from the passive 
impression, gradually palls; while the active 
habit is at the same time strengthened by 
repetition : and this habit is what afterwards 
inflicts natural punishment on the sensualist, 
severe in proportion to the degree of indul- 
gence. But the practice of temperate habits 
equally grows easier by use : and yet in this 
case, the pleasure, though flowing from the 
passive impression, remains undiminished, or 
even increases: for the temperate man relishes 
his food and drink more than the epicure and 
the drunkard. The law therefore is so consti- 
tuted, as to produce opposite effects, according 
as the habit is virtuous or vicious — rewarding 
in the one case, and punishing in the other 
— and so uniformly operates on the side of 
virtue. 

But of all our active habits it is alike true, 
that it is comparatively easy for us to mould 
them at first; that the difficulty grows with 
their growth, till they become inveterate; and 
it is at last sometimes really beyond our power 
to break through them. And accordingly it is 
a rule, almost without exception, that accord- 
ing to the habits formed in childhood and in 
youth, will be the character of the man till old 
age and death. It seems, indeed, as though 
by a long course of vicious habits, the dis- 
tinguishing characteristic of a moral being, 
Conscience itself, or his Moral Sense, may be 



316 



ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



altogether extinguished and blotted out ; that 
is to say, it may be rendered entirely in- 
sensible. 



We see, then, that the Law of Habit prevails 
most extensively in the several departments of 
Nature ; — that in mere unorganized matter, 
again in the vegetable world, still more among 
the brute creation, but most remarkably in 
man, it developes powers and capacities, which, 
as far as our experience goes, are not deve- 
loped in any other manner. More particu- 
larly we see, that this is the case in respect of 
Moral virtue. 

I. Now it has been sometimes objected to 
the whole scheme of Religion, that it is incon- 
sistent with the character of a wise and bene- 
volent God, to have placed us here, exposed to 
so many trials and miseries, if his final pur- 
pose had been merely to fit us for our future 
life, by raising us to a state of greater moral 
excellence : — that He would have placed us 
there at once, virtuous beings, without this 
long and painful course of discipline: and it 
is asked, why He should not have done so ? 
Perhaps there may be many reasons for such 
a constitution of things, which we may be in- 
competent to discover, or even to understand ; 
as there are obviously many difficulties in 
God's government even of this world, which 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 317 



we cannot solve. There may even be some- 
thing in the very nature of virtue itself, which 
makes it impossible, that it should be thus 
imparted at once in its entire fulness and 
strength to a created being : and indeed all 
our experience here favours such a supposition ; 
for virtue both consists in resisting temptation, 
and is formed by a habit of such resistance. 

But whatever be the reason, we see, that the 
fact is, that the Deity never does within our 
experience so impart it. He does raise up moral 
creatures in this world to certain degrees of 
virtue, greater or less : but wherever we have 
known such virtuous beings, this their charac- 
ter of virtue has been acquired by the forma- 
tion of habits developed and gradually strength- 
ened by their own conduct as moral agents. 
And this is a full and sufficient answer to the 
objection, that the Deity cannot be believed to 
adopt the method of forming a virtuous character 
by this slow and painful process : — He does 
actually do so. 

He imparts many powers and capacities to 
his creatures by this method of acquired habits ; 
but moral virtue He never, within our ex- 
perience, imparts, without the use of this 
method. Indeed excepting what little as- 
sistance precept and example are able to 
render, this is the sole method, by which the 
thing is done. 



318 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



2. When we consider, how great is the 
power of habit in our present state, and how 
that after long use virtuous habits become not 
only easy, but agreeable, and as it were na- 
tural ; vicious habits almost impossible to be 
got rid of; a future state of rewards and pun- 
ishments (if at least we are to exist at all here- 
after) would seem to be no more than natural. 
For, if we are to exist at all as moral beings, 
it seems far most probable, that we shall still 
have the same characters, which we carry 
with us out of this life (for our having different 
ones would imply, that characters may be 
formed otherwise than by the formation of 
habits ; which is contrary to all our experi- 
ence). And our having such, of itself implies 
a state of reward and punishment ; both be- 
cause such characters are, in proportion as 
they are confirmed by time, their own reward 
and punishment ; and because, independently 
of this, justice requires such reward and pun- 
ishment. Such a state, however, would cer- 
tainly be only a carrying on of the same 
scheme, which we experience here. 

Perhaps our trial may then be over, merely 
because our habits, whether bad or good, 
instead of being almost, will have become quite, 
inveterate. And as it is undeniable, that in 
this life virtue, as suck, produces happiness — 
vice, as such, produces misery ; so these same 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



319 



Natural Laws may then be carried out into 
their natural and complete consequences. 
Active virtue and benevolence, indefinitely 
strengthened by time and habit, and having 
their sphere indefinitely enlarged, may become 
sources of infinite gratification ; and so virtue 
become its own adequate reward : while, on 
the other hand, habits of discontent, malignity, 
and envy, fully developed in the same way, 
may be sources of infinite torment and suffer- 
ing ; and so vice become its own sufficient 
punishment. 

There seems, again, to be a particular analogy 
between our bodily diseases and those of our 
spiritual part. For, as we have seen above, f 
that it is comparatively easy, when the body 
is in health to keep it so; that a slight devia- 
tion from health is easily corrected ; that the 
difficulty increases, when disordered function 
has been thoroughly established by the habit 
of disease ; and lastly, that by a long con- 
tinuance of such habit the structure of some 
organ is destroyed ; after which no remedy 
will avail short of amputation, and if the organ 
is a vital one, death is inevitable : so in our 
moral diseases the same steps are to be traced, 
as far as we have opportunity of seeing. It is 
comparatively easy to avoid a bad moral habit : 



t P. 308. 



320 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

in proportion as any such is suffered to esta- 
blish itself, it grows difficult of cure ; by 
degrees it becomes inveterate or chronic, till 
at length the very structure of the mind is in- 
jured, and the Moral Sense itself, by which we 
discern between good and evil, is blotted out. 
Is it incredible that the analogy may hold good 
in the next step also? that, as the bodily 
disease ends in destroying the body, so may 
the moral disease lead at last to the destruc- 
tion of the moral creature ? — not to its annihi- 
lation (since we are supposing it immortal) but 
to a condition, in which inveterate habits of 
vice will have really destroyed its freedom of 
action and its powers of happiness, as well as 
its Moral Sense — all the most characteristic 
marks of a Moral being — and which may, there- 
fore, in one sense be called its destruction ? 

These analogies may also, I think, make 
us fearful of putting off the reformation of evil 
habits — still more of trusting for our safety to 
a death-bed repentance, even if we could be 
sure of having opportunity for it. Repentance 
is represented in Scripture as effecting an 
entire change of character and habits. Now 
as in the body, though a disease of long stand- 
ing is sometimes removed by a violent remedy, 
by a painful operation, or by amputation, yet 
these are at best but hazardous experiments, 
and even these are hopeless, if the disease has 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 321 

injured the structure of a vital organ : so, it 
seems, may a man's moral character be some- 
times reformed by a sudden and violent, though 
secret, process. But may not this too be a 
hazardous experiment at best? and may it not 
be alike liable to failure, whenever the disease 
has seized upon the vitals ? 

3. It has been thought by some, that the 
happiness of a future state must be alloyed 
to benevolent beings by their knowledge of 
the miseries of the wicked. An answer to 
this seems to be supplied by a consideration of 
that law of our constitution mentioned above ; 
by which, when we are habitually engaged in 
relieving the distresses of others, our painful 
feelings of compassion constantly become 
weaker, while the pleasure of actively relieving 
them gains strength : so that upon the whole 
the relief of misery affords us pleasure even 
here. We find then by experience (contrary 
certainly to what we should have expected) that 
the more benevolent a man is — that is to say, 
the more his habits of active benevolence are 
confirmed by practice — the less pain he en- 
dures from the mere sight of misery. The 
painful feelings of pity do not appear, therefore, 
to make a necessary part of active benevolence. 
Now if (as we can scarce help believing both 
from Scripture and from reason) our virtue 
shall be hereafter of an active nature, if we 

Y 



322 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

shall be employed in some way as agents in 
carrying on God's moral government ; | we 
have only to suppose, that this principle of 
our nature shall be further carried out, until 
the painful feeling of compassion at the sight 
or the knowledge of misery shall be altogether 
swallowed up in the active pleasure of relieving 
it ; and thus our happiness may be unalloyed, 
although we may be witnesses of pain and 
suffering. More especially may this be the 
case, when we shall witness no suffering, but 
what has been brought upon the sufferer in 
righteous judgment for his own conduct. 

4. We are told that the righteous shall here- 
after be separated from the wicked: and this 
is nothing else, than what we see is done in 
this world to a great degree, by the force of 
their own habits ; though they are still so far 
together, as to be in great measure cognizant 
of each other's actions and sufferings. For the 
virtuous naturally seek out each other, and 
avoid the wicked, as companions ; and the 
wicked do the same among themselves ; and 
this in proportion to the strength of their vir- 
tuous or their vicious habits. In a future state, 
therefore, when their respective characters of 
virtue and of vice shall be still further streng- 



f We are told that we "shall be as the angels in heaven ;" 
and these " are all ministering spirits." Hebrews i. 14. 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



323 



thened and developed, it seems not at all incre- 
dible, that a similar, but more entire, separation 
may be brought about by the same natural 
laws, which we see in great measure effectual 
to the same purpose here. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

That all Natural Tendencies fulfil useful Pur- 
poses, and have corresponding real Objects. 

rr^HE whole system of Nature is kept in 
JL action by those several tendencies or ap- 
petences, which have been implanted in all 
beings, organic and inorganic, by their Creator. 
Suppose these to be taken away : all physical 
Nature becomes at once a mere mass of inert 
matter, for ever at rest ; and all human action, 
as well as that of brutes, is immediately para- 
lysed. The scheme of Nature, in which we 
are placed, is thus constituted. Whether the 
whole scheme might have been other and 
wiser and better than it is, is an absurd specu- 
lation, unfit for man in his present state. But 
his faculties do enable him to consider parti- 
cular parts of this scheme, as designed to 
answer particular ends. He may examine 
these natural tendencies : and in so doing two 
observations occur in respect of them ; that 



324 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

every one fulfils some useful purpose ; and 
that every one has a real corresponding object 
in Nature. 

I. The tendencies of mere matter, or those 
qualities by virtue of which different portions 
of it tend towards each other, are commonly 
called Attraction. Attraction is of two kinds; 
that which acts at sensible distances, as that 
of Gravitation, of Magnetism, of Electricity ; 
and that which acts at insensible distances, as 
Chemical and Capillary Attraction, that of 
Cohesion, and all those peculiar to organized 
beings. Some of these properties, as that of 
Gravitation, preserve the great system of the 
universe itself, and pervade every particle of 
matter contained in it : and all act their parts 
in making the world we live in what it is — 
parts so important, that without them we 
should be incapable of action; our very bodies 
would fall to pieces. They fulfil useful pur- 
poses, then, in the actual scheme of Nature : 
nor can any man say, how extensive, or how 
disastrous might be the consequences, if any 
one of them were annihilated ; because no 
man knows one thousandth part of the pur- 
poses which they fulfil. 

That these several attractions have corres- 
ponding objects in Nature, requires no proof : 
for we infer the existence of the attractions, 
only from seeing them called into action by 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



325 



their respective objects. We never should have 
known, that magnetic attraction existed, if its 
object, iron, had not also existed. No man, 
however, supposes, that other unknown at- 
tractions exist, which never have been, and 
never can be, called into action for want of 
appropriate objects : for this would be to sup- 
pose, that the Deity creates what is altogether 
useless. 

2. Vegetables exhibit tendencies so obvi- 
ously adapted for useful ends in their economy, 
that Botanists have given them the name of 
Instincts, as being analogous to that principle 
among animals. In whatever position the 
seed is placed, the radicle, or future root, will 
strike downwards ; the plumelet, or future 
stem, will as certainly tend towards the sur- 
face. When raised above the surface, it will 
incline towards the light ; and if surrounded 
by other plants, will become drawn by striving 
after air and light above : the leaves will turn 
their upper surfaces in the same direction — 
these things being necessary to the health of 
the plant. The fibres of the root will travel 
many feet in a direction where nourishment is 
to be found. Of these tendencies, too, the 
correlative objects must exist, as we could not 
otherwise have discovered the tendencies. 

3. When a particle of matter has been taken 
into an animal or vegetable system, the chem- 



326 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

ical laws, by which it has hitherto been bound, 
are in great part suspended : it becomes obe- 
dient to a new code, the laws of Physiology, 
and is endowed with a new set of tendencies, 
all adapted to the support of life, and all find- 
ing objects whereon to act. 

4. Instinct leads different animals to seek 
different kinds of food ; some choosing animal 
food, some vegetable, some a mixture of both. 
And these instincts are clearly adapted to 
promote their welfare ; for their teeth, their 
stomachs, their gastric juice, their whole struc- 
ture, are adapted for the same food to which 
their instinct leads them. A sheep, formed for 
eating grass, shews no desire for flesh, nor a 
lion for grass ; and flesh and grass are provided 
for each. The instinct, by which a sparrow 
builds her nest, was manifestly intended to 
provide a place wherein to lay her eggs. Ani- 
mals in general shew an attachment to their 
young ; and their young in all such cases come 
into the world weak and needing their protec- 
tion : but the young of some kinds, as of most 
fishes, are able from the first to provide for 
themselves ; and the parents of these shew no 
such attachment ; it would be useless. Birds 
have an instinct directing them to fly, and they 
have wings to fly with. Nor can it be said, 
that tne mechanical structure adapted for 
flight, is what prompts them to fly ; for the 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. o'27 

young bird makes many attempts to fly, long 
before the mechanism is ready for the purpose. 

No man doubts, that all these instincts are 
given for certain ends and uses — so far from it, 
that whenever the use of any one is unknown, 
the naturalist immediately sets himself to find 
it out. 

5. The natural tendencies or propensities of 
the human mind have been divided by ethical 
writers, into Appetites, Desires, Affections, Self- 
Love, Resentment, and a Moral Principle.^ 

The Appetites are three, hunger, thirst, and 
that of sex. It requires no proof, that each of 
these fulfils a useful purpose in our consti- 
tution. 

The Desires are those of knowledge, of 
society, of esteem, of power, of action. With 
regard to the two first, if knowledge and 
society are themselves useful to mankind (and 
this will not be denied) then of course the 
desires, which prompt us to seek these, are 
useful, as means of attaining those ends. A 
desire of esteem induces those, who are de- 
ficient in a higher principle of action, to 
render themselves estimable in the eyes of their 
fellow men ; that is, it induces them to a line 
of conduct coincident with virtue and with the 



t Whether this classification be a perfect one or not, is of no 
consequence to the argument, provided only what is asserted 
of the propensities named is founded in fact. 



328 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

interests of society. More than this, by in- 
ducing the formation of virtuous habits, and 
deterring from vicious ones, it does its part 
towards forming a really virtuous character. 
The desire of power (besides prompting us to 
action in other ways too numerous to mention) 
is a principal ingredient in ambition and in 
the desire of wealth. The former supplies the 
world with statesmen, orators, and men distin- 
guished in every class : the latter is what 
chiefly keeps the whole body of society in 
activity. The desire of action tends to keep 
both our minds and bodies in health and 
vigour, by inciting us to duly exercise them. 

These desires, especially those of power 
and of wealth, are indeed sometimes carried to 
an excess, that is injurious both to the indivi- 
dual and to society. But this happens only in 
comparatively few instances, as we may know 
from their being made so much the subject of 
remark, when they occur. Their influence on 
the mass of mankind is manifestly useful by 
rousing them to constant exertion. 

The Affections are both benevolent and ma- 
levolent. As to the former, including friend- 
ship, patriotism, compassion, love of kindred, 
and of mankind at large, they are of the most 
obvious uses. But even the malevolent affec- 
tion of resentment performs a most important 
and useful office (its only proper one) that of 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



329 



repelling and avenging violence and injustice 
and vice of every kind.| 

Self-love, or a regard to our own real inte- 
rest, is equally useful to the individual and to 
society ; to the individual in the first instance, 
and through him to society, because the true 
interests of both are ultimately the same, and 
in the common course of things a man cannot 
effectually secure his own interest, without at 
the same time promoting that of the public. 

The Moral Principle, which prompts us to 
do right, and to abstain from wrong, needs no 
comment for the purpose of showing its utility. 

These various natural tendencies of mind 
are termed by moralists our Active principles, 
as supplying us with instinctive principles of 
action — in itself a sufficient proof that they are 
held to perform a most important part in our 
constitution — that of inciting us to action. 
With regard to all of them, likewise, no proof 
seems to be required, that the proper object of 
each exists in nature ; since they are entirely 
occupied in striving after these, and could not 
do so, if the several objects were not really 
presented to the mind. 

One remarkable propensity in the intellec- 
tual part of our constitution, that which leads 
us to expect that the course of Nature will 



f See Butler's Sermon on Resentment. 



330 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

continue to be uniform, may be mentioned. 
We could neither reason nor act without this 
conviction ; though we are able to give no ac- 
count of it, further than that it exists in us. 
But it has its corresponding object : for such 
an Uniformity of Nature is an actual fact in 
accordance with this conviction. 



As far as we see, then, Nature never im- 
plants a tendency or propensity, whether in 
unorganized matter, or in the vegetable or the 
animal world, except for some useful end, nor 
without also supplying a real object to corres- 
pond with the tendency. 

Now mankind in general manifestly have 
a natural propensity to believe in some su- 
perior Being, and to expect a future life and 
a future state of retribution ; — that is to say, 
to believe in the great leading doctrine of 
Religion. Such a belief has existed in all 
times and countries. It was universal among 
the Egyptians, Brahmins, Indians, Thracians, 
Druids, Greeks, and Romans ; among civilized, 
as well as barbarous nations. " We are con- 
firmed," says Cicero, " in the opinion of the 
soul's immortality, by the unanimous consent 
of all nations."! And the accounts of modern 



f " Pennanere animus aibitramur consensu nationum omnium.' 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



331 



voyagers and travellers show, that the same is 
the case now : Robertson, who had examined 
the accounts of all the native American tribes> 
thus expresses his conviction on this subject: 

"This sentiment is universal, and may be 

deemed natural We can trace this opinion 

from one extremity of America to the other : 
in some regions more faint and obscure, in 
others more perfectly developed, but nowhere 
unknown, 

Nor, if any real exception can be found, 
(which is very doubtful) would this prove that 
a sense of Religion is not natural to man. The 
most populous nation upon earth, are in the 
daily practice of putting their infant children 
to death : but no man will therefore assert, 
that parental affection is not a natural feeling. J 
So too, " we know, and it is our pride to know, 
that man is by his constitution a religious 
animal, and that Atheism is against not only 
our reason, but our instincts, and that it cannot 
continue long."§ The mind of man may in- 
deed be said to require spiritual things for 
food and drink, just as the body requires ma- 
terial things for similar purposes. " Look 

f Book IV. chap. vii. 

X " Major enim pars eo fere deferri solet, quo a Natura de- 
ducitur." " Mankind in general, are accustomed to follow, 
where Nature leads." Cic. de Ofiic. 1. 41. 

§ Burke. 



332 



ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 



out," says Hume himself, " for a people en- 
tirely destitute of religion : " if you find them 
at all, be assured that they are but few degrees 
removed from brutes." 

Nor is the scepticism of a few speculative 
men any proof, that a sense of religion is not 
natural to man ; as Hume himself seems from 
the above words to have been convinced. 
Berkeley persuaded himself, that the external 
world had no existence : yet a belief in it is 
surely natural to us ; few men can even con- 
ceive it possible to disbelieve in it. 

We may then, I think, assert without hesi- 
tation, that man has by nature a religious in- 
stinct — a hope of future reward and a dread of 
future punishment, according to his conduct 
here. May we not also feel assured, that this 
instinct was given him to fulfil a purpose — the 
obvious purpose of directing him to attain that 
reward, to avoid that punishment? It is allowed 
to be good reasoning to argue from man's love 
of activity, that he was intended by his Creator 
to be an active being. Why is not a similar 
mode of reasoning equally good in the present 
case? We can scarcely, indeed, conceive a 
belief universally implanted in us, only to 
be thwarted and disappointed. We cannot 
imagine our instinctive persuasion of the uni- 
formity of Nature, to be met by nothing but 
irregularities and anomalies on her part ; be- 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 333 

cause such a constitution of things would be 
contrary to all analogous cases, wherein we 
find every instinct to have its appropriate ob- 
ject ; and equally contrary to the character of 
a benevolent and consistent Creator. Perhaps 
the sceptic may say, that the instinct answers 
the purpose of inciting us to virtuous conduct 
equally well, although it may be a fallacious 
one. If this supposition be true, the Deity 
must, of course, have intended the real truth 
never to be discovered by man : and yet this 
sceptic supposes, that he has discovered it not- 
withstanding ! 

In arguing, both that the instinct is useful 
to us, and that it must have a real correspond- 
ing object in Nature — that is to say, that there 
really will be a future state of retribution ; we 
do no more than argue, as we are allowed to 
argue in all other departments of knowledge. 
In geological researches much more is inferred, 
than in the present case.t The geologist finds 
the jaw-bone of an unknown animal, armed 
with teeth adapted for seizing living prey : he 
infers from the Analogy of Nature, first, that 
the whole structure of the animal must have 
been equally suited for seizing prey ; secondly, 
that it had an instinct prompting it to do so ; 
thirdly, that other animals existed, fitted to 



t Page 16. 



334 ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 

become its prey. This argument proceeds on 
the assumption, that the Deity never can be 
supposed to give an instinct, either without a 
purpose, or without its correlative object. And 
does any man doubt the justice of the assump- 
tion, or of the argument? The whole Science 
of Comparative Anatomy is, indeed, founded 
on similar arguments from the structure to the 
instincts, and back again from the instincts to 
the structure. No naturalist ever for a moment 
supposes, that brutes have instincts, which 
never meet with their proper objects, and 
which are therefore never once called into 
action during their whole lives. There are 
some direct proofs, that such is not the case. 
The young of some animals are capable of 
providing for themselves ; and we know, that all 
such animals want the otherwise universal love 
of offspring; for in this case the instinct would 
be apparent, if it really existed. Most zoo- 
phytes are without sensations, as is proved by 
their being without a nervous system : now it 
is clear, that the sensation of hunger for in- 
stance, would be not only useless, but merely 
a source of pain, to an animal, which is fixed 
to a spot, and can do nothing to satisfy such 
an appetite. And just so the religious instinct 
of man, in that unnatural state where it is 
thwarted by sceptical doubts, does become to 
him a source of actual pain : for religious be- 



CONSTITUTION OF NATURE. 



335 



lief is the satisfaction and fulfilment of a spiri- 
tual want : scepticism is a state of uneasiness, 
discontent and privation. 

If the religious instinct of man is an excep- 
tion to this general law of Nature, if it is really 
doomed never to be satisfied, we must so far 
envy the unreasoning brutes. They have no 
such longing after a better state ; their desires 
are occupied in the pursuit of their sensual 
enjoyments, and are all gratified by the bounty 
of their Creator; while our most cherished 
hopes and longings are so cherished only to 
be blasted and disappointed. Is it credible, 
that the fact should be so ? 

Again, that such a hope is nothing but a 
vain phantom, it will be still harder to think, 
when we consider, that it is a hope, which in 
all ages of the world has been peculiarly 
cherished by the wisest and the best among 
mankind. That this is the case, has also been 
observed by Cicero : "A certain presentiment of 
a future life," says he, " is for some reason in- 
herent in the mind of man, and its existence 
and manifestations are most remarkable, where 
the abilities and depth of thought are great- 
est."! There seems too to be an instinctive 



f " Nescio quomodo inhasret in mentibus quasi saeculorum 
quoddam augurium futurorum : idque in maximis ingeniis 
altissimisque animis et existit maxime et appaiet facillime." 



336 



ACCORDANCE OF RELIGION. 



feeling in the human breast, that there is 
something morally wrong in unbelief: we are 
content to pity, or to ridicule, fanaticism and 
superstition ; these believe more than we our- 
selves : but we grow angry with the man, who 
believes less. Men have almost always been 
persecuted for denying some article of faith — 
for substracting something from an established 
creed, not for superadding to it. 

Addison has called the passions, the breezes 
of human life. May we not properly consider 
our instinctive desire of a future life, as the 
breeze, which wafts us into port ? 



CONCLUSION. 



337 



CONCLUSION. 

T THINK it must be allowed, that we have 
seen in the preceding pages a very striking 
series of Analogies (to say the least of them) 
traced between Religion, Natural and Re- 
vealed, including its evidences, and the system 
of Nature. These several analogies have been 
there considered as so many several and sepa- 
rate arguments, applicable to particular doc- 
trines and evidences ; and they have been most 
of them urged only as answers to sceptical 
objections. How far the Analogies have been 
accurately and justly drawn, it is for the reader 
to determine : but as far as they are accurate 
and just, they afford an answer to these objec- 
tions, which admits of no rejoinder ; unless, 
indeed, it can be proved to be absurd to sup- 
pose, that the Deity governs the Universe on 
one uniform and consistent plan. As far as 
they are accurate and just, they show directly 
and positively, both that the great doctrines of 
Religion involve in them nothing in itself 
absurd or incredible, and that its evidences 
are sufficient in kind to prove such things. 

z 



338 



CONCLUSION. 



Whether the actual evidence for Christianity 
be sufficient in degree, is matter of historical 
and critical discussion. 

But each of these Analogies, when viewed 
in the above light, affords an argument equally 
good, when taken alone and independently of 
the rest, as when combined with these — an 
argument against particular objections. If, 
however, we should attempt to push any such 
single argument further, and to turn it into a 
positive proof of Religion ; such a proof will 
be manifestly weak. I cannot, however, but 
think, that this is no longer the case, when 
all these Analogies are considered in combina- 
tion—that the cumulative proof, which they 
afford, is in a high degree convincing. 

There is indeed scarcely a single doctrine 
of Religion, against which objections have not 
been, at some time or other, started. Now 
these very objections, provided they have been 
satisfactorily answered, are really so many argu- 
ments on the side of Religion. The objections 
can be only of two kinds ; such as are likely 
to occur to men of common sense, though 
illiterate, and such as would occur only to the 
educated and the acute. Supposing them to 
be of the former kind, then they would be 
• likely to have occurred both to those who first 
forged the dogmas of Religion, and to those 
on whom they were imposed : and so far they 



CONCLUSION. 



339 



render it less likely, that any set of men would 
have made the attempt, or that, if made, it 
would have been successful ; , which it was. 
Supposing on the other hand the objections 
to be such as would occur only to the acute 
and the learned ; then we may conclude (if 
they have been satisfactorily answered) that 
no really unanswerable ones can be made ; 
since men of undoubted learning and ability 
have in so many ages vainly laboured to esta- 
blish any. 

Let us, however, suppose for an instant, that 
Religion, natural and revealed, is a fiction. It 
must then have been the fiction of men com- 
paratively rude and ignorant : for natural Re- 
ligion in some form or other is on all hands 
allowed to have existed from very early times 
and amongst the rudest nations ; and Chris- 
tianity was undeniably introduced into the 
world by uneducated men in the lowest ranks 
of life. And yet each of them turns out to be 
in the most exact and perfect accordance with 
the constitution of Nature. Of this wonderful 
accordance systematically considered, the men 
who promulgated Christianity, were assuredly 
ignorant; as we may be certain from their 
station in life, their country, and the age in 
which they lived : for many of the facts, by 
which the accordance is proved, have been 
brought to light by modern philosophy and 



340 



CONCLUSION. 



science. We must therefore conclude, that bar- 
barians in the case of Natural Religion, and 
Jewish fishermen in the case of Christianity, hit 
by pure accident upon so many doctrines thus 
wonderfully agreeing with that constitution of 
Nature, which was in fact unknown to them, 
and to the age in which they lived. Is this 
credible ? 

But such a coincidence implies what is be- 
yond comparison still more improbable than 
this. The scheme of Nature is an uniform and 
consistent one,f containing an infinite number 
of phaenomena. Religion is also a scheme, 
but containing a much smaller number of 
parts. Now the chances are almost infinitely 
less, that men should forge a scheme analogous, 
both in its general plan and in all its separate 
parts, with another scheme, without any con- 
sideration or knowledge of the pre-existing 
scheme ; than that they should merely invent 
certain unconnected doctrines, having an acci- 
dental agreement with particular parts of the 
unknown prototype — the prototype too being 
planned and ordered by a Being of perfect 
wisdom ; the antitype being framed by rude 
and ignorant men. Just as it would not be 
beyond the limits of credibility, that a traveller 
might find in a newly-discovered country some 



f See Part I. 



CONCLUSION. 



341 



particular laws resembling those of Britain ; 
but that he should find a whole constitution 
systematically made out, agreeing both in its 
general principles and in all its details with 
our own, and yet framed without any know- 
ledge of ours ; this would be quite incredible. 
And yet, in this case, both systems are sup- 
posed to be framed by beings of equal powers 
and similar wants, which might seem therefore 
likely to lead them more or less in the same 
path of invention. Such agreement would 
nevertheless be incredible. But in the case of 
so exact a resemblance between the scheme of 
Nature, and Religion supposed to be false, the 
prototype has been planned by a Being of per- 
fect wisdom, the antitype is supposed to be 
the work of rude and ignorant men. This 
surely puts the supposition of forgery beyond 
the limits of credibility. 

The several points of resemblance between 
the two schemes have been stated at large in 
the preceding treatise: but as the different 
religious doctrines have there been necessa- 
rily scattered and disjointed from each other, 
it may be as well here to take a brief review 
of them in a more connected manner; that 
the reader may see, from such a connected 
view, that all the great doctrines of Religion, 
(omitting entirely the many minor points 
which have equally been confirmed,) do in 



M2 



CONCLUSION. 



reality find their counterparts in the scheme of 
Nature. 

1. To begin therefore with Natural Religion. 
The foundation of this is the belief of a God. 
Now we have seen above, that we are abso- 
lutely compelled by the constitution of our 
minds, whether we will or no, to believe, that 
every event, the smallest as well as the great- 
est, is produced by some cause* — to believe, 
that every chain of second causes, however 
long, must ultimately merge in the agency of 
Mindf — and to believe, that Design in the 
effect must proceed from a. Designing Cause. £ 
But if we must believe thus, in respect of the 
most insignificant things that fall under our 
notice — much more must we believe so, when 
we contemplate all the wonderful mechanism 
and phaenomena of Nature. Now to say this, 
what is it, but to say, that we believe in a 
God, who created the Universe? 

Again, we are instructed by the records of 
Nature, that the Creator of the Universe has 
not (as some have supposed) delegated the 
government of it to a system of general laws, 
thenceforth dismissing all care about it him- 
self: for He has manifestly, from time to time, 
interposed with His Almighty power for the 
purpose of working certain changes in it : "§ 



* P. 37. f P. 43. X P. 49. § P. 298. 



CONCLUSION. 



343 



whence it is a just inference, that He is con- 
stantly watching and presiding over it : * that 
nevertheless, though He has wrought changes, 
those changes themselves,! as well as the most 
distant parts of the Universe, J demonstrate 
both His Creation and His Government to be 
in their general principles uniform and of a 
piece ; and that for this, as well as for many 
other reasons, there can be no absurdity in 
the supposition, that any unknown parts of 
this same Creation and system of Government 
may equally be constituted on the same uni- 
form principles. § 

We also see, that His Government and 
superintendence are not confined to Material 
Nature (indeed the Material and Moral worlds 
are so intimately mixed up together, || that such 
could not possibly be the case) ; that He ex- 
ercises a Moral Government over His Moral 
creatures, for that He governs them by a 
system of rewards and punishments allotted 
to virtue and to vice, that is to say, by a just 
and righteous Government:^ we find, that the 
constitution of our minds again compels us to 
acknowledge such an allotment to be just and 
righteous ; ** that, being free creatures, we 
sometimes obey and sometimes transgress the 



* P. 303. f P. 283, 284. \ P. 14, 18, 23. 
| P. 25. || P. 19. 1T P. 150. ** P. 158. 



344 



CONCLUSION. 



laws of this Government,* and that we bring 
happiness and misery on ourselves accord- 
ingly;! especially that our happiness is af- 
fected by the formation of our own characters 
and habits \ — in particular according as these 
are virtuous or vicious § — such characters 
being formed, as far as our experience goes, 
almost entirely by habitually acting and by 
suffering. || From all this it is clear, that we 
are dependent for our happiness or misery on 
the constitution He has given us, on the laws 
He has imposed upon us, and on the use, which 
we shall make of these : that is to say, that 
we are creatures dependent upon Him, our 
Maker, under a righteous and retributive sys- 
tem of Government. 

Now all these things are plainly the very 
counterparts of the great doctrines, which 
Religion inculcates as to the Moral Government 
and superintendence of the Deity, as to His 
rewarding and punishing us hereafter for our 
past conduct and according to our habits and 
characters of virtue and of vice, those charac- 
ters being formed almost entirely by our own 
actions and sufferings. 

But it is also a part of our nature here to 
regard with a reverential affection and esteem 
characters endowed with wisdom, justice, and 



* P. 154. f P- 175. X P. 169. 

§ P. 176. || P. 312. 



CONCLUSION. 



345 



benevolence,* even when these are mingled 
and alloyed with many human frailties. We 
are not merely prone to do this by our nature ; 
but we cannot help acknowledging, that it is 
also our duty to do it, or avoid reproaching 
ourselves,t when we fail in it. And in the 
case of one of this character to whom we are 
known, we have also a desire of gaining his 
goodwill and approbation, as being both agree- 
able and honourable to us.| But if the same 
person is also powerful — powerful to make us 
happy or miserable, (still more if he has ac- 
tually conferred benefits upon us,) these feel- 
ings towards him are increased by such a sense 
of our dependence on him. We also find by 
experience, that the favour of such an one 
may often be secured, and benefits obtained, § 
and punishment averted, || at his hands by 
deference and submission, and particularly by 
entreaty, on our parts. 

We are required by Religion to entertain 
similar feelings, and to pursue a similar line of 
conduct, towards one of a similar character — 
the Deity : only since He is perfectly wise, 
just, benevolent, and powerful, and since we 
are entirely dependent upon Him, we are 
therefore required to carry out these feelings 
and this behaviour to their utmost possible 



* P. 112. f P. 113. % P. 114. 

% P. 218. || P. 207. 



346 



CONCLUSION. 



extent, in respect to Him ; to be entirely sub- 
missive and devoted to Him ; to do our utmost 
to gain His approbation and goodwill ; and to 
pray to Him for what He is able either to give 
or to withhold. Is there any thing in this, that 
need seem new or surprising to us? 

But all this goes upon the supposition, that 
we are to exist in another and a better state 
hereafter: and in this, two things, again, are 
implied — that our minds, that is, we ourselves, 
are in their nature capable of existing in a 
state separate and independent of our present 
bodies, (for our present bodies are manifestly 
destroyed by death) — and that that state will 
be a higher and a better one. Now with re- 
gard to the first point, there are many reasons 
leading us to think, that the mind is not neces- 
sarily connected with our present bodies; and 
this equally, whether we consider the mind as 
a separate substance, or as a quality added 
by the Deity to our bodily structure.* And 
actual experience again shows us, that beings, 
even though they are to all appearance en- 
tirely dependent for their existence on certain 
systems of matter, can nevertheless exist quite 
independently of such systems. f For we see 
daily instances in the young of all animals, 
both human and brute, being for a time thus 



* P. 55. 



t P. 67. 



CONCLUSION. 



347 



apparently dependent, and yet afterwards ex- 
isting independently and alone. And as to 
the second point, of our being advanced to a 
higher and a better state, this is no more than 
one addition to the numberless instances of 
that principle of progression, in virtue of 
which various beings, especially living crea- 
tures, are actually advanced from lower to 
higher states;* and which we see prevailing 
throughout the whole system of Nature phy- 
sical and moral. 

These are the great truths, that constitute 
Natural Religion; and they are truths, which 
no man can with entire confidence and calm- 
ness reject; I think I may say, which he can 
refuse to believe without doing violence to his 
nature, because (to repeat again the words of 
Burke,) " we know, and it is our pride to 
know, that man is by his constitution a re- 
ligious animal." And this is to most plain 
men itself a proof, that Religion is true)" 

2. Let us next take the same brief, but 
connected, view of the principal doctrines 
peculiar to Revelation ; and see whether these 
equally find their counterparts in the consti- 
tution of natural things. 

The chief of these is the doctrine of a 
Mediator, and the Atonement made by Him. 



* P. 279. f P. 330. 



348 



CONCLUSION. 



Now to view the thing first in the most ge- 
neral light — there is no one thing, great or 
little, in the natural world, as far as our know- 
ledge of it reaches, that is not brought about 
by the intervention of some appointed means;* 
there is no single instance, on which we can 
lay our finger, and say, " This is effected 
directly and immediately by the Will of the 
Deity, without the intervention of any second 
cause." (And these natural means too we are 
very apt to think both circuitous^, and inade- 
quate to the end in view,| and most unfit for 
Almighty Wisdom to make use of.§) But more 
particularly we see, that our own happiness and 
misery here are always thus brought about by 
second causes|| — that they are continually both 
prevented and promoted by actions of our fel- 
low-creatures % — but most particularly to the 
present case, that, when misery and ruin are 
impending over us, these are often averted by 
the intervention and mediation of others, when 
all other help has failed us.** When we have 
committed offences, either against ourselves, 
or against our fellows, by transgressing any 
Natural Law, we are often released from the 
natural penalties attached to such offences, 
(that is to say, from sufferings inflicted, either 



* P. 243. + P. 248. % P. 252. § P. 256. 
|| P. 244. f P. 202. ** P. 209. 



CONCLUSION. 



349 



by human resentment or by natural evils, in 
the way of natural consequence,) we are often 
released from these penalties by the voluntary 
atonement of others:* and however difficult it 
may be to justify such things on any consider- 
ations of reason, still not only does the thing 
actually so happen in the ordinary course of 
Nature ; but men themselves recognize the 
principle of vicarious atonement, by delibe- 
rately acting upon it, in respect both of sin 
against the Deity f and of offences against 
each other; and that notwithstanding its ap- 
parent insufficiency upon due consideration to 
give any real satisfaction. | 

Then there are in Revealed Religion cer- 
tain arbitrary appointments, or what seem so 
to our ignorance ; such as Baptism and the 
Eucharist ; our obedience to, and compliance 
with, which are represented to be important to 
our welfare. Now of this, again, we see the 
counterparts in the course of Nature; where 
human happiness is continually mixed up with, 
and dependent on, all sorts of institutions and 
ceremonies, most numerous, quite arbitrary in 
their continued use, if not in their origin, and 
apparently often most absurd, frivolous, and 
vexatious. § 

There are also in Revealed Religion myste- 

* P. 211. f P. 212. t P. 211. § P. 194. 



350 



CONCLUSION. 



ries, that is, things beyond our comprehension 
as to their manner of being. But all Nature 
is full of things in the same sense mysterious : 
nay, there is not a single fact or truth in 
the whole circle of either Physical or Moral 
Science, which does not contain, or run up 
into, some mystery — that is, into something 
quite beyond our comprehension — but which 
is, notwithstanding, an indisputable truth and 
reality.* 

Again, God's religious government of the 
world is represented by Revelation to be a 
Progressive Scheme — that is to say, a scheme 
leading to a more perfect order of things — a 
scheme slowly developed through a succes- 
sion of ages, and still carrying on ; begun, as 
far as we are more immediately concerned, at 
the creation of Adam ; advanced by successive 
Dispensations, as well as by the moral govern- 
ment of mankind ; to be more fully developed 
at the final judgment; and to be afterwards 
continued through periods and by methods 
unknown to us. Now His methods both of 
physical and moral government, as exhibited in 
Nature, are manifestly each of them a scheme ;t 
and each of these schemes is also progressive — 
progressive both in its separate parts and taken 
as a whole. But the discoveries of Geology 

w — ■ — 

* P. 130. f P- 5. 



CONCLUSION. 



351 



likewise prove to us, that the actual system of 
Nature, especially of organized and animated 
Nature, in which we are placed, is but a 
small part of one great Progressive Scheme, 
begun more ages ago than we can calculate, 
developed slowly but uniformly, and still carry- 
ing on towards completion.* 

And this would by itself be a strong proof 
from Analogy, that the moral government of 
the world must probably be also a Progressive 
Scheme, equally extending through a long- 
period of time. But besides this, the two are 
so intimately bound up and connected to- 
gether, that this too can scarcely permit us 
to doubt, that, if the physical scheme extends 
through countless ages, the moral cannot be 
confined merely to what is now passing before 
our eyes. We cannot indeed avoid supposing, 
that the material scheme must have been 
formed chiefly in subservience, or with a 
view, to the moral scheme — that it was pre- 
paratory to it : now we cannot reasonably con- 
clude, that the preparations for a scheme 
should have occupied an infinite series of 
ages, and have been developed by many suc- 
cessive steps and progressive degrees ; while 
the scheme itself fills a space as nothing in 
comparison, and consists only of a single step — 



* P. 283, 284, 286. 



352 



CONCLUSION. 



the abode of man in his present condition 
here. 

All this then can scarcely permit us to doubt, 
that, as all present things are connected with, 
and have sprung out of, what went before many 
ages ago; so they are equally related, and will 
lead, to future and distant parts of the same 
scheme. And if that scheme be uniform and 
of a piece, then it must also be a progressive 
one : and if so, it will not be contrary to the 
Analogy of Nature, but every way consistent 
with it, if we, who as moral creatures are in- 
cluded in the moral scheme, shall partake of 
this progression ; and accordingly shall here- 
after be raised to a higher rank of being and 
a better state; as we see happens to many 
creatures on this earth. 

In the next place, God's several Religious 
Dispensations to mankind are asserted to have 
been introduced by miracles. Now it is matter 
of fact, that the several Physical Dispensations 
of the world, made known to us by Geology, 
were each of them so introduced by a mira- 
culous interposition ; * and it cannot therefore 
be thought improbable, that the Religious Dis- 
pensations (since the material world must, to 
our apprehension, have been created chiefly 
with a view to the moral) that the Religious 

* P. 298. 



CONCLUSION. 



353 



Dispensations should have been thought wor- 
thy of a similar interposition at their several 
introductions. 

Thus are all the great doctrines, both of 
Natural and Revealed Religion in accordance 
with natural things, which we see before us ; 
and of whose truth and reality we cannot pos- 
sibly doubt. It is difficult surely to believe, 
that coincidences so many and so exact have 
been purely the result of accident : but this 
must be believed, if Natural Religion has ori- 
ginated in the superstitious fancies of barba- 
rous nations, and Christianity in the zeal or 
fraud of Jewish fishermen. For both were 
clearly ignorant of this accordance ; which the 
progress of knowledge has alone made mani- 
fest. It was not indeed till after the lapse of 
seventeen hundred years from the publication 
of Christianity, that it was first distinctly seen 
by Bishop Butler. If Religion, therefore, be 
the invention of man, its accordance with 
Nature is purely accidental. Surely, how- 
ever, the truth of it, as mere matter of proba- 
bility, estimated only from its intrinsic nature 
and evidence, and setting aside all its external 
proofs, is far more credible than such incre- 
dible coincidences. 

But Christianity does also appeal for the 
truth of her statements to the positive evi- 
dence of testimony. And what does the con- 

A A 



354 



CONCLUSION. 



stitution of the world we live in, teach us with 
regard to the weight and value of this species 
of evidence 1 Why that it is, and is univer- 
sally admitted to be, sufficient to establish as 
scientific truth, facts of the very kind rejected 
by sceptics in Religion as incredible, viz. 
special interpositions of the Deity* — that 
these facts are admitted so unhesitatingly and 
so universally, that no man has ever even 
thought of refusing to believe them, on the 
ground that they were incapable of proof by 
this kind of evidence — and that, if any man 
should do so, he would be universally con- 
sidered as blinded by prejudice, and unfit to 
be reasoned with.f 

But again we experience in daily life, that 
our happiness and misery, our safety and de- 
struction, are continually made to depend on 
our belief of truth resting on evidence, or our 
rejection of it;| that in these cases the evi- 
dence is often of the very same kind as that 
of Religion ; sometimes the evidence of reason, 
sometimes that of testimony ; that it is often 
even much weaker in degree : and yet we find 
by experience that, if we believe and act upon 
such evidence, we secure our safety and our 
happiness; if we reject it, we incur punish- 
ment and ruin. 



* P. 121. f P. 123. I P. 192. 



CONCLUSION. 



355 



Therefore we can have no reasonable as- 
surance or security, that those of our interests 
concerned in the question of Religion (our 
everlasting happiness and our ruin) do not 
depend upon our believing and acting on the 
evidence before us, in the same way. 



FINIS. 



C VVhittinghani, Tooks Court, Chancery Lane. 



ft £ 

I 



